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ABSTRACT
Women Are Like Silk and Men Are Like Gold:
A Cross-country Comparison of Institutional Responses to Honor Violence
By
Alana M. Henninger
Advisor: Dr. Michael Maxfield
Over the past decade, a specific form of interpersonal violence known as honor violence
has drawn international attention because it has been increasingly reported in immigrant
communities in western countries. There are currently no specific institutional responses to
honor violence in the United States, but the growing media coverage of honor-related crimes has
led interest groups to call for new legislation and institutional responses specific to honor
violence. The global debate on the codification of honor violence hinges on the discussion of
whether honor violence is a cultural crime that deserves special consideration, or whether such
codification encourages discriminatory responses to specific ethnic groups.
This dissertation research is a cross-country comparison of institutional responses to
honor violence in Turkey and England. This research first explores how institutional responders
socially construct honor and honor violence, because these constructions provide the framework
for individual, organizational, and institutional responses. Next, this research examines the
differences in, and challenges to, two different models of providing criminal justice and social
service responses to honor violence. ‘Othering’ provides the theoretical framework for then
examining whether discriminatory responses based on culture, religion, and ethnicity are
occurring in each model.
A comparative case study method with 60-90 minute interviews and vignettes was used
to examine criminal justice and social service institutional responses to honor violence in each
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country. 74 key stakeholders were interviewed based on their knowledge of, and experience with,
honor violence. Vignettes describing a case of honor violence that is common to each country
were administered during each interview to assess whether othering is occurring among
institutional responders. Using qualitative content analysis, the results show that othering appears
to be occurring at the governmental level in both Turkey and the UK, which responders argued is
part of nationalist agendas. I argue that this othering then has an effect on institutional responses,
which is apparent in conservative othering among Turkish police officers and liberal othering
among British police officers. Social service/NGO responders in each country tended to not only
avoid engaging in othering, but actually discussed forms of othering in various institutional
responses. This research responds to and informs the arguments for and against codifying honor
violence, and discusses the broader implications of responses that address violence against
women yet respect religious norms and customs. Recommendations are made for best practices
and frameworks for policymakers and law enforcement to address honor violence in the U.S.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Gender-based violence is a global problem that attracts a great deal of attention from
researchers, policymakers, and the media. In August 2012, President Barack Obama issued an
executive order calling for a multi-year strategy for the prevention of, and response to, genderbased violence at the international level. The President defines gender-based violence as a
national security, public health, and economic issue that should be the focus of foreign policy.
He argues that the empowerment of women is “critical to building stable, democratic societies;
to supporting open and accountable governance; to furthering international peace and security; to
growing vibrant market economies; and to addressing pressing health and education challenges”
(Obama, 2012, p. 1). This order calls for data collection on gender-based violence, as well as the
identification of best practices across agencies.
Over the past decade, a specific form of gender-based violence known as honor violence
has drawn international attention because it has been increasingly reported in immigrant
communities in western countries (AHA Foundation, 2012; Haile, 2007; Idriss & Abbas, 2011;
Kortewag & Yurdakul, 2009). Honor violence is defined as a continuum of controlling and
violent acts that are often perpetrated by family members in a premeditated and collective
manner. The motive for honor violence is typically reported to be the perception that an
individual brought shame upon their family, and honor needs to be restored. (e.g., Meetoo &
Mirza, 2007; Ouis, 2009; Peyton, 2014; Welchman & Hossain, 2005).
Currently, there are no specific institutional responses to honor violence in the United
States. Interest groups in the United States, however, have begun calling for new legislation and
institutional responses specific to honor violence (AHA Foundation, 2012; Tahiri Justice Center,
2012). In response, the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations for the 2013
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fiscal year directed the Office of Violence Against Women and the National Institute of Justice
to begin collecting statistics on the incidence and prevalence of honor violence in the United
States. These agencies were also asked to begin funding research to determine best practices for
law enforcement and service providers (United States House of Representatives, 2012). To date,
there have been no published reports of additional progress. This study examines institutional
responses to honor violence in two countries (Turkey and England) with specific responses to
honor violence as potential models for an American institutional response to honor violence.
Honor violence is considered a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural practice that, like all forms
of violence against women, requires institutional responses (Welchman & Hossain, 2005).
Institutional responses include, but are not limited to, actions by government, criminal justice,
public health, and social service organizations, community and faith-based organizations, and the
media. Each of these institutions helps to shape collective identity and culture (Korteweg &
Yurdakul, 2009).
Appropriate institutional responses to honor violence are important for several reasons.
First, the violent acts referred to as crimes of honor are illegal in most nations. Second, genderbased violence has been recognized internationally as the cause of a variety of serious public
health problems (Nasrullah, Haqqi, & Cummings, 2009; World Bank, 2012). Finally,
understanding honor violence is the first step towards prevention through international and
domestic policy, legislation, and intervention.
To be able to implement effective institutional responses to a social problem, however,
there must first be a clear definition of the social problem. There is currently a global debate on
whether honor violence should be defined as a crime that is (1) separate from domestic violence
under the penal code (as it is in Turkey) (Livaneli, 2006) or (2) a special form of domestic
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violence under the penal code that is closely monitored and tracked (as it is in England) (London
Metropolitan Police, 2012).
Many researchers and activists argue that providing institutional responses to honor
violence and services to victims of honor violence is difficult because these crimes often go
unreported and undetected (Idriss & Abbas, 2011; Welchman & Hossain, 2005). Additionally,
government institutions in western countries are accused of being hesitant to act because of the
fear of appearing racist or forcing western values upon established cultural norms (Chesler,
2010; 2012; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007). Idriss & Abbas (2011) argue that separating honor violence
from domestic violence will help with both of these problems by creating a clear legal mandate
for how honor violence should be reported and addressed. For example, tracking systems could
be implemented that would allow for the collection of more accurate statistics on the incidence
and prevalence of honor violence. Better statistics could then lead to increased public awareness
efforts, as well as the push for better training for law enforcement, legal, public health, and social
service responders (Idriss & Abbas, 2011).
Others argue that institutional responses to social problems that are perceived as cultural,
however, require careful consideration because of the potential for othering. Othering is “a
process that identifies those that are thought to be different from oneself or the mainstream”
(Johnson et al., 2004, p. 253) that is common in societies with a dominant social group and
minority social group. Groups may be considered in the minority due to gender, race, class,
culture, religion, or ethnicity. As a result, minority groups are often treated unequally because
they are considered different from and inferior to the majority (Schwalbe et al., 2000). Gianettoni
& Roux (2010) argue that othering is manifested in western institutional responses to perceived
cultural crimes as a kind of “subtle racism” (p. 375) that exaggerates cultural differences
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between the majority population (e.g., white nationals) and the minority population (e.g., Middle
Eastern or South Asian immigrants).
Thus, institutional responses targeted specifically to honor violence may perpetuate honor
violence because they are directed towards specific groups (e.g., Muslims, South Asians, Kurds)
rather than violence against women in general (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Kogacıoglu, 2004).
According to Abu-Lughod (2011),
“any diagnosis of gender violence that attributes it to timeless cultures distracts us from
local, national, and international political, institutional, and cultural dynamics…that are
essential to an analysis of violence and responsible efforts to mobilize against it” (p. 50).
In other words, the greater social and political context of any institutional response must be
considered when designing policy initiatives.
For example, the social context of domestic violence, rather than honor, may be to blame
for the increased incidence of violence against women. For this reason, Abu-Lughod (2011)
argues that responding specifically to honor violence as a crime that is separate from domestic
violence may cause additional problems, such as othering. It is also possible that responses to
perceived forms of cultural violence may be used to further political agendas concerning border
control, national security, and immigration policies (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Abbas, 2011; Ticktin,
2008).
This study is a cross-national comparison of institutional responses to honor violence in
Turkey and England with three aims. First, this study examines the differences in, and challenges
to, criminal justice and social service responses to honor violence in each country. Second, the
opinions of the individual actors within these institutions towards institutional responses are
explored. Finally, this study considers the presence of othering among individuals within Turkish
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and English institutions who are responding to honor violence among immigrant populations in
multi-cultural societies. The purpose of this research is to provide a model for an American
institutional response to honor violence. A comparative case study method with interviews and
vignettes is used to examine institutional responses to honor violence in each country.
This study goes beyond previous research by providing a cross-country comparison of
two different strategies for providing institutional responses to honor violence. Cross-country
comparisons are especially useful for examining and understanding the context in which
organizations and activists are working in, and how these contexts affect policy and practice
(Miller & Barberet, 1994). This study focuses on how criminal justice and social service
institutions in two countries respond to honor violence, what key stakeholders think of these
responses, and the presence of othering among key stakeholders within these institutions.
Although it is acknowledged that honor violence is perpetrated against both females and males,
honor violence is considered to primarily be a form of violence against women and girls (e.g.,
Pervizat, 2006). Thus, this study focuses primarily on the experiences of women and girls.

	
  

5	
  

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Othering, a process of social exclusion through which one dominant group is deemed
different from and often superior to another group, provides the theoretical framework for the
current study. Othering is not predicated on race, ethnicity, or nationality, but rather can occur
among any population. Understanding power differentials, usually linked to ethnocentrism and
cultural essentialism, within a society are key to understanding othering (Mohanty, 1988; Said,
1973; Young, 2007). The group with the most power is dominant, and the perceived weaknesses
in the subordinate group are used to justify the domination of that group (de Beauvoir, 1949;
Said, 2003).
2.1: Forms of Othering
Othering occurs in a variety of ways. Simone de Beauvoir (1949) provides one of the
earliest discussions of othering. Drawing on Hegel’s conceptualization of the self and the other,
de Beauvoir argued that “otherness is a fundamental category of human thought” (p.p. 3).
Groups cannot define themselves without constructing an ‘other’. Using gender as an example,
de Beauvoir explained that men have defined themselves as the essential group throughout
history, while women are defined as the other, incidental, and inessential group.
Said (1978/2003) discusses othering in terms of Orientalism, which he described as the
way that Western societies discuss Eastern societies (i.e., the Orient) and portrays one of the
“deepest and most recurring images of the Other” (p.p. 1). Western constructions of the Orient,
Said argues, are an integral part of how the West (i.e., the Occident) defines itself as drastically
different from and better than the Orient. In this way, Orientalism as a discourse serves as a
symbol of the superiority and power of the West over the East.
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An integral part of discussion of othering and Orientalism is colonialism. European
nations, it has been argued, colonized Middle Eastern, African, and Asian nations as a means of
building an empire. To justify colonization, which usually meant exploiting the people and the
resources of the colonized nation, European nations argued that there was a moral responsibility
to civilize and educate the primitive people of the colony (Asad, 1973; Said, 1978/2003).
Scholars have argued that othering, therefore, is an integral part of establishing national identity,
with important implications for politics, economics, and institutional responses to perceived
social problems (Petersoo, 2007).
Young (2007) argues that there are two forms of othering, which he terms conservative
and liberal. In conservative othering, one group demonizes another by projecting negative
attributes to the othered group while granting positive attributes to their own group. A kind of
cultural essentialism occurs, in that the othered group is viewed as qualitatively different than the
rest of society. In liberal othering, however, the othered group is viewed as simply lacking some
qualities, virtues, or cultural capital common to the rest of society. In other words, “they would
be just like us if these circumstances improved” (p.p. 5).
Forms of conservative othering (e.g., Orientalism) often receive more attention than
liberal othering because they are more blatant. Liberal othering is subtler, often manifesting as
the homogenization of a group (e.g., Muslims) who should be “pitied, helped, avoided, studied”
(Young, 2007 p.p. 5). Young argues that liberal othering often focuses on crime and deviance, in
that the othered group engages in criminal and deviant activity because they simply do not know
any better. Education, therefore, is seen as the key to eliminating certain forms of cultural
criminal and deviant activity. He describes this form of othering as inclusionary because the goal
is to educate and rehabilitate the other. Conservative othering, on the other hand, often manifests
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as punitive or exclusionary policies. Thus, othering is an integral part of the way a society
conceptualizes and maintains order.
2.2: Honor Violence & Othering
Honor violence is an example of an issue that sharply divides majority and minority
populations, creating a strong ‘us vs. them’ or ‘insiders and outsiders’ mentality (Abbas, 2011;
Abu-Lughod, 2011; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009; Sen, 2005). Cultural differences, which are
exhibited through race, religion, citizenship, gender roles, and language, cause tension, which is
often attributed to a perceived lack of assimilation among immigrant groups (Abbas, 2011;
Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009; Petersoo, 2007).
Several researchers have noticed the presence of othering in institutional responses to
honor violence, especially in police responses. Honor violence is often perceived as a backward
or primitive cultural practice that only occurs within immigrant groups (Abu-Lughod, 2011;
Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004). As a result, laws are often applied differently
to othered groups under the guise of ethnic or cultural consideration (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008;
Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004). Schwalbe et al. (2000) argue that the study of othering usually
focuses on the othered groups rather than the elite groups who are engaging in othering.
Shalhoub-Kevorkian and Erez (2002), Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2004), and Erez and
Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2004), however, provide an in depth examination of institutional responses
to violence against Palestinian women. They examined police responses to violence against
women, as well as their opinions on best practices of policing violence against women, in a
militarized social space. They argue that Israeli officers policing violence against women in
Palestinian communities were greatly influenced by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinians
are a marginalized group who are generally regarded as different from, or other than, the
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majority population. Violence against women among Palestinians is treated as a cultural problem,
thus resulting in police responses that are different from the majority population. Like Young
(2007) I argue that conservative and liberal othering occurs in multi-cultural societies, and that
this othering affects institutional responses to honor violence. More specifically, I argue that
conservative othering in the Turkish context and liberal othering in the English context occurs
among responders, either purposefully or inadvertently.
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
Reports of the increasing incidence of honor violence in western nations has led to a
global debate on appropriate institutional responses to this form of gender-based violence. Honor
violence is a complicated and sensitive social problem because it is often linked to specific
religions, ethnicities, and cultures. For example, honor violence is most often linked to Islam
(e.g., Abu-Lughod, 2011; AHA Foundation, 2010; Chesler, 2010; Idriss & Abbass, 2011; Sen,
2005). Some researchers posit that the tendency to associate honor violence only with Islam is in
part an extension of Islamaphobia following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 (Abu-Lughod, 2011;
Sen, 2005). Similarly, Idriss and Abbas (2011) argue that individuals in western nations have
become increasingly interested in, and fascinated by, violent acts that have been carried out in
the name of Islam. Chesler (2010) goes so far as to call honor violence “Islamic gender
apartheid”.
Many researchers argue that honor violence is cultural rather than religious (Douki,
Nacef, Belhadj, & Ghachem, 2003; Idriss & Abbas, 2011; Nasrullah et al., 2009). More
specifically, honor violence is claimed to be present in patriarchal cultures (Kvinnoforum, 2005;
Pitt-Rivers, 1974; Sev’er and Yurdakul, 2001). Patriarchal cultures are comprised of structured
kinship networks with social hierarchies ranked by age and gender (Kandiyoti, 1988). Several
religions are represented in these cultures including, but not limited to, Islam, Hinduism (Chesler,
2012; Nasrullah et al., 2009), and Christianity (Nasrullah et al., 2009). Understanding the
cultural, ethnic, religious, societal, and political contexts of honor and honor violence, therefore,
is important for implementing effective institutional responses (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Korteweg &
Yurdakul, 2009; Miller & Barberet, 1994; Nasrullah et al., 2009).
3.1: Operationalizing Honor
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According to Pitt-Rivers (1966; 1977), honor is a construct that is present in almost every
culture as a measure of self-worth and value, as well as an assigned societal estimation of worth
and value, which is acknowledged and claimed (see also Idriss & Abbas, 2011; Miller, 1993;
Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Stewart, 1994). “Honor, therefore, provides a nexus between the ideals
of a society and their reproduction in the individual through his aspiration to personify them”
(Pitt-Rivers, 1966, p. 22). Societal norms and values dictate honorable behavior, as well as the
way that people should be treated for honorable (or dishonorable) behavior. In this way, honor
and pride are linked to power, social status, identity, and reputation (Pitt-Rivers, 1966; 1977).
Although the concept of honor is universal, it is socially constructed in many different
ways (Miller, 1993; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Pitt-Rivers, 1966; 1977; Stewart, 1994) by culture,
historic time period, region, and class (Pitt-Rivers, 1966; 1977). According to the social
constructionist perspective, social problems are subjectively defined within specific social
environments. The way events and social problems are understood depends on the effect that
culture and experience have on the categorization and processing of information. Thus, our
behavior and reactions are the result of the meaning that is attached to our social constructions
(Berger & Luckman, 1966; Loseke, 2003; Patton, 2002).
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, several anthropologists studying honor in Mediterranean
cultures found that the honor of the individual is tied to the honor of the greater kinship network.
A person must feel respected by the greater community in order to have honor. This need for
respect and honor then dictates which behaviors are appropriate, and which behaviors result in a
violation of honor and a loss of respect (Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002a; Peristiany,
1966). These are considered “honor cultures” (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Pitt-Rivers, 1966; 1977).

	
  

11	
  

Honor is a kind of possession and shared resource of the family that can be lost or gained,
as well as traded on, thus protecting the reputation of the family is an important part of
socialization within honor cultures (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001; Uskul et
al., 2012). According to Afzal (2012), the saying “Man is a piece of gold. Woman is a piece of
silk. If you drop silk in mud it’s stained forever, unlike gold” epitomizes this social construction
of honor. A violation of honor is considered a physical violation to the body, necessitating
physical violence to redeem honor (Pitt-Rivers, 1966). Cultures with traditions based on honor
are said to have strict codes of moral behavior that are linked to female sexuality, gender roles,
and distinct social constructions of femininity and masculinity. For example, it is often argued
that female gender roles in honor cultures require women and girls to be subservient and sexually
passive. Men, on the other hand, are supposed to be dominant providers for their family who are
sexually active (Ouis, 2009).
In western cultures, however, honor is often defined in terms of the moral character of the
individual and is not linked to any greater social network (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Uskul et al.,
2012). In the United States, for example, honor is a form of individual worth that is not affected
by the actions of others (Leung & Cohen, 2011). As a result, threats to personal honor by others
are less likely to result in aggressive or violent responses (Cohen & Nesbitt, 1994). It becomes
very important, therefore, to understand the social constructions of honor that the individuals
providing institutional responses to honor violence are working under, as well as their
understanding of the social constructions of honor of the people that they are serving.
3.2: Operationalizing Honor Violence
Honor violence is an example of a socially constructed problem that is claimed to be
present in some cultures but not others, and discussed in terms of culture, sexuality, and religion
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(AHA Foundation, 2012; Ouis, 2009; Tahiri Justice Center, 2012; Welchman & Hossain, 2005).
There is no universally accepted definition of honor violence, however. Welchman and Hossain
(2005) caution that defining honor violence is not a straightforward process, and the term is often
used to signify the “exoticisation” of the crime. In its most simplest form, the term honor
violence is used to differentiate a specific crime by motive and definitions tend to take the form
of case descriptions. They cite the definition provided in 1996 by Lama Abu Odeh as an example,
which says “a paradigmatic example of a crime of honour is the killing of a woman by her father
or brother for engaging in, or being suspected of engaging in, sexual practices before or outside
marriage.”
Thus, there are several important components of a definition of honor violence. Although
not always the case, honor violence is often agnatic (i.e., committed by a patrilineal family
member of the victim) (Peyton, 2014). Honor violence also tends to be collective and
premeditated in that several family members will collude to engage in violence (Baker,
Gregware, & Cassidy, 1999) against individuals for “transgressing established societal norms”
(Pervizat, 2006). Acts considered to transgress these norms and violate the honor of the family
typically relate to perceived sexual deviancy and “behaviors that challenge male control”
(Welchmann & Hossain, 2005; p. 5). Acts of sexual deviancy include premarital relationships,
premarital sex, adultery, rape, and having a relationship with an individual that the family does
not approve of (Chesler, 2010; Welchman & Hossain, 2005).
Behaviors that challenge male control may include any number of acts such as smoking,
drinking, missing curfew, talking back, having friends who are outside the religious or ethnic
group (Chesler, 2010; Welchman & Hossain, 2005), refusing a marriage (Chesler, 2012;
Welchman & Hossain, 2005), or divorce (Chesler, 2012). Being “too western” has also been a
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reported motivation for honor violence (Chesler, 2010; Idriss & Abass, 2011). Westernization is
characterized by the failure to conform to traditional cultural and religious norms (e.g., wearing
traditional clothing like veils or headscarves), as well as being too independent, pursuing higher
education, and seeking a career (Chesler, 2010).
Social Control Theory provides a useful framework for defining honor violence. The
manner by which society regulates itself is social control. Social control motivates social groups
to conform to collective morals and norms informally (e.g., through other members of society) or
formally (e.g., through institutions) (Janowitz, 1975). Researchers typically describe honor
violence as a mechanism of informal social control that is prevalent in patriarchal cultures. The
honor of the family depends on controlling the sexuality of female members by restricting
extramarital sexual activity, reproduction, and fraternization with males (Chelser, 2012; Ouis,
2009). In this way, girls are considered sexual objects that are the property of their family
members from a very young age. The honor of the girl or woman is a source of social capital for
the family within the greater social network of the community (Ouis, 2009).
If a female family member commits an action that is perceived to have violated the honor
of the family, an assault or murder is committed to restore family honor and deter future honor
violations (Ouis, 2009, Welchmann & Hossain, 2005). Objective proof of honor violations is not
necessary for the justification of honor violence (Cheler, 2012; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007; PittRivers, 1968). The reputation of the female is symbolic of honor, which is why the life or body
of the female is not considered as valuable as the honor itself (Bourdieu, 2001; Ouis, 2009).
Perpetrators, however, are also subjected to informal social control. If the perceived shameful act
is kept a secret, the honor of the family is not tarnished. If the shameful act becomes public
knowledge, then the male family members are pressured to restore honor to the family by

	
  

14	
  

committing an honor crime (Ouis, 2009; Pitt-Rivers, 1966; Welchmann & Hossain, 2005). Social
institutions, such as criminal justice and social service organizations, then provide formal social
control to punish the perpetrator and provide services to the victim of the honor crime
(Welchman & Hossain, 2005).	
  
Some researchers argue that victims of honor violence are young females (usually under
the age of 25), from rural regions (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Chesler, 2010; 2012; Kulczycki &
Windle, 2011). Nasrullah et al. (2009) found that marital status is predictive of honor killings, in
that married women are murdered more often than single women. The decision to commit honor
violence is typically reported as being made by a family or tribal council (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade,
2008; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009; Kulczycki & Windle, 2011). Perpetrators are often male
relatives of the victim (Pervizat, 2006), and sometimes the youngest in the family
(Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Chesler, 2010; Kulczycki & Windle, 2011). Choosing the youngest male
relative to commit the honor crime is a strategic family decision because they are more likely to
receive a reduced sentence and be able to begin a new life after release (Ahmetbeyzade, 2008;
Kulczycki & Windle, 2011).
Studies tend to focus on the incidence of honor killings (e.g., Chesler, 2010; 2012;
Hellgren & Hobson, 2008; Kulczycki & Windle, 2011; Nasrullah et al., 2009) rather than honor
violence, most likely because murder is a more reliable form of quantifiable data. The United
Nations Population Fund (2000) provided the most recent attempt at a worldwide prevalence
estimate at 5,000 honor killings per year. Although this estimate is frequently cited in the
literature (e.g., Chesler, 2010; Kulcyzcki & Windle, 2011; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007), the United
Nations never published how they arrived at their estimate and this estimate is now fifteen years
old. Incidence of honor violence is difficult to establish due to misreporting deaths as suicides,
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accidents, and disappearances, as well as underreporting (Al-Adili et al., 2008; Kulczycki &
Windle, 2011). Honor violence is also difficult to track because most countries do not classify
honor crimes separately from other crimes (Chesler, 2010).
3.3: Honor Violence vs. Domestic Violence
The definition of a crime is perhaps the most important consideration for policymakers
who are developing institutional responses. The problem with providing institutional responses
to honor violence begins with differentiating honor violence from domestic violence. Domestic
violence is typically defined as the physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological
abuse of an intimate partner for the purposes of control and domination (Buzawa, Buzawa, &
Stark, 2012; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). Two elements are typically used to differentiate
honor violence from domestic violence. The first is that honor violence is usually committed by a
male family member (e.g., father, brother, uncle, or cousin) rather than an intimate partner
(Nasrullah et al., 2009). The second is the motivation for the crime, which is to restore honor to
the family (Chesler, 2010; Welchman & Hossain, 2005).
There are two schools of thought pertaining to the categorization of honor violence as
separate from domestic violence. Some scholars and interest groups argue that honor violence is
a group of crimes that should be separate from domestic violence under the penal code. Chesler
(2010), for example, argues that honor killings are not a form of domestic violence because the
motivation for honor killings is related to strict moral codes within fundamentalist religions. The
AHA Foundation (2012), a New York City based women’s rights organization, argues for the
inclusion of honor violence in the United States Violence Against Women Act as a means of
prosecuting honor crimes separately from domestic violence. There is also a movement in the
United Kingdom to pass a bill that would specifically prohibit honor violence, as well as
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consider honor violence a racially and religiously motivated crime. The logic for this
categorization is that race and religion become aggravating factors that are subject to higher
maximum penalties and mandatory sentencing (Idriss & Abbas, 2011).
Other scholars argue that separating honor violence from domestic violence under the
penal code causes two problems. On the one hand, labeling honor violence as a cultural tradition
may prompt non-response based on respect for multiculturalism (Meetoo & Mirza, 2007). On the
other hand, separating the two crimes encourages discriminatory and xenophobic responses to
specific ethnic groups based on cultural traditions. Using the label “honor crimes” immediately
characterizes a group of people (usually Middle Easterners and South Asians) who commit
violence against women in a way that is different from others (usually people in western nations)
(Abu-Lughod, 2011; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009; Siddiqui, 2005). Understanding specific
forms of violence encourages improved institutional responses (e.g., police training, relief efforts,
shelters), education, and public awareness, but blaming and stigmatizing certain ethnicities and
cultures for honor violence is problematic. For example, female victims of honor violence are
often described as property under the control of men, but this oversimplifies the differences in
complex codes of morality between cultures by equating male coercion with morality (AbuLughod, 2011).
Several scholars also argue that violence against women is a global problem that is
prevalent in all cultures and based on the same motivations (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 2011; Meetoo &
Mirza, 2007; Sen, 2005). As Abu-Lughod (2011) said,
“Everywhere, it seems some fathers are violent, some brothers commit incest, there are
men who kill their wives and lovers on suspicion, and families and marriages can be
dysfunctional and abusive. “Honor cultures” do not have a monopoly on violence against

	
  

17	
  

women: American and European newspapers, judges, lawyers, psychiatrists, and prisons
testify to this” (p. 34).
When addressing crimes like honor violence, a collective culture is blamed rather than the
individual. Yet, this does not occur with other forms of domestic violence (Abu-Lughod, 2011;
Volpp, 2000). The focus, therefore, should be on violence against women as a human rights
violation rather than a focus on so-called cultural forms of domestic violence (e.g., Abu-Lughod,
2011; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007; Sen, 2005; Siddiqui, 2005). To be clear, proponents of this
argument are not implying that honor violence does not exist. What is being argued is that the
context of the violence (e.g., culture, moral systems, politics, family ideologies) must be
understood in order to implement successful responses (Abu-Lughod, 2011).
3.4: Institutional Responses to Honor Violence
Institutions are defined as “systems of established and embedded social rules that
structure social interactions” (Hodgeson, 2006, p. 2). Most studies focus on defining and
describing honor violence, but fail to provide an empirical analysis of institutional responses to
honor violence. For example, Kulczycki and Windle (2011) provide a systematic review of forty
studies conducted on honor violence in the Middle East and North Africa prior to 2008. They
found that the majority of research on honor violence is generally descriptive, based on
secondary data, and has been conducted since the year 2000. Most studies have used media
reports (e.g., Chesler, 2010; 2012; Kortewag & Yurdakul, 2009; Nasrullah, Haqqi, & Cummings,
2009), mortality, police and court records (e.g., Al-Adili et al., 2008; Kulwicki, 2002; ShalhoubKevorkian, 2002), legal analysis (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Arnold, 2001), and interviews with
NGO representatives or police officers (e.g., Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004) to examine incidence
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and prevalence, types of honor violence, characteristics of victims, perpetrators, and legal
elements of honor violence (see Kulczycki & Windle, 2011).
A wealth of research has examined institutional responses to violence against women
more generally (e.g., Allen, Watt, & Hess, 2008; Bott, Morrison, & Ellsberg, 2005; Kulwicki,
Aswad, Carmona, & Ballout, 2010; Miller & Barbaret, 1994; Seith, 2001). Key stakeholders
have been interviewed about institutional responses specific to honor violence in the United
Kingdom (e.g., Home Affairs Committee, 2008; Kvinnoforum, 2005) and Turkey (Kardam,
2007), and their responses have been described in reports (e.g., police responses, judicial
outcomes, NGO’s serving victims of honor violence, public awareness campaigns). These
reports, however, are produced primarily by key stakeholders in governmental, nongovernmental, social service, and human rights organizations. While these are valuable resources
for learning about general institutional responses to honor violence, they may be biased because
they are produced or funded by key stakeholders (e.g., United Kingdom House of Commons,
European Commission, Human Rights Watch, United Nations) who may have specific agendas
for providing and endorsing specific responses.
The growing momentum behind establishing honor violence as a crime that is separate
from domestic violence, however, makes it important to empirically examine the different ways
of responding to honor violence and whether responding specifically to honor violence creates
discriminatory responses in multi-cultural societies. To date, no studies have conducted crosscountry comparisons of institutional responses to honor violence, or examined othering among
institutional responses to honor violence. Othering and discriminatory institutional responses
have, however, been found among British police officers responding to recent immigrants
(Morant & Edwards, 2010), Israeli police officers responding to violence against Palestinian
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women (Erez & Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian &
Erez, 2002), and Canadian health care providers responding to female South Asian immigrants
(Johnson et al., 2004).
This study goes beyond previous research by providing a cross-country comparison of
two different strategies for providing institutional responses to honor violence. Cross-country
comparisons are especially useful for examining and understanding the context in which
organizations and activists are working in, and how these contexts affect policy and practice
(Miller & Barberet, 1994). This study focuses on how criminal justice and social service
institutions in two countries respond to honor violence, what key stakeholders think of these
responses, and the presence of othering among key stakeholders within these institutions in order
to provide recommendations for an American response to honor violence.
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CHAPTER 4: CASE COUNTRIES
4.1: Case Selection and Research Sites
Turkey and England were purposefully chosen for study for three reasons. Each country
has (1) a high number of identified cases of honor violence and (2) a significant and well-defined
institutional response to honor violence (3) among a perceived minority population.
Turkey
Separate laws for domestic violence and honor crimes exist, with honor crimes generally
considered a form of “customary killing” under the Turkish Penal Code. In 2006, the Turkish
National Assembly reported that 1,091 honor crimes were committed between 2000 and 2005.
As a result, the police, judiciary actors, and health workers began participating in training
programs for gender-based violence in 2008 (Livaneli, 2006). Honor violence is often considered
a problem amongst the Kurdish and rural tribal populations in eastern Turkey, as well as the
same populations who migrate to large cities (Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Livaneli, 2006). Istanbul
and Diyarbakır were purposefully chosen to represent major urban centers in western and eastern
Turkey, with different mixes of resident and recent immigrant populations. Istanbul is a major
world city, while Diyarbakır is a regional conurbation that is also home to large numbers of
displaced Kurds.
England
Honor violence is not a distinct crime under the English Penal Code. A special network
of services, however, has been created to specifically address honor violence. The Metropolitan
Police Service and the West Midlands Police Service both have special units that focuses on
honor violence (London Metropolitan Police, 2012; West Midlands Police, 2014), and cases of
honor violence are tracked in an effort to provide statistics on incidence and prevalence. England
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also has a network of prosecutors who are specially trained to try cases of honor violence (Crown
Prosecution Service, 2012).
In 2010, 2,823 cases of honor violence were reported to police in the United Kingdom
(Iranian & Kurdish Women’s Rights Organization, 2011). It is estimated that twelve honor
killings occur per year, with the highest number of reported cases occurring in London (ACPO,
2008). England is considered a multi-cultural nation. The majority of the population is White
British, with large Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Turkish populations. There are also large
populations of Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus (Office for National Statistics, 2001). Each of these
groups has been reported as having cases of honor violence (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Chesler,
2010; 2012; Welchmann & Hossain, 2005).
The following two sections introduce the case study sites, focusing on the country-level
factors that have an influence on the perpetration and victimization of honor violence,
institutional responses to honor violence, legislation concerning honor violence, and the role of
the political climate in these responses. This information draws largely on historical analysis,
reports from women’s NGO’s and police services, legal documents, and past research on honor
violence in each country.
4.2: Case Country One- Turkey
The Republic of Turkey is often referred to as the bridge between the East and the West.
Located where Southeastern Europe meets Southwestern Asia, Turkey borders Bulgaria and
Greece to the west; Syria and Iraq to the south; and Georgia, Armenia, and Iran to the east. The
Bosporus Strait serves as the line between the European and Asian sides of Turkey, with Istanbul
literally divided in two. With a population of 81,619,392, Turkey is comprised of 70-75%
Turkish, 18% Kurdish, and 7-12% other ethnicities. Turkish is the official language, with
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Kurdish and other minority languages also spoken. The Turkish population is 99.8% Muslim,
but .2% practice other religions (predominantly Christianity and Judaism) (Central Intelligence
Agency, 2014).
A basic understanding of the history of the modern Turkish state is important for
contextualizing the beliefs, attitudes, and opinions of institutional responders in this study.
Responders discussed the intersectionality of honor violence and a range of other factors, such as
Turkish modernization, nationalism, the Kurdish Question, gender inequality, the Turkish
application to the European Union, the Gezi Park protests, and Turkish leadership. Each will
briefly be discussed below.
Turkish Modernization
During World War I, the Ottoman Empire aligned with the Central Powers. Their loss to
the Allied Powers led to the Turkish War of Independence, which was fought from 1918 to 1923
(Bozdoğan & Kasaba, 1997). Turkish modernization then began in 1923 with the replacement of
the Ottoman Empire with the Republic of Turkey under the vision of Mustafa Kemal (referred to
as Atatürk, or “Father of the Turks”) (Arat, 1997; Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006; Yeğen, 2009). The goal
of the modernization process was to model Turkey after western countries, doing so by moving
Turkey away from an Islamic society toward secularism (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Kasaba, 1997;
Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006; Yeğen, 2007), replacing Shari’a law with a new set of laws based on the
Swiss Civil Code (Arat, 1997; Ilkkaracan, 1998; Camyar & Tagma, 2010), adopting the Latin
alphabet, and promoting women’s liberation (Camyar & Tagma, 2010; Gorgas, 2009).
This modernization process, however, has been criticized “as a patriarchal and
antidemocratic imposition from above that has negated the historical and cultural experience of
the people in Turkey” (p. 5) (Kasaba & Rasat, 1997). Kasaba (1997) argues that pushing citizens
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away from traditional ways of living towards a more western society was particularly important
in shaping the modernization of Turkey. This process was top-down, with political elites
believing that if Ottoman institutions and the physical environment could be modernized, then
“the behavior of individuals could be easily molded and made to fit the requirements of the
newly created circumstances” (Kasaba, 1997, p.p. 24).
One major criticism of the Turkish modernization process is the Kemalist need for a
universal nationalism that homogenized the population of Turkey (Bacik & Coskun, 2011;
Kasaba & Rasat, 1997). Turkish culture is collective, meaning the well-being of the group is
stressed over that of the individual (Cihangir, 2012). This can be manifested in a variety of ways,
but in terms of state-building in the Turkish context, ethnic, religious, and cultural unity was
promoted (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Gorgas, 2009; Keyder, 1997; Yeğen, 2007) and the voice of
ethnic minorities was quashed (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Gorgas, 2009). This is in direct
opposition to the Ottoman state belief that citizens of different ethnicities and religions could be
unified in one territory (Yeğen, 2007). Political elites thought in terms of categories like “old vs.
new” or “traditional vs. Western” (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Kasaba, 1997; Koğacıoğlu, 2004),
which led to the singling out of two groups: the Kurdish and women.
“The Kurdish Question”
The “Kurdish Question” (i.e., recognition of the Kurdish identity and homeland)
developed in response to Turkish nationalist reform efforts. Kemalists argued that there was no
such thing as a “Kurdish problem” because everyone who lives in Turkey is considered Turkish,
therefore Kurds as a distinct group are non-existent. The purpose of Turkish modernization was
to create a homogenous and unified community of Turks. In other words, “Turkishness” was to
be defined politically rather than ethnically. This policy expected minority populations in Turkey
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(e.g., Kurds and Laz) to be re-defined as Turkish, and excluded non-Muslim communities
altogether (e.g., Greeks, Armenians, and Jews) (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Gorgas, 2009; Kasaba,
1997; Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006; Yeğen, 2007; 2009).
Kurdish culture came under attack in the 1920’s in an effort to construct this uniform
Turkish national identity (Gorgas, 2009). Forced assimilation policies were implemented (Yeğen,
2007; 2009), although this was framed as “inviting” Kurds to become Turkish (Yeğen, 2009).
These policies include a ban on the use of the Kurdish language in schools and publications, as
well as the terms “Kurd” and “Kurdistan” (Gorgas, 2009). Instead, Kurds were referred to as
“Mountain Turks” (Gorgas, 2009; Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006). Another example of repressive
assimilation in Turkey is the Kurdish name ban (Aslan, 2009; Yeğen, 2009). The Civil
Registration Law states that children cannot be given names “which do not conform to national
culture, moral norms, customs, and traditions and which offend the public” (Aslan, 2009, p.p. 2;
Yeğen, 2009). Thus, the Kurdish identity became a “symbol of otherness” within Turkey
(Gorgas, 2009).
Kurdish uprisings in pursuit of equal treatment began almost immediately after the
nationalist agenda was set in motion, in large part due to the fact that Kurds were promised legal
rights by reformist-nationalists prior to the foundation of the Turkish Republic (Gorgas, 2009;
Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006; Yeğen, 2007; 2009). In fact, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres promised to
establish Kurdistan as an independent homeland in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq for
ethnic Kurds (Yavuz & Özcan, 2006). In the 1920’s and 1930’s, these uprisings were referred to
as “reactionary”, “feudal”, and “obstacles to civilization and progress” (Gorgas, 2009). Over the
last three decades, Kurdish opposition has most commonly been referred to as terrorism (Bacik
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& Coskun, 2011; Casier & Jongerdon, 2012; Kasaba, 1997) and the result of
“underdevelopment”, rather than “genuine and legitimate causes” (Kasaba, 1997, p. 18).
The terrorist label is most often applied to the Partiya Karkêren Kurdistan (Kurdistan
Workers Party or PKK) (e.g., Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011; Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006), a Kurdish
separatist group, which was formed in 1978 by the Turkish revolutionary left to gain autonomy
from the Republic of Turkey (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Çağlayan, 2012; Casier & Jongerdon,
2012). In 1980, a military coup occurred which destroyed opposition from left-wing groups in
Turkey (Yeğen, 2007). In response, the PKK led an armed opposition in 1984. This armed
opposition has continued over the last three decades, and is considered a war within Turkey by
some scholars because of the military response engaged in by the Turkish state (e.g., Bacik &
Coskun, 2011; Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006; Yeğen, 2007).
The PKK describe their methods as an armed opposition against colonizers who have
enslaved the Kurdish population, rather than terrorist activity (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011).
More specifically, the PKK argued that Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria had colonized Kurdistan
and divided it into four regions, thus Kurdistan should be reunited and independent from
colonizers (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Çağlayan, 2012; Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006). In this way, the
PKK justifies their acts as “counter-violence” against their oppressor (Bozarslan, 2004).
Kemalists, however, tend to believe that Kurdish insurgency should be treated with the
same harsh and severe methods used against the Kurds and other ethnic groups throughout
Turkish history (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Kasaba, 1997). As a result, the idea that “Kurds are the
Turks who have forgotten their Turkishness” was replaced with “Kurds are an untrustworthy
people on Turkish territory” who “are of another, inferior and incurable descent” in the 1990’s
(Yeğen, 2007, p.p. 137). Today Kurds are considered “pseudo-citizens” by many people within
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Turkey (Yeğen, 2009, p.p. 597), and confrontations between Turks and Kurds have moved
beyond state action, with citizens confronting each other (Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006).
Women in Turkey
It has been argued that in the nationalist and modernization movements in Turkey,
women’s liberation was used as a tool for reaching specific goals (Çağlayan, 2012; Koğacıoğlu,
2004). Social constructions of gender, especially what it means to be a woman, help to define
“nationalist fictions” (Çağlayan, 2012, p.p. 4). An example of a gendered nationalist fiction in
Turkey is the idea that a ‘modern’ woman would have equal rights, yet still embody tradition
(Çağlayan, 2012; Koğacıoğlu, 2004). For example, the implementation of the Turkish Civil Code
in 1926 instituted equal rights for women in regards to divorce, child custody, and inheritance, as
well as banned polygamy (Ilkkaracan, 1998). The modern Turkish woman was envisioned as
educated and unveiled, the antithesis of the backward Ottoman woman (Koğacıoğlu, 2004).
Feminist scholars argue, however, that this was simply a new form of patriarchal control.
The state framed women’s liberation as something that was being given to women, while the
male elite subjected women to their idea of the modern woman and family in order to push their
political agenda. More specifically, women were considered to be responsible for the
reproduction of both the population and national culture, defined in terms of their function as
caretakers within the family, and pressured to behave in a certain way (Çağlayan, 2012;
Kandiyoti, 1997; Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989). This included wearing
certain clothing, working in specific professions, and interacting with males in culturally
approved ways (Çağlayan, 2012).
Çağlayan (2012) argues that women’s liberation has been used differently by the PKK in
the Kurdish movement. Abdullah Öcalan (the leader of the PKK) has used women’s liberation as

	
  

27	
  

a tool to empower women as well as mobilize both men and women in armed conflict. Öcalan
has criticized the patriarchal nature of Kurdish society and the placement of women in secondary
positions to men, arguing that linking namus to both women and the nation has prevented
Kurdish men from mobilizing against the Turkish state. In other words, making women
dependent on men not only “pulls women down” but also pulls men down with them by creating
the need to remain at home to successfully control female behavior. Within the Kurdish
movement, especially within the PKK, ideological discourse centers on women becoming active
participants within nation building rather than viewed as “carriers and transmitters of the
authentic essence of Kurdish culture” (p.p. 18). “New Kurdishness” includes leaving the
patriarchal family behind, and embracing true equality between men and women.
As a result, women have played a major role in the Kurdish movement since 1980, with
large numbers joining guerilla fighters in the mountains throughout the 1990’s and later forming
independent female-led military units. Women also began to actively participate in pro-Kurdish
political parties and civil society organizations, reaching high-ranking positions within these
organizations. Unfortunately, although women were liberated in many ways, they continued to
be “spoken about” in nationalist discourses, without ever gaining a voice in the discussion
(Çağlayan, 2012).
Turkish Membership in the European Union
For Turkey, membership in the European Union (EU) would solidify and signify its
position as a secular, western, and modern republic (MacLennan, 2013). Many Turks see EU
membership as the final step in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s vision of a politically, economically,
and culturally developed nation (Koğacıoğlu, 2004; MacLennan, 2013). Although Turkey has
pursued membership to the EU since 1959, and been a candidate since 1999, official accession
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negotiations did not begin until September 2005 (Arvanitopoulos & Tzifakis, 2013; Camyar &
Tagma, 2010; Marshall, 2013). The EU has been reluctant to grant Turkey membership status
because of a variety of social, economic, and political problems, such as inherent differences in
religious values (e.g., Islam vs. western religions) (MacLennan, 2013); the displacement of, and
military action against, the Kurdish population (Aslan, 2009; Yavuz & Özcan, 2006; Yeğen,
2007); lack of civilian supervision over the military; lack of defense expenditure oversight
(Arvanitopoulos & Tzifakis, 2013); censorship (MacLennan, 2013); and gender inequality
(Marshall, 2013). Additionally, several EU member states questioned whether adding Turkey to
the EU would benefit the European security system (Camyar & Tagma, 2010).
As part of their continued effort to join the EU, Turkey has implemented several political
and economic reforms in order to fulfill the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria (Camyar &
Tagma, 2010; Marshall, 2013; Yavuz & Özcan, 2006). Membership in the EU requires that
candidates strictly adhere to specific equality policies (Kardam, 2007; Marshall, 2013). Of
particular interest to the current study is the way that Turkey has addressed gender inequality and
violence against women as a means of gaining entry to the EU. The Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Additional
Protocol to CEDAW, were signed and ratified by Turkey in the years 1985 and 2000 (European
Parliament, 2012). Specific articles within the Turkish Constitution, Civil Code, Penal Code, and
Labor Law have raised concerns among member states in the EU, prompting the Turkish
government to make several amendments (Koğacıoğlu, 2004; European Parliament, 2012).
The EU has raised specific concerns about domestic violence and honor killings,
considering both to be widespread problems within Turkey that need to be addressed (European
Parliament, 2012; Koğacıoğlu, 2004). For example, in 2005 the Turkish Penal Code was
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modified in several ways, including changing the reference to violence against women from
“crimes against family or social order” to “crimes against individuals” (Altınay & Arat, 2009;
European Parliament, 2012). The Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence Against Women
was enacted in August 2012 in an effort to conform to the Council of Europe’s convention on
domestic violence (Howe, 2013). Approximately thirty changes to the Penal Code were made
concerning gender equality, such as increased prison sentences for polygamy, non-registered
religious marriages, and sexual assault; the banning of virginity tests; the criminalization of
sexual assault within marriage; and honor killings (European Parliament, 2012).
It has also been argued, by both Turkish scholars and the EU, that women should be more
involved in Turkish politics (European Parliament, 2012; Howe, 2013). Currently, only 14% of
Parliament positions are filled by women, which does not allow for equal representation at the
institutional level (Howe, 2013). Many activists argue that the government should institute
quotas for female political representation, which is something that President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan has been very outspoken against (European Parliament, 2012; Howe, 2013).
Current Turkish Context
Fieldwork in Istanbul and Diyarbakır took place from June through September 2013.
Several respondents discussed two current events during this period: the Gezi Park protests and
speeches made by then Prime Minister, and current President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Gezi Park
In 2012, then Prime Minister Erdoğan announced the approval of the Taksim Pedestrian
Project, a government endeavor to build replicas of buildings that were demolished in Taksim
Square. Gezi Park was scheduled to be razed in order to rebuild Topçu Barracks, a historic
Ottoman building that was demolished in the 1940’s (Arat, 2013; Todays Zaman, 2013). These
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barracks were intended to house a cultural center, art gallery, shopping mall, residential and
office buildings, or hotels (Howe, 2013; Todays Zaman, 2013). New construction in Gezi Park
was hotly contested because it is currently the only park in the vicinity of Taksim Square
(Todays Zaman, 2013).
Initially the Chamber of Urban Planners, Chamber of Architects, and the Istanbul
Regional Board of Protection of Cultural and Natural Assets all fought against the Gezi Park
plans (Todays Zaman, 2013). The public followed suit, beginning peaceful protests in Gezi Park
on May 28, 2013 and the police responded to the peaceful protests with extreme force on May 30,
2013. Tear gas and water cannons were used on protestors, resulting in more than a dozen
serious and fatal injuries. The original protestors were then joined by a variety of other groups
with different complaints and ideologies, yet united against then Prime Minister Erdoğan’s
perceived authoritarian and Islamist policies (Arat, 2013; Howe, 2013; Uras, 2013). Many
Turkish citizens feel that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has violated their rights since
the party came to power in 2007, such as censoring and jailing journalists, restricting access to
alcohol, repealing abortion rights, and discouraging schools from teaching evolution (Arat, 2013;
Uras, 2013). This general feeling of discontent was common throughout Turkey, leading to
protests and riots across the country (Uras, 2013).
As will be discussed in later chapters, respondents argued that the Gezi Park protests
were indicative of an ongoing cultural shift among the Turkish population, and an expression of
extreme dissatisfaction with Turkish leadership. In other words, the Gezi Park protests may have
begun in defense of trees but came to symbolize a much greater social malaise concerning the
perceived move away from secularism and encroachment on the private lives of citizens (Atay,
2013).
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President Erdoğan
A current point of contention within Turkey is perceived institutionalized gender
inequality. Many Turks believe that the current Turkish government takes a paternalistic and
patriarchal view of women, regarding them as needing protection in the same way as children.
This is evidenced in the recent name change of the “Ministry of Women and Family” to the
“Ministry of Family and Social Policies”, which clearly expresses the governmental view that
women are considered part of a family unit rather than as individuals (Candas & Silier, 2014;
Howe, 2013). For example, women are expected to fill more social roles as the primary
caregivers of children in the home, rather than joining the workforce, leaving women
economically dependent on men (Candas & Silier, 2014).
For the past several years, President Erdoğan has frequently made speeches that reflect
the current government’s views on gender equality (Candas & Silier, 2014). In July 2010
Erdoğan infamously stated that men and women cannot be considered equal because they are too
different (Candas & Silier, 2014; Daloglu, 2014; Sarhan, 2014). He has repeated this sentiment
over the last several years, adding as recently as November 24, 2014 that this inequality is due to
biological differences related to motherhood. He is quoted as stating, “you cannot put women
into men’s work like the communist regimes did in the past…That would go against women’s
delicate bodies” (Daloglu, 2014; Sarhan, 2014). Turkish feminists argue, however, that Erdoğan
is confusing the concepts of “sameness and equality” (Sarhan, 2014 p.p. 3), in that women and
men may be different in many ways, but that does not mean that they should not have equal
rights.
He is also known for repeatedly stating that Turkish women should have at least three
children (Candas & Silier, 2014; Sarhan, 2014), although he prefers that women have five
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children because “now there are washing machines and childcare is easier” (Candas & Silier,
2014 citing Sabah, 2012). In his November 24, 2014 address, Erdoğan added that “there are
those who understand this [and] those who don’t. You can’t tell this to feminists, because they do
not accept motherhood”. Turkish scholars argue that Erdoğan wants to regulate private women’s
health and family issues, thereby making them a public issue, while keeping women out of other
public spheres like the workforce (Sarhan, 2014). This tendency to take private issues and make
them public leads to discrimination and undermines gender equality (Candas & Silier, 2014).
Honor & Honor Violence in Turkey
Namus vs. Töre
Although honor violence is an ancient practice, it did not receive public attention until the
1990’s in Turkey followings news coverage of a series of public executions motivated by honor
(Pervizat, 2006). Before beginning a discussion of honor violence in Turkey, however, the
concept of honor must be addressed. There are two words that are most often associated with
honor in Turkey: namus and töre. While these concepts have been discussed at length by other
scholars (e.g., Çağlayan, 2012; Pervizat, 2006; Tillilon, 1983), it is important to provide a brief
explanation of each term.
The word “namus” is typically used to describe honor for both men and women, but the
term has different meanings for each gender. For females, namus is often directly linked to
sexuality. Among males namus reflects trustworthiness and personal sexuality, as well as control
over the sexuality and behavior of female family members (Çağlayan, 2012; Pervizat, 2006;
Sev’er & Yurdakul 2001). Sev’er & Yurdakul (2001) argue that “according to cultural mores,
men cannot have namus by themselves, because their namus is always determined by the namus
of their mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters.” Thus, the honor of the woman reflects the honor
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of the family, and both females and males are responsible for ensuring that the namus of females
remains “clean” (Kardam, 2007; Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Pervizat, 2006, p.p. 297; Sev’er & Yurdakul
2001).
Arin (2001) elaborates on this construction of namus, explaining that women were
traditionally considered the property of the family and the representation of familial honor.
Marriages were considered business transactions between families, thus the most valued aspect
of a woman was considered to be her honor. In order to maintain honor, women are supposed to
embrace certain values, such as virginity until marriage, modesty, and devotion to the family.
Under these subjective conditions, honor is easily violated. For example, women and girls can be
considered immodest if they walk in public without a male escort, flirt, request a love song on
the radio, engage in a relationship before marriage, or have sex before marriage (Arin, 2001;
Kardam 2007; Pervizat, 2006). Gossip, even if untrue, can also dishonor a family (Arin, 2001).
Töre, however, does not directly translate to honor. In Turkish, töre refers to custom (or
tradition) as defined by rules, morals, ethics, and laws (Arin, 2001; Pervizat, 2006). Honor
killings are often confused with, and referred to, as “customary killings” or “crimes of tradition”
in Turkey (Arin, 2001; Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Pervizat, 2006). The purpose of customary killings is
to control the behavior of tribal populations (Pervizat, 2006). A common example of customary
killings is a blood feud (i.e., retaliatory cycles of violence between families or clans) (Kardam,
2007; Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Pervizat, 2006). Blood feuds are similar to honor killings in that the
motive is usually honor (Koğacıoğlu, 2004). They are not directly tied to gender or sexuality, but
victims of blood feuds are typically male (Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Pervizat,
2006).
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It is been argued that using the term “customary killing” interchangeably with “honor
killing” reflects the complex intersection of regional politics, nationalism, and racism towards
the Kurdish population in Southeastern Turkey. Using the term “customary killing” implies that
honor violence is a crime of tradition committed by Kurds, and is a means for the Turkish
population to distance themselves from the barbaric and uncivilized members of the Southeastern
population (Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Pervizat, 2006). Western Turks will typically argue that women
from Southeastern Turkey are more oppressed because they live in rural regions that adhere to
backward traditions (Altınay & Arat, 2009), and thus refer to western cases of honor violence as
crimes of passion (Pervizat, 2006).
Turkish Penal Code
Koğacıoğlu (2004) argues that honor violence in Turkey occurs within a complex context
created by a variety of institutional structures. One glaring example is the Turkish Penal Code. In
Turkey, “customary killing laws” are often used in cases of honor killings. To be clear, the word
“honor” is never mentioned in the Turkish Penal Code, but is understood to be one form of
“customary killing” (Pervizat, 2006).
The Turkish Penal Code has undergone a great deal of change, mostly due to the tireless
work of women’s rights organizations (Birdal, 2010; Ilkkaracan, 2007) and the Turkish
application to the EU (European Parliament, 2012). Several of these changes concerned honor
violence. The Sixth Harmonization Package to the EU criteria was adopted by the Turkish Grand
National Assembly in 2003, which required changes to Articles 462 and 453 of the Turkish Penal
Code (European Parliament, 2012). Prior to compliance with EU criteria and the subsequent
creation of the New Turkish Penal Code in 2005, Article 462 allowed the discovery of an illicit
relationship to be used as a mitigating factor at trial, resulting in a one-eighth reduction in the
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prison sentence. Article 51, the unjust provocation clause, was often used in conjunction with
Article 462 and allowed for an additional two-thirds reduction in the prison sentence. These
clauses stipulating honor as a mitigating factor at sentencing were removed, and clauses listing
honor as an aggravating factor were added. Perpetrators can now receive life sentences for honor
killings (Koğacıoğlu, 2004; European Parliament, 2012). Interestingly, however, Baglı and
Ozensel (2011) found that increased sentences might not be enough. Of the 190 perpetrators
incarcerated for honor killings that they interviewed, 48.4% stated that longer sentences would
not deter them from committing future honor killings and 47.9% of respondents stated that they
felt no remorse for their crime. Furthermore, 27% of respondents stated that their honor killing
received a positive response from their family, and 53.7% received positive attention from other
inmates (as cited by Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014).
Clauses stating that perpetrators could receive reduced sentences if they were a minor or
could prove unjust provocation, as well as the conditions for trying cases of honor killings, have
also been amended (Koğacıoğlu, 2004; European Parliament, 2012). Taken together, youthful
offenders were previously receiving little to no criminal sentences, leading many family
members to choose the youngest family member to commit an honor killing in order take full
advantage of the Penal Code (Arin, 2001; Koğacıoğlu, 2004). In 2004, law 5237 of the Turkish
Penal Code specified that increased sentences will be given to perpetrators who commit crimes
against their spouse, child, or other family members (Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014). Today, the
Turkish Penal Code treats customary and honor killings the same, but women’s rights activists
unsuccessfully fought to have the word “honor” included in the new Code to distinguish the two
crimes (Pervizat, 2006).
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Other articles within the Turkish Penal Code that are related to honor violence are
adultery and blood feuds. The Turkish Criminal Code prohibited sex between unmarried
individuals until 1996, but defined fornication differently for men and women (women could be
convicted for having sex with one man, but a man could only be convicted if it was proven that
he was living with a woman who was not his wife). Adultery is still considered acceptable for
men but unacceptable for women, especially in eastern Turkey. Women who are suspected of
committing adultery often become victims of honor violence (Ilkkaracan, 1998). Finally,
tradition has been considered an aggravating factor when cases of blood feuds go to trial for
many years. Koğacıoğlu (2004) argues that this discrepancy clearly shows that men are valued
more highly than women in Turkey, highlighting flagrant structural inequality.
Furthermore, judges and prosecutors are given a great deal of discretion when trying
cases of honor violence, and often choose to apply lesser charges to cases of honor violence
because they empathize with perpetrators who kill for honor (Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Akpinar,
2003; Koğacıoğlu, 2004). For these reasons, Arin (2001) goes so far as to argue that honor
killings are a form of “state-sanctioned femicide” while Ahmetbeyzade (2008, p.p. 200) refers to
honor killings as “state-controlled gender discriminatory legal violence against women.” Perhaps
in response to these claims, prosecutors were instructed by the Ministry of Justice in 2006 to
begin family violence investigations immediately, seek restriction and protective orders when
necessary, and ensure that law enforcement carries out these orders (Kara, Ekici, & Inankul,
2014). Howe (2013) argues that although they were slow to follow the law, judges are also now
penalizing perpetrators of honor killings and rape more harshly than in the past.
Law to Protect Family & Prevent Violence Against Women (Law No. 6284)
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Law 6284 was enacted in 2012 “to protect women, children, and family members” who
are at risk of, or have experienced, violence by establishing and regulating procedures
concerning violence. Under this law, several actions can be taken to protect victims of violence
(Law no. 6284, 2012).
“Protective Cautionary Decisions”: Judges can issue orders for the protection of victims
with several stipulations. For example, perpetrators of violence can be forced to leave the marital
home (referred to by responders in this sample as “home suspensions”) and prohibited from
coming within a specified distance of the victims’ workplace. Victims can also be placed in
witness protection programs (Law no. 6284, 2012).
“Preventive Cautionary Decisions”: Judges can also issue orders that are intended to
prevent the perpetration of future violence. Perpetrators can be prohibited from threatening,
insulting, and humiliating the victim; suspended from the home; and prevented from approaching
the victim at their home, workplace, or school. If a shared custody agreement has been reached,
perpetrators may be required to have supervision when visiting with their children. Perpetrators
may be forced to refrain from contacting the person under protection through any alternative
means, including through the friends, relatives, or children of the person under protection.
Perpetrators may be instructed not to damage the personal belongings of the person under
protection, and relinquish all weapons to law enforcement (even if a permit has been issued to
legally carry the weapon or the individual is employed in a position requiring the possession of a
weapon). Preventive injunctions may also require the perpetrator to refrain from the use of
alcohol or drugs while in the presence of the protected person, or seek in patient treatment for
substance abuse (Law no. 6284, 2012).
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Civilian Authorities: Some preventive and protective measures can also be implemented
by civilian authorities (e.g., law enforcement officials and prosecutors). These include providing
shelter; financial aid; psychological, legal, and other related services; temporary protection in life
threatening situations; and two to four months of daycare (Law no. 6284, 2012).
Guidelines: Protective and preventive cautionary decisions are initially granted for six
months, with the possibility of extension or modification. Victims are not required to provide
evidence of violence in order for a cautionary decision to be immediately granted. Perpetrators
are immediately notified that a cautionary decision has been granted, and that violation of the
decision can result in imprisonment. The first violation of a cautionary decision may result in
three to ten days imprisonment, depending on the severity of the violation. Each subsequent
violation is subject to a maximum of thirty days imprisonment, not to exceed six months (Law
no. 6284, 2012).
Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centers: Law 6284 also required the establishment
of Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centers (ŞÖNİM) to support and monitor the
implementation of protective and preventive measures. ŞÖNİM’s are open seven days a week,
twenty-four hours a day, to provide a range of support services and collect data. This includes the
coordination of services (e.g., shelter, temporary financial aid, medical and legal assistance),
filing cautionary decision applications, managing call centers, and cooperating with NGO’s. The
employees of ŞÖNİM’s directly assist protected persons in a number of ways. Protected persons
are informed of their rights, where they can receive institutional support, psychological
counseling, employment assistance, and vocational training. Individual cautionary decisions are
monitored, and reports concerning the protected individual’s personal history are provided to the
court upon request.
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Perpetrators are also handled by ŞÖNİM’s. Reports concerning the perpetrators personal
history and implementation of the cautionary decision can be provided to the court upon request.
Perpetrators may also be required to attend anger management, stress management, training,
and/or rehabilitation programs in order foster attitudinal and behavioral change, as well as raise
awareness for violence prevention. Medical examinations may be required, as well as treatment
for substance abuse and psychological disorders. Additionally, ŞÖNİM’s are collecting data
concerning issued protective and preventive cautionary decisions (e.g., decision implementation,
sentencing for decision violations).
Police Responses
To my knowledge, no research has explored criminal justice responses to honor violence
in Turkey. In terms of a domestic violence response, the police follow standard procedures such
as first ensuring that the victim receives necessary medical attention, taking a victim statement,
conducting a risk assessment, contacting a social worker and the Child Protection Institution,
beginning an investigation, and processing a restraining order (Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014). In
2006, the Prime Minister directed police departments to include violence against women training
in their curriculum, as well as enforce a 10% quota for female police officers (Kara, Ekici, &
Inankul, 2014). 40,000 police officers in first responder positions were to be trained under this
directive on gender equality and violence against women, techniques for dealing specifically
with victims of violence, and the specifics of the Law for the Protection of Family (Kara, Ekici,
& Inankul, 2014). Although protection orders and shelters are usually provided by other
institutions, the police were also instructed to provide both temporarily in cases of a life
threatening emergency (Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014)
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Two recent studies examined police officers beliefs about violence against women. In
their survey of police cadets and police officers with over five years experience, Kara, Ekici, and
Inankul (2014) found that 68% of respondents do not believe that addressing domestic violence
is a primary duty, 38% believe that men and women are not equal, and 18% actually believe that
“some women deserve violence” (p.p. 12). Most officers stated that there has not been enough
domestic violence training within the Turkish National Police. This is evidenced in the sample
by the 21% of officers who had never heard of the Law for the Protection of Family and
Prevention of Violence Against Women, and the almost 50% who stated that they believe that
women exaggerate claims of domestic violence and that cases of domestic violence can be
resolved using mediation rather than legal measures. Unal et al. (2011) found that most police
cadets believed that wives should receive permission from their husbands to work; about half
believed that women should have intercourse with their husbands when asked; and
approximately one quarter believed that intercourse without consent is not rape and physical
abuse is acceptable (cited by Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014).
In terms of victim responses to police interventions, two national studies between 2007
and 2009 found that approximately 5% of respondents would seek help from the police if they
experienced domestic violence (Altınay & Arat, 2009; T.C. Başbakanlık Kadının Statüsü Genel
Müdürlüğü, 2009 cited by Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014). This study also found that only 41% of
respondents who were victims of violence, and did contact the police for help, were happy with
their experience (T.C. Başbakanlık Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü, 2009 cited by Kara, Ekici,
& Inankul, 2014). Victims of domestic violence have also reported that police officers are not
empathetic, are unresponsive or respond late to victims, do not complete investigations, do not
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inform victims about their rights, and attempt to use non legal methods to resolve disputes
(Altınay & Arat, 2009; Unal et al., 2011 cited by Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014).
Victims also tend to be blamed for honor violence, while perpetrators are empathized
with. The belief that perpetrators of honor violence should be treated leniently within the
criminal justice system is common (Arin, 2001; Caffaro, Ferraris, & Schmidt, 2014). Law
enforcement has been accused of failing to provide adequate protection to women experiencing
violent victimization concerning honor, and colluding with perpetrators of honor violence. In the
past, accomplices were never charged for their role in planning the crime, family members were
often not required to testify at the trial, in depth investigations were not conducted, and cases
were quickly closed (Arin, 2001).
Social Service Responses
Since the 1990’s, several NGO’s have been established in Turkey for victim support and
shelter (Altınay & Arat, 2009), as well as lobbying for legislative change. These organizations
provide services for all types of violence against women, including honor violence, such as
psychological and legal counseling, shelter, emergency evacuation to another city or country,
awareness raising activities about women’s rights, assistance with state institutions (e.g., social
services), training workshops for professionals dealing with violence against women, and day
care centers (Birdal, 2010; Kadav, 2014; Mor Çati, 2014; WWHR, 204).
Several organizations have a range of more specialized goals and services in addition to
the general services listed above. The Purple Roof Women’s Shelter, for example, emerged from
domestic violence protests and marches in the 1980’s, making it one of the first NGO’s to fight
for the protection of women from violence (Mor Çati, 2014). Purple Roof is an example of an
organization of women working to build institutions within Turkey that generates power for
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women, rather than a male-dominated state institution providing services to women (Arat, 1997;
Altınay & Arat, 2009). In this way, a main goal of Purple Roof is to promote self-sufficiency and
empower women to strive for gender equality, as well as “question social values which are a
production of violence against women” (Mor Çati, 2014).
Another NGO, Women for Women’s Human Rights (WWHR), was established in 1993
in Istanbul to educate women about their human rights in order to respond to violence against
women (Ilkkaracan, 1998). WWHR is an extremely influential organization in the Turkish
women’s movement, and their goal is to document laws and practices concerning women’s rights
in order to empower both women and women’s rights organizations (Birdal, 2010). WWHR is an
advocacy and activist organization, rather than an organization that provides direct services to
victims. Some of their main activities are aimed at increasing legal literacy through the
development and implementation of training programs on national and international women’s
rights, influencing national and international mechanisms for policy and legal decision-making,
fostering the exchange of information between organizations, and developing tools for women’s
organizations (WWHR, 2014).
In southeastern Turkey, many organizations were established in response to the suffering
women endured due to the armed conflict between the Turkish military and Kurdish guerilla
forces (Birdal, 2010; KAMER, 2014). KAMER, for example, was established in 1997 and now
manages women’s centers in 23 provinces of eastern and southeastern Anatolia. In 2003,
KAMER began working towards protecting women specifically from honor violence. In that first
year alone, KAMER worked with 23 female victims of honor violence. KAMER quickly
realized that most women and girls who are at risk of honor violence are unable to reach their
organization, so they began using outreach techniques in different neighborhoods. KAMER has
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also created 12 Kurdish language television programs to raise awareness, created documentaries,
makes house visits, and collaborates with a variety of state and local organizations (KAMER,
2011).
Honor violence is also a high priority for the Diyarbakır Bar Association Center for
Women’s Rights and Selis Women’s Solidarity Foundation. In addition to offering the general
services mentioned above, the Bar Association conducts risk assessments, provides state officials
(e.g., judges and prosecutors) with a four-hour gender awareness and human rights course, and
provides legal support other NGO’s in Diyarbakir. Similarly, Selis Women’s Solidarity
Foundation, began providing psychological services to women in 2002. Recognizing that walk-in
appointments are not always possible, Selis also hosts community activities like picnics and field
trips for women who do not feel safe visiting the organization offices (Birdal, 2010).
Many of these organizations are committed to remaining independently funded, meaning
they will not accept any funding from the state. These organizations believe that state funding
opens the door to manipulation and control (Birdal, 2010). For example, Selis argues that
framing honor violence as tied to specific regions and ethnicities reflects the state’s stance on the
Kurdish Question, and refuses to apply for state funding (Birdal, 2010). KAMER, however, is
one of the most well-funded NGO’s in Turkey. Because KAMER receives funds from state and
international organizations, as well as embassies and consulates, many NGO’s in Diyarbakır will
not collaborate with KAMER. These women’s organizations criticize KAMER for taking money
from a state that does not support the movement for Kurdish independence, which is a very
sensitive issue in Diyarbakır. KAMER counters this argument, however, by stating that they are
not affiliated with any political group, and provides services to women of all ethnic, religious,
and cultural groups (Altınay & Arat, 2009; KAMER, 2011).
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The shelter system is another contentious issue in Turkey. Three types of institutions
oversee Turkish women’s shelters. The General Directorate of Social Services and Protection of
Children (SHÇEK) is a state institution that manages domestic violence shelters called “women’s
guesthouses”. Municipalities manage shelters in larger towns at the community level, while
NGO’s manage several women’s shelters at the civil society level (Diner & Toktas, 2013).
Although Municipality Law 5393 was issued in 2005 with the goal of establishing shelters in
municipalities with more than 50,000 residents, there still are not nearly enough shelters to meet
the demand (Altınay & Arat, 2009; Diner & Toktas, 2013). In 2010 only 58 women’s shelters
were established in Turkey, with the capability of serving a total of 1,354 women.
These shelters often are not secret or secure, which puts the safety of both victims and
staff at risk of violence. Of the many different types of shelters, those run by SHÇEK are often
considered the most secure, and are preferred in high risk cases like honor violence (Diner &
Toktas, 2013). Turkish women’s shelters that are run by the state have, however, been described
as prison-like, in that they require women to give up their cell phones, obtain permission to leave
the premises, and report their activities after returning to the shelter. The purpose of this, it has
been argued, is to continue protecting the honor of the woman while she is under state protection
(Birdal, 2010). Birdal (2010) argued that this is the tradeoff for protection that non-state funded
agencies do not have the resources to provide.
Employees at women’s shelters argue that the dearth of shelters is indicative of the
governmental view that protecting the family, rather than women, is the priority. Women’s issues
(like shelters) do not receive much needed attention because men hold most positions of power
in Turkey and view domestic violence as an ordinary social problem rather than a serious issue to
be addressed. As a result, funds are not allocated to women’s services, even though there are
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definitely resources available in the budget. Additionally, shelters are expected to be managed
with few employees, who work on a part time basis and are not qualified social workers (Diner
& Toktas, 2013).
4.3: Case Country Two- United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (UK) is an island nation consisting of four countries: England,
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The islands are surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the
west and north, the English Channel to the south, and the North Sea to the east. The only land
border lies between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. With a population of
63,742,977, the UK is comprised of 87.2% white British, 3% black/African/Caribbean British,
2.3% Indian British, 1.9% Pakistani British, 2% mixed, and 3.7% other ethnicities. English is the
official language, with Scottish, Welsh, Irish, and Cornish recognized as regional languages. The
British population is 59.5% Christian (e.g., Anglican, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist),
4.4% Muslim, 1.3% Hindu, 2% other, 25.7% no religion, and 7.2% unspecified (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2014).
A basic understanding of the history of multiculturalism within the UK is important for
contextualizing the beliefs, attitudes, and opinions of institutional responders in this study.
Responders discussed the intersectionality of honor violence and a range of other factors, such as
multiculturalism, nationalism, immigration, religion, and forced marriage legislation. Each will
briefly be discussed below, in addition to the legal, police, and NGO responses.
Multiculturalism
The term “multiculturalism” is used to refer to theoretical, policy, and practical responses
to ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious diversity. The focus is on respecting diversity, and easing
tensions resulting from this diversity (Beckett & Macey, 2001; Garbaye & Schapper, 2014;
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Meetoo & Mirza, 2007). The term was coined in the 1970’s to refer to societies which were
developed by settlers (e.g., Australia and Canada), but was later applied to Western European
societies with growing populations of immigrants (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014). Before World
War II, immigration within Western Europe was mostly limited to other Europeans. After World
War II, Western Europe began to focus on economic development. This often involved the
utilization of foreign guest workers from less developed economies and former colonies to meet
temporary labor demands (Beckett & Macey, 2001).
This migration was not temporary, however. By the mid-1970’s, recession decreased the
need for foreign guest workers, but many migrant families had already established permanent
residency. This created a melting pot of cultures and lifestyles that was vastly different from
those considered typical to Western Europe. As a result, ethnic and religious minorities were
treated as a problem that needed to be solved through assimilation or integration (Modood, 1997).
Multiculturalism then emerged as a means of developing policies of antidiscrimination
throughout Western Europe, such as providing provisions for ethnicity and religion in policies
pertaining to housing, education, and healthcare. Partnerships at the local and national level were
also promoted with ethnic minority organizations (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014).
History of Multiculturalism in the UK
Conceptions of multiculturalism vary by country, and result in different institutional
responses that are influenced by political culture at both the local and national level (Modood,
1997). More specifically, Beckett and Macey (2001) argue that multicultural institutional
responses are dependent upon historical time period and ideologies concerning inclusion and
exclusion; assimilation; integration; cultural pluralism; citizenship; and nationalism. In the UK,
Garbaye and Schnapper (2014) argue that multiculturalism developed chronologically in three
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stages: the 1960’s “race relations”, the late 1970’s through the 1990’s “multiculturalism”, and
“the post-9/11 shift to shared values, integration, and cohesion” (p.p. 5).
In the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, families began migrating from the Indian
subcontinent (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). This prompted the “race relations stage”, which
was an initial wave of restrictive immigration policies by the Conservative and Labour
governments followed by a wave of integrationist policies (i.e., immigrants should be accepted
as a culturally diverse group, and afforded equal opportunities) (Beckett & Macey, 2001;
Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014).
A shift then occurred in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s towards antiracist policies in
response to urban violence throughout the country and a mobilization against racism, especially
the Brixton riots in 1981 as well as the Tottenham and Birmingham riots in 1985. For example,
‘Race Relation Units’ were developed in local councils to address social policies and
employment for disadvantaged ethnic minorities as part of the 1976 Race Relations Act. It was
also at this time that the term multiculturalism was first used by educators and politicians to draw
attention to new partnerships that were formed with ethnic community groups, as well as
highlight the educational needs of ethnic minority children (e.g., English classes and religious
accommodations). Funds were specifically earmarked for ethnic minorities, with Muslims having
a particularly strong voice throughout the 1980’s (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014).
Until the early part of the 21st century, British multiculturalism recognized and
accommodated differences between races, ethnicities, cultures, and religions. By the late 1990’s,
however, a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment occurred in conjunction with “crises of national
identity” (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014, p.p. 2). The third stage of multiculturalism, however, did
not begin until after the terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001. A few months prior to 9/11, riots occurred
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in northern England. These riots, coupled with the 9/11 attacks, shifted the multicultural
paradigm back towards assimilation and the new idea of “community cohesion”.
Community cohesion discussions focused on shared values, moral principles, and codes
of behavior; inter-community interaction; and social solidarity. After the 7/7/2005 terrorist
attacks in London, politicians completely retreated from using the term “multiculturalism”
(Latour, 2014). Multiculturalism policies were blamed for allowing violent home grown Muslim
extremists to go unchecked, and the trend toward the “securitization of immigrant integration”
(p.p. 9) gained more traction. Funding was pulled from ethnic minority groups and causes that
did not stress cultural cohesion, adherence to common (i.e., British) values, and integration
(Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014).
Thus, multiculturalism in a post-9/11 UK slowly began to shift the focus of cohesive
community partnerships with religious groups to policies like the Preventing Violent Extremism
strategy (aka, Prevent), the goal of which was to prevent Muslim radicalization through
community religious groups and government agency partnerships. In this context, discussions
became less about multiculturalism and more about how Islam should be addressed in the UK
(Arénes, 2014; Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014; Latour, 2014). More specifically, Arénes (2014)
argues that the 7/7 bombings were particularly traumatic for the British population because the
Muslim suicide bombers were born and raised in the UK. This led to the argument that the
suicide bombers had not been sufficiently integrated into British culture.
In 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron gave a speech rejecting multiculturalism,
arguing that such policies foster the separation of different cultures from the mainstream. It has
been argued that the pendulum of multiculturalism appears to have swung back towards
assimilation, with the expectation that British values and culture will be adhered to by ethnic
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minorities (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014). Madood (2014), on the other hand, argues that this is
not necessarily the case. While recent policies (e.g., community cohesion, security, immigration,
and naturalization) may not adhere to the multiculturalism of the past, they also are not
assimilationist. When viewed in the greater context of the current British state, these new
policies have not overturned or contradicted previous multicultural policies. Latour (2014)
argues that these policies have simply been securitized.
Multiculturalism and Nationalism
Multiculturalism and nationalism are inextricably linked in the UK. There are two layers
to this discussion of British nationalism. Garbaye and Schnapper (2014) discuss nationalism in
terms of what they call the “English question”, which is how the identity of the multinational
United Kingdom is defined, and whether that identity should be defined in terms of the British
majority. The UK is currently going through the process of redefining the British identity,
especially in light of the different definitions of what it means to be British from Scottish, Welsh,
Irish, and English perspectives (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014; Modood, 2014).
The second layer of British nationalism pertains to race, ethnicity, religion, and culture.
Modood (2014) argues that “Britishness” (p.p. 29) has always been identified as Caucasian,
which makes it difficult to include ethnic minorities in definitions of Britishness. In order for the
British national identity to evolve and become more inclusive, Britain would have to move
towards a multicultural and non-racial definition of Britishness. In order to do this, Madood
argues that the UK would have to “rethink the national story” (p.p. 30) in a collective and
pluralistic way which moves beyond assimilation and majoritarian nationalism.
Multiculturalism and Religion
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Religious diversity has been a contentious issue throughout British history. Relevant to
the current discussion is the position of Muslims within the predominantly Christian UK. In 1988,
Salman Rushdie published the Satanic Verses in the UK, a controversial novel that was
considered blasphemous by Muslim populations all over the world (Lewis, 1991). What would
become known as the Rushdie Affair began in January 1989 with public book burnings in the
UK city of Bradford, followed by countrywide protests (Latour, 2014), book bannings in several
Muslim countries, and violence against UK book stores selling the novel (Lewis, 1991). On
February 14, 1989, the Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (i.e., formal Islamic legal
decree, in this case a death sentence) against Rushdie (Lewis, 1991).
Modood (1990) argues that the intense reaction to the novel was due to the use of
sexually explicit imagery and vulgar language concerning the Prophet Muhammad, rather than
the novel as a critique of the Muslim faith. He further argues that although British South Asian
Muslims did not necessarily agree with the fatwa, they did support actions taken by the
Ayatollah because he “stood up for Islamic dignity” (p.p. 155). The crux of the issue was a
collective feeling of distress and confusion that the British government would go to great lengths
to protect the honor of the Saudi royal family by attempting to censor the drama-documentary
Death of a Princess, but failed to intervene with the publication of the Satanic Verses to protect
the honor of the Prophet Muhammad.
Latour (2014) argues that the Rushdie Affair brought national attention to what would
become termed “the Muslim community” (p.p. 44), through which all British South Asians were
identified. Xenophobic reactions to British Muslims increased, with Muslims replacing black
men “as the new enemy within” (p.p. 45). Latour further argues that the visibility and distrust of
this newly defined Muslim community led to the religious undertones applied to the ethnically
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motivated rioting in 2001. The riots, combined with the terrorist attacks on 9/11, led to a new
government strategy that focused on social cohesion and integration targeted to the British
Muslim community. Immigration and terrorism were firmly linked after the passage of the
Counter-Terrorism Act of 2001; Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act of 2002; and the
Terrorism Act of 2006 following the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London (Latour, 2014).
Patel (2008) argues that the retreat from multiculturalism and increased cooperation with
faith-based organizations, especially in regards to policy development, has opened the door for
religious fundamentalists to strengthen patriarchal power structures and further marginalize
minority women. Community representatives of these faith-based cooperations are typically
conservative, misogynistic, and homophobic males, while minority women remain politically
unrepresented and without power to fight for change. Faith groups have been tasked with
regenerating social capital within minority communities, thus drawing religion into traditionally
secular state and local policies. She argues that this is especially true in discussions of perceived
cultural crimes like honor violence and forced marriage, which state institutions “exoticise” (p.p.
21) and separate from other discussions of violence against women. Perceived cultural crimes are
then used to justify other agendas (e.g., immigration) that would otherwise be considered racist
and restrictive.
Criticisms of Multiculturalism
All forms of multicultural policies are criticized for being essentialist in that it is often
assumed that cultures have their own unique essence that is stereotypical and unchanging despite
context. This essence is then used to explain the behavior of everyone within specific ethnic
groups as if that culture is homogenous (Modood, 1997; Patel, 2008). In this way, multicultural
policies often target minorities rather than democratically include them (Patel, 2008). Modood
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(2014) argues that the future of multiculturalism is the acceptance of a Britain that is not defined
by race, religion, culture, or language. Assimilation and integration attempt to subsume other
cultures, making them more like the dominant culture.
Several scholars have argued that multiculturalism in the British context has been
problematic for addressing violence against women, especially perceived cultural crimes like
honor violence and forced marriage (e.g., Beckett & Macey, 2001; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007; Patel,
2008). Although domestic violence is not directly caused by multiculturalism, it is perpetuated.
A basic tenet of multiculturalism is respecting different cultures. In cases of violence against
women, this often manifests in institutional responses as non-intervention or mediation through
male community leaders. Under a multicultural framework, violence against women is allowed
to continue because it is considered a cultural practice in which the state should not interfere
(Beckett & Macey, 2001; Patel, 2008).
Beckett & Macey (2001) argue that accepting cultural diversity does not mean that there
are no limits to what is considered acceptable behavior, and it is not ethnocentric to believe that
violence against women is unacceptable in any culture. The problem lies in different definitions
of what is considered a basic human right, and the conflicting definitions that may exist between
cultures. The question of which basic human right trumps another (e.g., freedom of religion vs.
freedom from violence) is a philosophical question that is difficult for governments to address.
They conclude that failing to challenge cultural norms that result in violence is “colluding in the
continued oppression of the least powerful members of our society” (p.p. 317).
Forced Marriage
Garbaye & Schnapper (2014) describe discussions of forced marriage in South Asian
communities as an example of a multiculturalism “policy flashpoint” (p.p. 16) in the UK, while
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Guiné (2014) argues that forced marriage has been used to legitimize policies linking
immigration and terrorism in Western Europe. The forced marriage debate within the UK is
related to discussions of honor violence in two ways. First, I (and several respondents in this
study) argue that forced marriage is often conflated with honor violence. Although forced
marriage is not necessarily a form of honor violence, forced marriage can lead to honor violence.
Second, forced marriage and honor violence are often linked in discussions of policy and
institutional responses.
Forced marriage in the UK is defined as one “where one or both people do not (or in
cases of people with learning disabilities, cannot) consent to the marriage and pressure or abuse
is used” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Home Office, 2014a). A person can be charged
with forced marriage if they use violence, threats, or coercion in order to force another person
into marriage; and/or uses deception in order cause another person to travel outside the UK for
the purpose of a forced marriage (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014a). There have been two
approaches to addressing forced marriage that have emerged over the last decade. Feminists
argue that forced marriage is a human rights issue, and that cultural difference should not be used
as an excuse to oppress women. The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, on the other hand, argues that
cases of forced marriage should be mediated within the family in line with Islamic tradition
rather than addressed by outside institutions (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014; Guiné, 2014).
Current government policy favors the feminist approach (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014),
defining forced marriage as a human rights violation as well as a form of violence against
women and men (Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Home Office, 2014a). In 2005, the
Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) was established as a joint venture between the Foreign &
Commonwealth Office and the Home Office, followed by the 2010 Forced Marriage Civil
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Protection Act, and the 2014 Anti-social Behaviour, Crime, and Policing Act. The FMU provides
individual support both within and outside the UK, although overseas support can only be
provided to British nationals through consular assistance. This support includes a public helpline,
safety advice, the prevention of “reluctant sponsor” cases (i.e., when an unwanted spouse
attempts to move to the UK), the rescue of victims who are unwillingly being kept overseas,
outreach and training programs, and awareness raising campaigns (Foreign & Commonwealth
Office and Home Office, 2014a).
Under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime, and Policing Act (effective June 16, 2014),
forced marriage became a criminal offense punishable by up to seven years in prison (Crown
Prosecution Service, 2014a; Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Home Office, 2014b).
Prosecutors previously used existing legislation in cases of forced marriage (e.g., false
imprisonment, kidnapping).
Violations of Forced Marriage Protection Orders (FMPO) also fall under the 2014 act,
punishable by up to five years in prison (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014a). A FMPO is issued
by the Family Court to protect current and potential victims from forced marriage, making it a
civil remedy. The terms of an FMPO differ by individual case, but generally prevent civil and
religious marriage ceremonies, thereby protecting the intended victim. Other restrictions can be
added to the FMPO on a case by case basis. Both adults and minors can apply for FMPO’s (as
long as the child has someone to assist them or court permission), as well as relevant third parties
(who are appointed by the Lord Chancellor) (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014a; Foreign &
Commonwealth Office and Home Office, 2014b).
Interestingly, the person being protected by the FMPO can decide how they would like
violations of FMPO’s to be addressed. There are two options. The first is having the Crown
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Prosecution Service pursue criminal sanctions punishable by five years in prison. Victims can
also choose to seek an arrest warrant from the Family Court, where the offender will be charged
with contempt of court (punishable by up to two years in prison). Police officers now have the
power to arrest violators of FMPO’s without an order issued by the courts (Crown Prosecution
Service, 2014a; Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Home Office, 2014b)
Honor Violence in the UK
Honor violence first became a hot button issue in the UK in the 1990’s after several cases
were well publicized by the media. Since then, honor violence has continued to be a crime that is
most often associated with South Asian and Middle Eastern communities (Peyton, 2014;
Siddiqui, 2005). Although the focus is mainly on Muslim populations, cases of honor violence
have also been reported in Sikh and Hindu communities in the UK (Siddiqui, 2005). Honor in
the South Asian context is usually defined as izzat, which “is measured by the degree of respect
shown by others” (Chakravarti, 2005, p.p. 309-310). Women are considered the bearers of izzat,
while males are tasked with upholding the izzat of a family. Izzat is often linked to caste systems.
Honor can be lost or gained through money and power, as well as behavior, within families in
upper castes. In lower castes, however, families have only their honor as a means of increasing
their social power. Thus, violence is used to punish those who violate the family honor in an
effort to maintain social power and control (Chakravarti, 2005; Werbner, 2007).
An interesting dichotomy exists in discussions of honor violence within the UK, in that
honor violence (like forced marriage) is defined as a cultural crime that only exists within ethnic
minority communities. White western populations also are described as having honor, but not as
perpetrators of honor violence (Reddy, 2008; Sen, 2005; Siddiqui, 2005). Some scholars argue
that examples of honor violence were previously present in British society (e.g., in the form of
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duels to protect the reputation of a family member or woman), but that honor is a more personal
construct in today’s society which does not control women’s behavior in the same way as
collective South Asian communities. Partial defenses to homicide, however, do parallel using
honor as a justification for murder. Western males might not cite honor as a motivation for their
crime but they will state that the behavior of a woman (e.g., committing adultery) made them
lose control and unjustly provoked them to kill out of anger (Sen, 2005; Siddiqui, 2005).
In terms of perceived cultural crimes like honor violence, it has been argued that
multiculturalism leads to several problems. On a practical level, multiculturalism has led to nonintervention from a variety of institutions (e.g., law enforcement, social services) out of a respect
for culture and religion (Meetoo & Mirza, 2007; Siddiqui, 2005), and the fear of appearing racist.
On a more philosophical level, multiculturalism homogenizes cultures and focuses on the
differences between ethnic groups rather than the similarities between them (Siddiqui, 2005).
Stating that a specific culture or ethnic group is completely homogenous, and that everyone
within that culture follows the same traditions, removes individual agency. In other words, it
remains unexplained why, if cultures are completely homogenous, everyone within that culture is
not committing honor violence. Furthermore, attributing honor violence to specific cultures and
ethnicities separates these crimes from other forms of violence against women (Reddy, 2008).
Another danger of considering religion and culture in situations of forced marriage and
honor violence is what Patel (2008) calls the relativist approach, which is the presumption that
human rights originate in the West and should not be forced on other cultures. She argues that
this argument certainly does not apply, however, in countries that have signed the Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Patel, 2008).
Crown Prosecution Service/British Penal Code
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There are no specific laws addressing honor violence within the British Penal Code.
Honour based violence (HBV), as it is referred to by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), is
considered an umbrella term that that covers a variety of established criminal offenses. The CPS,
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), and support groups define HBV as “a crime or
incident that has or may have been committed to protect or defend the honour of the family
and/or community.” The CPS further specifies that HBV is a “collection of practices” which are
used to control the behavior of family or other social groups, and force adherence to perceived
cultural and religious beliefs. HBV is considered a human rights violation, domestic violence,
and/or sexual violence (ACPO, 2008; Crown Prosecution Service, 2014a).
The CPS prosecutes HBV using the CPS Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy.
Cases of HBV and forced marriage are flagged by the CPS according to special guidelines and
procedures. Prosecutors are instructed to record all forced marriage offenses under the AntiSocial Behaviour, Crime, and Policing Act of 2014, breaches of FMPO’s, and other criminal
offenses connected to forced marriage (e.g., harassment, kidnapping, blackmail, immigration
offenses) in the CMS Case Management System. Additionally, any criminal offenses motivated
by honor must be recorded in the CMS Case Management System. In cases of HBV, prosecutors
will try cases according to the specific crime committed (e.g., murder, assault, assisted suicide,
conspiracy to commit murder). Flagged files are then referred to a specialist prosecutor, who will
work closely with police officers in complex cases (e.g., homicides, multiple defendants,
multiple jurisdictions) (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014b). The CPS also provides very detailed
instructions for prosecutors working on cases of HBV and forced marriage, which are publicly
available (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014a).
Police response
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Although police forces throughout the UK have created websites that provide information
on HBV and available services (e.g., London Metropolitan Police, 2014; West Midlands Police,
2014), very little information is available on the actual police response. Interestingly, in an effort
to provide transparency, the Greater Manchester Police (2014) have made their procedures in
handling cases of honor violence and forced marriage publicly available. This very detailed
document provides definitions of HBV and forced marriage, explanations of the roles of different
ranking police officers and support staff, procedures for handling cases, risk assessments,
external agencies who provide additional services, and relevant legislation. This document
corroborates information I collected from police officers in both the Metropolitan Police Service
and the West Midlands Police Service, thus making it a good resource on general procedures
followed throughout England.
- Definitions, Aims, Roles, & Responsibilities
The Greater Manchester Police (2014) use the same definitions of HBV and forced
marriage as the CPS and ACPO, adding that HBV occurs in several cultures, nationalities,
communities, and religions. They also differentiate HBV and other forms of violence, explaining
that several family and community members will often collude to commit honor violence and
forced marriage. Within their aims, this document states that the goal of police intervention in
cases of honor violence and forced marriage is to investigate effectively and hold offenders
accountable for their actions “without stereotyping, stigmatizing, or making assumptions about
any given individual or community” (p.p. 1). Furthermore, the police aim to instill confidence in
victims to report instances of honor violence and forced marriage, as well as effectively assess
the situation through risk assessments in order to protect the victim from violence in the future.
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The responsibilities of each employee of the police department is listed in this document,
including Superintendents, Divisional Commanders, Call Handlers, Enquiry Counter Officers
(i.e., officer who takes walk in complaints), Inspectors, Constables, and Detectives. For example,
Superintendents are responsible for providing leadership, advice, and guidance; reviewing force
performance; and serving as the agency liaison. Call Handlers are the first point of victim contact,
and are informed that they are often the “one chance” (p.p. 3) for victims to receive help. They
are trained to be sympathetic, reassuring, and calming while acting in accordance with the forces’
Domestic Abuse Policy (Greater Manchester Police, 2014).
Enquiry Counter Officers are trained to ensure confidentiality and privacy, request an
officer from the Public Protection Investigation Unit or Senior Detective, and accurately record
the incident with only the victim (i.e., not in the presence of a family or friend that has
accompanied the victim to the police station). Police officers (e.g., Constables, Inspectors,
Sergeants) have a range of duties, but all are trained to understand and/or follow standard
operating procedure. In other words, not all officers will engage in the following activities in the
course of their normal duties (e.g., some offices are first responders while others are in
supervisory roles) (Greater Manchester Police, 2014).
- Procedures
The first step in helping victims of honor violence is to collect detailed personal
information, beyond simple demographics and contact information. Victims are asked for their
passport information, where they attend school, whether they have children, employment
information, names and addresses of their parents, National Insurance number, travel plans, and
addresses where they may visit family abroad and in the UK (Greater Manchester Police, 2014).
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The responding officer will then record the details of the allegation, beginning with
whether there have been any threats, abuse, or “hostile action” (p.p. 17) against the victim. As
the officer collects this information, they are trained to consider the safety of the victim and
whether a Safety Plan should be implemented. For example, victims may be at increased risk of
harm if their family members are made aware that the victim has contacted the police. If this is
the case, the victim and others (e.g., siblings, significant others) may need to be immediately
removed from the home and placed under protection. Officers are trained to use vetted
interpreters, rather than family members, and contact a Specialist Child Protection Investigating
Officer if the victim is under the age of 18 (Greater Manchester Police, 2014).
The Domestic Abuse, Stalking, and Honour Based Violence Risk Identification,
Assessment, and Management Model (DASH) is then completed with the victim. Officers are
trained to prepare for situations when the victim wishes to return home, despite being at high risk
of future violence. In these cases a safety plan is established, which can include code words for
all contact between the officer and the victim, information on FMPO’s, alerts to the FMU and
port authorities, and advise on changing bank and cell phone accounts. Additionally, all victims
are asked to consent to the collection of fingerprints, DNA, and photographs, as well as noting
distinguishing marks, features, and tattoos. This information is entered in a separate database, or
in some cases only recorded on paper (Greater Manchester Police, 2014).
Officers are also trained in what not to do. Victims are never to be turned away due to the
belief that their claim is not one for the police to handle. Family members or community leaders
are never to be approached unless the victim requests such contact, and officers should never
attempt mediation between the victim, family, and/or community. Information should never be
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shared with third parties unless the victim requests the sharing of information, and express
consent is given (Greater Manchester Police, 2014).
The report also discusses several additional concerns in cases of HBV and forced
marriage. Officers are warned that although many families who have perpetrated violence
against their children will not file missing person reports, others will file criminal charges against
a child who has run away from home in the hopes that the police will locate and return the child.
Sometimes families will ask third parties (e.g., lawyers, family doctors) to request information
from the police in order to learn the whereabouts of a child. These requests are often made over
the phone, rather than through official channels, in the hopes that the third party can persuade an
employee within the police station to reveal sensitive information.
Officers also receive instructions concerning relocation and witness protection. In many
cases, even a simple relocation of a victim can be traumatic. Victims are often asked to move to
another city and sever contact with their family, friends, and community, meaning they lose
social, emotional, cultural, religious, and education support networks. Officers are reminded to
constantly be aware of these additional forms of vulnerability faced by victims, as well as show
compassion and understanding if a victim decides to return home after reporting their
victimization.
NGO Response
The NGO response to honor violence in the UK has mainly been through Black Minority
Ethnic (BME) women’s organizations. Respondents in this study most commonly reported
working with the following three charities in cases of violence against women: Southall Black
Sisters, Iranian Kurdish Women’s Rights Organisation (IKWRO), and Karma Nirvana. Links to
these charities are also provided on police websites (e.g., London Metropolitan Police, West
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Midlands Police, Greater Manchester Police) for victims of honor violence and forced marriage.
The following section will provide a brief description of these charities, as well as a range of
smaller charities and organizations that also address honor violence and forced marriage.
One of the largest and most well known women’s NGO’s, Southall Black Sisters, opened
in 1979 to campaign for the rights of African-Caribbean and Asian women. Southall Black
Sisters identify themselves as a secular feminist organization with the goal of acknowledging and
working against racism, religious patriarchal control, and violence against women (Patel, 2008).
Southall Black Sisters provides a range of services to BME women and children who have
experienced gender based violence (including honor violence and forced marriage). They also
have consulted on forced marriage legislation in the Home Office, as well as helped to develop
policies concerning honor violence and forced marriage for the Crown Prosecution Service and
the police. The Southall Black Sisters have made ten recommendations for best practices for
addressing gender-based violence in the UK, which will be discussed in Chapter 7.4 (Southall
Black Sisters, 2014).
Karma Nirvana was established in 1993 specifically to support victims of honor violence
and forced marriage. This organization is grounded in the belief that cultural acceptance should
not include the acceptance of harmful practices like honor violence and forced marriage. They
are also committed to training professionals dealing with cases of honor violence and forced
marriage, focusing on the idea that service providers should not be afraid to offend communities
by addressing perceived cultural crimes. Karma Nirvana offers a range of services such as a
hotline which provides assistance to both victims and professionals seeking guidance on cases,
awareness raising and training programs for law enforcement officials and schools, statutory
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guidance for government officials, and referrals to support agencies for victims (Karma Nirvana,
2014).
IKRWO, founded in 2002, provides culturally specific responses to women and girls
from the Middle East, Afghanistan, and other vulnerable communities in the UK who are at risk
of honor violence, forced marriage, child marriage, female genital mutilation, and domestic
violence. This response includes direct services, as well as advocacy and training for police
social service organizations, and schools. The direct services provided are advice on legal rights
and employment training, referrals to specific agencies (e.g., housing, immigration),
accompaniment to appointments (e.g., police, health, legal), English language classes), and
counseling (IKWRO, 2014).
A variety of smaller BME charities also provide direct services to victims of honor
violence and forced marriage. Although many of these charities were established to provide
direct services to specific populations, such as Imece Women’s Centre (for Turkish, Kurdish, and
Turkish Cypriot women), Henna Foundation (for Muslim women), Saheli (South Asian women),
and Ashiana Network (South Asian, Turkish, and Iranian women), they will support as many
members of the BME community as funding will allow. Some of these charities (e.g., Ashiana
and Saheli) also run shelters for female victims of violence (Ashiana, 2014; Imece Women’s
Centre, 2014; Henna Foundation, 2014; Saheli, 2014).
Additionally, there are second tier organizations like Imkaan and Against Violence &
Abuse (AVA) that do not provide direct services to victims. Instead, these organizations provide
services to the agencies that are directly working with victims of violence and abuse. Both
organizations serve as consultants (e.g., service evaluations, writing documents and booklets,
research, partnership development, capacity building), training on violence against women and
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girls, hosting events (e.g., conferences, networking activities), guidance on best practices (e.g.,
toolkits, sample policies and procedures), newsletters, and advocacy. Imkaan identifies as a BME
organization, while AVA does not (AVA, 2014; Imkaan, 2014)
Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs)
MARACs are implemented by a British charity called Coordinated Action Against
Domestic Abuse (CAADA). The goal of CAADA is to provide practical support to professionals
and organizations serving victims of domestic abuse, in an effort to form a response that is multiagency and risk-focused. (CAADA, 2014). In MARACs, representatives from statutory and
voluntary agencies discuss cases of high- risk victims of domestic abuse (including honor
violence). The goal of these conferences is to coordinate a plan by sharing information and
forming partnerships between agencies, thereby increasing the safety of the victim (CAADA,
2014; Home Office, 2011). MARACs are typically led by the police, meet at least monthly for
two to four hours, and discuss as many as 20 cases. Participating agencies include the police,
Independent Domestic Violence Advisors, healthcare, probation, housing, children and young
people’s services, adult services, and mental health (Home Office, 2014). Two hundred seventy
MARACs are currently operating throughout England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland,
which manage approximately 64,000 cases per year (CAADA, 2014).
- Summary
Turkey and England were chosen for study because of the high number of identified
cases of honor violence, and an established institutional response. Additionally, both countries
consider honor violence to be a problem among minority populations (e.g., Kurds and South
Asians), but not the majority population. Although both countries conceptualize honor violence
as one form of domestic violence, the two countries differ in their approach to responding to
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honor violence. The Turkish police response treats honor violence as a form domestic violence,
with no procedural differences. The law, however, allows for honor to be considered an
aggravating factor at sentencing under the customary killing code.
England, on the other hand, treats honor violence as a specific form of domestic violence.
There are units within the police service that specialize in investigating honor violence, and
prosecutors who are trained to try cases of honor violence. Although the law does not
differentiate honor violence from other types of crimes, forced marriage has been criminalized.
Social service and NGO responses in both countries are careful to identify cases of honor
violence in order to appropriately address the escalated risk associated with these types of
offenses.
These sites not only allow for a comparison of two different responses to honor violence,
but also an examination of othering at both the macro and micro level (e.g., governmental,
organizational, and individual). An examination of othering within Turkey adds to the
conceptualization of othering in an interesting way. Honor violence is often associated with
Muslim populations, yet Turkey is a mostly Muslim country that engages in othering based on
ethnicity. This differs from England, where othering often occurs based on both ethnicity and
religion. Using Young’s (2007) description of liberal and conservative othering, this study adds
to the literature by examining two different forms of discriminatory responses to the same social
problem.
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CHAPTER 5: METHODS
5.1: Research Questions
This study examines honor violence, with a particular focus on institutional responses to
honor violence in Turkey and England by addressing the following questions:
(1) How does the social construction of “honor” and “honor violence” vary by culture?
(2) What are the institutional responses to honor violence in Turkey and England?
How are they similar or different?
(3) How do the responses of individual institutions differ?
(4) What are the goals of, and challenges to, institutional responses to honor violence?
(5) How effective are these responses?
(6) What are the beliefs, attitudes, and opinions of the individual actors within these
institutions towards the victims and perpetrators of, and responses to, honor violence?
(7) What consequences do these beliefs, attitudes, and opinions have on institutional
responses to honor violence?
(8) Is othering occurring among institutional responders? In what ways?
(9) Is othering influencing discriminatory institutional responses?
(10) How are crimes of honor similar to or different than other forms of violence against
women?
5.2: Expectations/Hypotheses
This is an exploratory study of institutional responses to honor violence, therefore
specific hypotheses were not tested. I did, however, have some expectations of what I would
find based on the literature.
H1: Each country will have different social constructions of both honor and honor violence.
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H2: Each institution (criminal justice and social service) will have different (and perhaps
conflicting) goals in responses to honor violence
H3: Evidence of othering in institutional responses will be found in each country. This may be
evidenced, for example, in the description of and attitudes towards victims and perpetrators;
making overgeneralizations about the victims/perpetrators based on culture, race, religion, or
ethnicity; or the choice of response (e.g., arrest or provide a warning).
H4: In England, I expect to find strong support for making honor violence a separate crime under
the penal code within the criminal justice and social service organizations.
H5: Strong support for changing the term “honor violence” is expected in social service
organizations, but not in criminal justice organizations.
5.3: Research Design
This research is a qualitative, comparative case study of institutional responses to honor
violence in Turkey and England. The goal of this study is to examine the multiple levels of
individual, societal, institutional, and political contexts of honor violence as a complex social
problem, at the micro and macro level. According to Yin (2009),“ a case study is an empirical
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context,
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 18).
Case studies address a research question through the description of specific individuals, groups,
nation-states, or cultures using multiple methods of data collection (Flick, 2009; Patton, 2002;
Yin, 2009). In this way, the unit of analysis is the case.
Purposeful sampling, which is typically used for studying unique and limited populations
in their entirety, is used in this study to gain in depth and highly descriptive information of
critical cases (Bachman & Schutt, 2007; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). In this study, the cases studied
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are Turkey and England. Nested within the case study of each country are case studies of two
institutions (criminal justice and social service), the organizations that make up those institutions,
and the individuals working within those organizations. Thus, there are several levels of units of
analysis. Interviews and vignettes are used as case data (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009) to examine
these institutional responses to honor violence in each country at the individual level to build into
the country level case studies to be compared.
5.4: Preparation
Affiliations with universities in each country were established in August 2013 through
the colleagues of Dr. Michael Maxfield, dissertation advisor. Several key stakeholders in
criminal justice and social service/NGO institutions were emailed between May and July 2013,
prior to arrival in-country. The Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) training was
completed in February 2013 and the application to the John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Institutional Review Board was completed in May 2013. Consent forms, interviews, and
vignettes were translated into Turkish prior beginning fieldwork.
5.5: Data Collection
Criminal justice and social service institutions in each country were examined. Each incountry contact agreed to provide an introduction to officers of differing ranks in police
departments, NGO’s and social service agencies that serve victims of honor violence, attorneys
and government officials who have experience with cases of honor violence, and professors and
researchers who have studied honor violence.
Fieldwork
Fieldwork in Turkey (Istanbul and Diyarbakır) was completed between July 1 and
September 28, 2013 (n=39). Although I received two months of intensive Turkish language
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training, I was not able to conduct interviews completely in Turkish without assistance. Thus,
three graduate students from Istanbul Bilgi University were hired as research assistants to assist
with the fieldwork. Each research assistant was not only fluent in Turkish and English, but also
had experience researching gender-based violence. These students assisted with scheduling and
interviewing respondents who were not fluent in English. Fieldwork in England (London and
Birmingham) was completed between July 1, 2013 and December 23, 2013 (n=35).
Interviews
Access to Responders in Turkey
- Police Officers
To get access to police officers in Turkey, my advisor requested the help of a colleague
with access to individuals working for the Turkish National Police. We met shortly after my
arrival in Istanbul to discuss my research project and whom I wanted to interview. This contact
stated that he could refer me to many police officers with experience responding to honor
violence, but warned that most police officers would not agree to be audio recorded.
This contact set up my first interview in Istanbul, and stated that the first interviewee
would recommend other police officers that I could interview with the help of a research
assistant. This method of snowball sampling did not occur, however, and I had to rely on my
initial contact to arrange all of the interviews with police officers in Istanbul. My contact
arranged interviews with police officers of different ranks at many different police stations
throughout Istanbul. Although I would have preferred to conduct interviews in a neutral location,
I was instructed to interview the police officers at their office.
The interviews with police officers in Istanbul were difficult. Most police officers
initially refused to sign the consent form. When my research assistant explained that we could
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not proceed without their signature, many officers printed and signed their names illegibly. Only
one police officer in Istanbul allowed us to record their interview. Several police officers went so
far as to say that, if asked, they would deny ever having spoken with me. I assured them that I
would not identify them by name anywhere in my research. I also decided not to identify the
rank or specific department of any police officer interviewed in Turkey to further protect their
identities. During one interview, one officer explained why police officers were so hesitant to
give interviews and completely unwilling to be recorded. He stated that police officers have been
fired in the past for giving interviews to researchers that the Turkish government deemed to be
negative portrayals of Turkish institutions. He gave a specific example of a police officer with a
PhD in a social science who conducted research showing that ecstasy use is common among
Turkish high school students. After his research was published, he was fired. As a result, police
officers are currently afraid to conduct their own research or even give interviews to researchers
that may reflect badly on the Republic of Turkey in any way.
To address the issue of being unable to record interviews, two research assistants
accompanied me to interviews. While one research assistant conducted the interview and took
abbreviated written notes, the other research assistant took detailed notes on their laptop. Both
research assistants were asked to transcribe and translate their notes immediately after the
interview. Most of the police officers said that they could only give thirty minutes of their time,
which greatly limited the interview. We did not have time to ask all of the interview questions,
and my research assistants also did not have time translate as they were conducting the interview.
Instead, I had to rely on them to complete the interviews completely in Turkish and wait for the
translated transcripts. The police officers in Istanbul also tended to refuse to answer certain
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questions, or gave purposefully vague answers. In some instances, other police officers joined in,
turning the session into a group interview.
My police contact in Istanbul referred me to a very helpful contact in Diyarbakır, where
the interview process was much easier. As in Istanbul, this contact in Diyarbakır arranged
interviews with officers of differing ranks throughout a variety of police departments. The police
officers in Diyarbakır had much more time to give for the interview, allowing for more
information to be collected. All but one of the police officers in Diyarbakır allowed their
interviews to be audio recorded, which required only one research assistant. She took
abbreviated notes as she conducted the interview, then transcribed and translated both the
interview and her notes. All three research assistants also provided invaluable insight throughout
the interview process, providing detailed explanations as footnotes within the transcribed
interviews of concepts and events that they thought I would not understand from the context of
the interview.
- Interviewing Social Service and Women’s NGO Professionals
I also experienced a great deal of difficulty finding social service and women’s NGO
professionals who were willing to speak with me in Istanbul. I began by interviewing two
Researchers who were also Activists at Istanbul Bilgi University. Both interviewees were very
involved in the women’s movement in Turkey, and had a list of responders that they
recommended I speak to based on their knowledge and experience with honor violence.
Many of these responders, however, would not respond to my requests for an interview.
After an interview with a Legal Activist at a women’s NGO in Istanbul, I asked if she knew why
I might be having so much difficulty arranging interviews with responders in the social service
sector. She explained that
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“Turkey has become a target of foreign researchers, which is good, but the researchers
are not connecting afterwards and not looking at the history of how things used to be,
and just get the information and not give feedback about the research and what the
product- it causes frustration. We are spending time and effort and we want more than
just taking and leaving, we want a more- we want the contact and collaboration to
continue somehow. We feel like laboratory subjects, so organizations decide they are not
talking to researchers for a while. We want to support, but if it’s only coming from one
side it’s a problem. It creates a barrier to reaching people, they’re not willing to do it
anymore. I would advise you in the beginning of your interview you should tell people
that you will at least send your thesis for example. They need some kind of assurance that
these people will only tell the information, and then you go and they’ll never hear from
you in the future.”
As a result of this conversation, I will be providing a copy of my dissertation to every responder
who participated in this study. I hope to be able to collaborate further if responders have an
interest in continuing with this line of research.
I then discussed this problem with two of my research assistants. Both women are very
well connected with social service and women’s NGO professionals in both Istanbul and
Diyarbakır, and offered to begin requesting interviews from their contacts as well as persistently
following up with the professionals who had not responded to my initial requests for interviews.
As a result of their help, I was able to begin making contact with many influential responders.
With more time, I am sure I would have had greater success. I am deeply indebted to both
women. Without their help, I doubt I would have been able to interview more than one or two
professionals in the social service sector.
Access to Responders in England
All of the interviews in England were audio recorded, and then transcribed. Interviewees
typically had enough time for the entire interview.
- Police Officers
The interview process was similar in England. My initial contact at University College
London introduced me to a police officer at the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). She then
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arranged interviews with police officers of different ranks, working in different boroughs
throughout London. Although some of these interviews took place in cafes, most interviews
occurred in the office of the interviewee. The police officer with the MPS put me in contact with
an officer at the West Midlands Police (WMP) in Birmingham. All of the interviews were
arranged over a five-day period at the offices of the interviewees.
- Interviewing Social Service and Women’s NGO Professionals
Prior to my arrival in England, I researched NGO’s who assisted victims of honor
violence. I emailed each of these NGO’s, but had difficulty making contact. Many of my
interviews were the result of other interviewees requesting the help of their friends and
colleagues. In many interviews, I was told that I most likely was not receiving responses because
social service and women’s NGO professionals are bombarded with requests for research,
especially from Master’s and Ph.D. students. Many professionals find the requests tiresome,
while others simply do not have the time to participate in every request for research. I believe
that if I had more time in country, I would have had more success in breaking through this
barrier.
In sum, sampling was not systematic because in many cases I had very little control over
who was chosen for interview, where the interview would take place, or whether all of the
interview questions could be asked. As mentioned previously, what were intended to be single
interviews often turned into group interviews. There were several reasons that these situations
occurred. With Police Officers in Istanbul, it appeared that I was considered a novelty. For
example, the friends of the police officer who was being interviewed would stop by their office,
see the interview taking place, become interested in the discussion, and decide to participate. At
times the interviews took on an almost party-like atmosphere, with refreshments served and up to
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five police officers present. Not all of the officers would participate in the discussion. Rather,
they seemed interested in simply listening to what was being discussed. In these situations, I was
advised by my research assistants that any attempt to clear the room would be considered very
insulting and may end in our being asked to leave. Thus, we continued with the interviews to the
best of our abilities.
In many other cases in both Turkey and England, an interview with one responder would
be scheduled and, upon our arrival, an additional person would be present. In these situations,
responders explained that they thought the second person would add additional expertise to the
interview. I chose to continue these interviews in pairs, consenting both interviewees, because of
the risk of losing interviews with knowledgeable responders outweighed the desire to strictly
adhere to the research design.
Interview Process
Key stakeholders were selected for interview based on their knowledge of, and
experience with, honor violence. These interviews provide the context for understanding the
institutional response to honor violence and the factors that influence the response. Responders
were asked for their own specific beliefs and opinions, rather than give responses that reflect the
beliefs and goals of their organization. It is possible, however, that their responses were
influenced by the agendas of their organizations. I conducted a total of 74 interviews. A detailed
description of participants is provided in the following chapter.
Informed consent was obtained prior to all interviews. Any questions concerning the
study were answered to ensure that the participant understands the conditions of their
participation and any potential risks or benefits that may occur as a result of the study. Each
participant was informed that they may withdraw their consent at any time. An iPad was used to
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obtain consent digitally, using consent forms uploaded through the “Form Tools PDF” app for
iPad. Having participants electronically sign the consent form better protected confidentiality by
avoiding paper forms, allowed for back-up to remote servers, and made it easier to manage the
forms while travelling. The iPad was password protected, and the signed consent forms were
exported to the study laptop and a remote server for backup.
Although the goal was to conduct a sixty to ninety minute interview with each respondent,
some interviews were considerable shorter due to time restraints for the interviewee. The
questions were semi-structured and open-ended (see Appendix A for the Interview Schedule).
The interviews were semi-standardized in that there were many pre-established questions that
were asked in a systematic and consistent order, but the format was less formal. Informality
allowed me to address questions that are more relevant to the personal beliefs of each respondent,
and probe further into questions that may not be as applicable to other respondents (Flick, 2009;
Yin, 2009). Finally, I attempted to create a comfortable, non-judgmental, and respectful
atmosphere that encouraged the interview to flow like a conversation in the hopes that the
respondent would be willing to answer the questions honestly and completely (Hermanowicz,
2002; Yin, 2009). Earlier interviews informed subsequent interviews to ensure the richness of the
data collected.
Interviews were audio-recorded on an iPad, and then uploaded to the study laptop for
transcription and analysis. Field notes were taken either during, or as soon as possible after, the
interviews (Ely et al., 1991; Patton, 2002). These notes focused on my observations and
interpretations of what was discussed, as well as on the body language and nonverbal cues of the
respondent. Field notes also addressed biases and judgments that I may have brought to the
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research, as well as identified pervasive and atypical characteristics in the sample (Guba, 1981;
Patton, 2002).
Transcription of interviews was an ongoing process. I transcribed the interviews
conducted in English with Turkish responders. The interviews conducted in Turkish were
divided between my three research assistants, who provided both the Turkish and English
transcripts along with their field notes. Although I attempted to keep up with transcription while
conducting the overseas fieldwork, the majority of transcription was completed after my return to
the U.S. A fourth research assistant was hired to help with the transcription of the interviews
conducted in the UK.
Vignettes
Vignettes describing a case of honor violence that is common to each country were also
administered to assess othering among institutional responders. A vignette provides a
hypothetical narrative about a specific situation. Research participants are asked to read the
vignette, and then answer closed- or open-ended questions pertaining to the hypothetical
situation (Thaler, 2012). Vignettes are often used to examine violence, honor, and othering, for
example police responses to violence against women (including honor violence and racism)
(Erez & Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian & Erez,
2002), othering and honor violence (Gianettoni & Roux, 2010), emotional reactions to perceived
violations of honor (Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000; 2002b), violence in honor cultures
(Lee & Ousey, 2011; Vandello & Cohen, 2003), rape (Murthi, 2009), and violence against peers
and dates (Cauffman et al., 2000).
The vignettes in this study (adapted from Gianettoni and Roux, 2010) describe a case of
honor violence that is common to Turkey and England. The script of each vignette is identical,
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except for the names, religions, and ethnicities of the hypothetical characters. Thus, there are
eight variations of the vignette (see Appendix B for full versions of each vignette). The names in
the vignettes reflect common names of members of the respective religious and ethnic majority
and minority populations. Police officers in England were presented with a vignette describing
the case of a victim of honor violence named Emily (a common English name), and another
vignette describing the case of a victim named Geetanjali (a common South Asian name). Police
officers in Turkey were presented with a vignette describing the case of a victim of honor
violence named Ayla (a common Turkish name), and another vignette describing the case of a
victim named Zilan (a common Kurdish name). The responses of how the interviewees would
respond to the case in the vignette were compared to assess differential treatment of victims
based on religious and ethnic stereotypes. An in depth discussion of the interviews and vignettes
used in the study are provided in the following sections.
The responses of how the interviewees would respond to the case in the vignette were
compared to assess differential treatment of victims based on cultural and racial stereotypes.
Vignettes were only given to interviewees who work with victims. Although I attempted to
administer an equal number of each type of vignette in a random manner, this was not always
possible due to unexpected group interviews. Thus, vignettes were typically given in an
alternating fashion (e.g., Turkish, Kurdish, Turkish) by type of responder (e.g., police officer,
social worker).
5.6: Quality and Credibility
It is important to consider reliability and validity when designing a research study, but
these concepts do not always translate well in qualitative research designs. Lincoln and Guba
(1986) argue that internal validity can be addressed in terms of credibility, external validity in
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terms of transferability, reliability in terms of dependability, and objectivity in terms of
confirmability. Credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability can then be used to
address trustworthiness, which is another way of describing methodological rigor. Credibility
refers not only to rigorous research methods, but also the training and experience of the
researcher. The research should also be dependable, in that the research plan is systematically
designed and followed, as well as transferable to similar situations.
Patton (2002) identifies nine criteria that should be met to ensure the quality and
credibility of qualitative methods grounded in a social constructionist perspective. The first five
criteria apply to the researcher as an individual. As a researcher, I must (1) acknowledge the
subjectivity of my analysis and interpretations, (2) strive for an enhanced and deepened
understanding of the perspectives of the respondents (3) that are authentically depicted, (4) make
contributions to dialogue, (5) and strive for reflexivity.
Reflexivity emphasizes self-awareness throughout the research process (Patton, 2002). I
must consider my own thoughts, feelings, and experiences when conducting the interviews with
key stakeholders, as well as during the process of describing, analyzing, and interpreting the
interviews with key stakeholders (Krumer-Nevo & Sidi, 2012; Patton, 2002). The challenge was
to find my voice, acknowledge bias, and authentically present multiple perspectives while
providing critical and creative analysis. Reflexivity can be achieved by asking the following
questions: “What do I know? How do I know what I know? What shapes, and has shaped, my
perspective? With what voice do I share my perspective? What do I do with what I have found?
How do the participants know what they know? What shapes, and has shaped, their worldview?
How do they perceive me? Why, and how do I know? How do I perceive them?” (Patton, 2002).
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More specifically, reflexivity can be used to avoid othering within research methodology
and writing by considering the history of the participant (key stakeholders), and in this case the
history of the population that the key stakeholders are providing services to. The institutional
response in each individual country was considered specifically and contextually (Krumer-Nevo
& Sidi, 2012). One of the main goals in the proposed study is to be aware of the social and
political contexts under which the institutional responders being interviewed are operating, as a
way of using specific examples to inform a universal framework (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Mohanty,
1988; 2002) for institutional responses to honor violence. Finally, any researcher who is studying
a population that is considered an Other must be careful not to represent individuals as objects
(Krumer-Nevo & Sidi, 2012), even if that population is indirectly studied through key
stakeholders who are serving the othered population.
The final four criteria, (6) trustworthiness, (7) particularity (taking unique cases into
account), (8) praxis (relating theory and reflexivity to action), and (9) triangulation are
methodological concerns. Triangulation is the process of using a variety of data sources, methods,
theories, and analysts to study the same issue. The goal of triangulation is to overcome bias and
add credibility to research findings by testing for consistency of results. The proposed study used
multiple data methods (interviews and vignettes), data sources (key stakeholders in two
institutions), theories (othering, social control, and social construction), and member checks to
provide triangulation (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). According to Guba (1981), member checks “go
to the heart” of credibility. Member checks allow research participants to provide feedback on
the perceived validity, accuracy, fairness, and completeness of the data (Guba, 1981; Patton,
2002). In this study, member checks were conducted during the study. Throughout each
interview, I restated and summarized comments made by the respondent to determine accuracy.
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5.7: Data Analysis
Qualitative content analysis was used to examine themes present in the field notes,
interviews, and vignettes conducted during the case study. Data collection and analysis were
ongoing and iterative process throughout the duration of the study, in which newly and
previously collected data were constantly compared and contrasted in reference to established
themes (Bowen, 2008; Patton, 2002).
Data analysis began with open coding. In this initial stage of coding, emerging concepts
and themes were extracted from the raw data and analyzed in manageable pieces. These
emerging themes and concepts provided descriptions of what is occurring in the data (Strauss &
Corbin, 2007; Patton, 2002). Separate memos were written for each interview about the thought
process that occurred during the identification of each theme and their underlying concepts and
codes. These memos also differentiated the higher-level concepts from the lower level concepts.
Higher-level concepts can be applied to multiple participants in that they serve as unifying
mechanisms. Lower-level concepts provide information pertaining to the higher-level concepts
that relate specifically to the individual (Corbin & Strauss, 2007). Special attention was paid to
the use of racial, religious, or ethnic wording and statements to establish whether othering is
occurring. Themes were added to Excel spreadsheets by category for organization and to track
how many responders expressed similar beliefs (e.g., definitions of honor violence, descriptions
of institutional responses, best practices). These spreadsheets were then merged and imported to
SPSS.
The second step in the data analysis was axial coding. During this stage of analysis,
relationships between concepts, themes, and cases were determined. Themes typically refer to
emergent categories (e.g., definitions of honor violence). Patterns, similarities, differences, and
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connections in the data were identified and explored. Patterns typically refer to descriptive
findings (e.g., “most key stakeholders believe that honor violence is different from intimate
partner violence”). To do this, bivariate analyses were conducted in SPSS focusing on
relationships between the country, type of responder (e.g., police officer, social worker), and
specific theme (e.g., honor is very difficult to define, responses should be multi-agency and
holistic). Finally, the themes, concepts, codes and their relationships were interpreted using
inductive reasoning, in that hypotheses about what the data means were made based on the
theoretical framework. Significance was attached to these relationships order to synthesize the
data and draw conclusions both within and between countries (Corbin & Strauss, 2007; Patton,
2002).
5.8: Ethical Considerations
There are very few ethical considerations in the proposed study because interviews will
be conducted with key stakeholders, rather than vulnerable populations such as victims or
perpetrators. It is important to consider, however, that I am studying a dominant population that
is providing institutional responses to a minority population who is considered the Other. From
one perspective, I might be considered a part of the dominant population. From another
perspective, I am an outsider studying responses to a sensitive and politically charged social
problem. Like all outsiders, my views are subjective. I was careful to recognize that, and be wary
that it does not unduly influence what I claim or conclude.
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS
6.1: Participants
	
  

As can be seen in Table 1, 39 responders from Turkey (52.7%) and 35 responders from

England (47.3%) were interviewed. More specifically, 18 responders working in Istanbul
(24.3%), 21 in Diyarbakır (28.4%), 23 in London (31%), 10 in Birmingham (13.5%), 1 in
Manchester (1.4%), and 1 in the Welsh city of Cardiff (1.4%) were interviewed. Responders
identified their nationalities as Turkish (52.7%), English (44.6%), Scottish (1.4%), and American
(1.4%). More female responders (64.9%) were interviewed than male responders (35.1%). The
sample is ethnically diverse, with responders identifying as Turkish (29.7%), Kurdish (20.3%),
Kurdish/Armenian (1.4%), Kurdish/Zaza (1.4%), White (29.7%), Asian/Indian (4.1%),
Asian/Pakistani (5.4%), Black (2.7%), and Indo-Caribbean (1.4%). Most interviews were
conducted with responders working within criminal justice organizations (63.5%), followed by
social service organizations or NGO’s (25.7%), universities (8.1%), or the government (2.7%).
Responders interviewed for this study were Police Officers (56.8%), Lawyers (12.2%), Social
Workers (6.8%), Employees at Women’s NGO’s (10.8%), Psychologists (2.7%), Researchers
who are also Activists (8.1%), and Governmental Officials (2.7%).
	
  
Table 1. Description of Participants

	
  

N

%

Country
Turkey
England

39
35

52.7
47.3

City
Istanbul
Diyarbakır
London
Birmingham

18
21
23
10

24.3
28.4
31
13.5
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Cardiff
Manchester

1
1

1.4
1.4

Nationality
Turkish
English
Scottish
American

39
33
1
1

52.7
44.6
1.4
1.4

Sex
Female
Male

48
26

64.9
35.1

Ethnicity
Turkish
Kurdish
Kurdish/Armenian
Kurdish/Zaza
White
Asian/Indian
Asian/Pakistani
Black
Indo-Caribbean
Missing

22
15
1
1
22
3
4
2
1
3

29.7
20.3
1.4
1.4
29.7
4.1
5.4
2.7
1.4
4.1

Type of Organization
Criminal Justice
Social Service/NGO
University
Government

47
19
6
2

63.5
25.7
8.1
2.7

Position
Police Officer
Lawyer
Social Worker
Researcher/Activist
Women's NGO Employee
Psychologist
Government Official

42
9
5
6
8
2
2

56.8
12.2
6.8
8.1
10.8
2.7
2.7

	
  
Table 2 presents the affiliated organizations of interviewed responders.
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Table 2. Organizational affiliates of study participants

	
  

Type of Institution
Criminal Justice

Name of Institution
Police Department
Police Department
Metropolitan Police Service
West Midlands Police
Private Law Practice
Bar Association
Crown Prosecution Service

Social Service/NGO

Municipal Women's Shelter
Women for Women's Human
Rights (WWHR)
Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınağı Vakfi
(Purple Roof Women’s Shelter
Federation)
Kadın Dayanısma Vakfı
(Women Solidarity Foundation,
KADAV)
Kadın Merkezi Vakfı
(Women Center Foundation,
KAMER)
Kadın Adayları Destekleme
Dernegi (Woman Candidates
Support Foundation, KA.DER)
Diyarbakır Women’s Problems
Research and Application Center
(DIKASUM)
Association of Selis Women’s
Counseling Center
Centers for Avoiding and
Monitoring Violence (ŞÖNİM)
Imkaan
IMECE Women's Center
Iranian & Kurdish Women's Rights
Organisation (IKWRO)
Karma Nirvana
Against Violence & Abuse (AVA)
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85	
  

Number of
Interviewees Research Site
9
Istanbul
11
Diyarbakır
9
London
10
Birmingham
2
Istanbul
2
Diyarbakır
2
London &
Manchester
1
Istanbul
1

Istanbul

1

Istanbul

1

Istanbul

2

Diyarbakır

1

Diyarbakır

1

Diyarbakır

2

Diyarbakır

2
2
1

Diyarbakır
London
London

1
1
1
1

London
Leeds
London
London

Researcher/Activist

Government

Istanbul Bilgi University
Haliç University
University of London
London Metropolitan University
Foreign & Commonwealth
Office/Home Office (Forced
Marriage Unit)
Mayor's Office

Total

2
1
2
1

Istanbul
Istanbul
London
London

1
1

London
London
74

As discussed in Chapter 5, I did not have the opportunity to ask each responder all of the
interview questions. In most cases, this was because the responder did not have time to complete
the entire interview. In these interviews, I focused on questions pertaining to the institutional
response to honor violence in their country. I usually skipped the questions concerning
definitions of honor and honor violence, as well as their opinion on use of the term “honor
violence”.
6.2: Definitions of Honor
Although I was unable to ask 13 responders (17.6%) for their definition of honor, I was
able to infer definitions of honor in 11 of those interviews. In two cases, the question was asked
but the Turkish responder did not provide an answer (2.7%). A definition of honor could not be
inferred from the rest of these two interviews. Thus, 70 responders provided definitions of honor
(94.6%). Several themes emerged in responders definitions of honor, which have been divided
into the following categories: difficulty defining honor; definitions vary; descriptions of honor;
honor’s relationship to other concepts; and honor in terms of gender, family, and race/ethnicity.
Difficulty Defining Honor
Approximately half of the population (52.7%) began by saying that honor is a very
difficult concept to define, while 24.3% stated that honor is a very complex concept (9
responders in each sample). British responders had a particularly difficult time defining the
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concept, with almost half (40%) automatically associating honor with honor violence. Seven
responders (9.5%) argued that honor is not something that is written down or verbalized in any
way, but is at the same time a very ubiquitous concept. This may be part of the reason that many
responders had a difficult time defining honor. A Detective Sergeant with the WMP compared
her definition honor to a definition she once read in a research study conducted with a group of
South Asian women. In this study, one of the participants described honor as being like
“…the weather- it's always there, and it's something like- it's like a veil, it's something
that is not spoken about. It's something that they're born with, and they know exists, and
know their rules, but it's never defined. So, for me, honor is something that is very
controlling, but never spoken about, but everybody knows what it means, and what the
consequences can be if you break that, that complex set of codes. Does that make sense?”
Interestingly, she was unable to provide her definition of honor, instead drawing on a definition
of honor provided by victims of honor violence.
Definitions Vary
Although only two responders used the exact phrase “honor exists on a continuum”,
most responders described honor in this way. For example, 61 responders (82.4%) argued that
definitions of honor differ according to individuals, regions, and/or countries. Twenty-six
responders (35.1%) described honor as being defined differently in the East and the West.
Several responders gave detailed explanations of how definitions of honor differ between
regions within Turkey. According to several responders, definitions of honor differ not only
between eastern and western Turkey, but also within different cities in the same region. Based on
the experience of one police officer working in western Turkey, he argues that honor killings do
not occur in western Turkey because they do not conceptualize honor in the same way as eastern
Turks. In eastern Turkey, people “live for honor” and believe that if they lose their honor, then
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their life has ended. They will then be too ashamed to face the community. If their child is
dishonored they believe that the life of the child is over as well, which leads to honor killings.
Two responders described how definitions of honor in Turkey differ from other countries.
For example, I interviewed a Turkish Researcher/Activist in Istanbul who also wrote her doctoral
dissertation on honor violence. She explained that defining honor in a Turkish context is very
difficult and she, in fact, devoted 85 pages of her dissertation to the topic. A police officer
provided a more detailed description on differences between regions and countries. Throughout
his interview, this he explains that he experienced stereotypes of eastern Turks while living in
western Turkey. He realized that people thought that eastern Turks were uncivilized and
uncultured, and it changed the way he thought about his own culture. He stated that he is now
cultured and civilized, even though people still believe that he is stereotypically different from
them simply because he was born in the east. He does not think this stereotype can be overcome,
but he tries to bring western beliefs back to the east in order to make his family and community
more enlightened and refined.
Honor was described as collective, individualistic, or both by 55 responders (74.3%). In
the UK, 13 responders (37.1% of the UK sample) described honor as both collective and
individualistic, three as collective only (8.6%), and one as individualistic only (2.9%). In Turkey,
20 responders described honor as collective (51.3% of the Turkish sample), two as
individualistic (5.1%), and 16 as both (41%). Of the 20 responders who reported that honor is a
collective concept, 16 were police officers (15 male and one female). Of the 16 responders who
identified honor as both collective and individualistic, 13 were employed in social service or
NGO’s (all female). Finally, 12 responders described honor as having a positive connotation
(16.2%), 15 a negative connotation (20.3%), and 25 both (33.8%). For example, some responders
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described honor as being a positive attribute (e.g., pride or respect) while others described honor
negatively (e.g., losing status in the community or violating social norms).
Descriptions of Honor
Responders tended to then provide broad descriptions of what honor means to them.
Eleven respondents (14.9%) began by stating that honor is an “ancient” concept. Honor was
then described as a value (55.4%), ideology (16.2%), rules and customs (67.6%), morals (31.1%),
beliefs (47.3%), pride (12.2%), a human right (8.1%), and social capital (8.1%). Honor can also
be part of a person’s personality (5.4%), their reputation (32.4%), status in the community
(28.4%), a form of respect and disrespect (18.9%), and the respect of male figures (6.8%).
According to a Chief Prosecutor with the CPS, the definition of honor has changed over
time. Honor is “something to proud of” as an individual, but also is related to the status of the
family. For him, honor is defined as the level of respect that a person receives which is related to
how a person is perceived by the community. He argues that this definition of honor has
morphed into something that women are responsible for, and is thus used to control female
behavior. A Research Officer for a women’s NGO described this definition of honor as a form of
social capital in collective societies, in that the behavior of one person reflects on the entire
family. 	
  
Some descriptions of honor were provided by one group more than another. For example,
89.7% of the Turkish sample described honor as rules and customs. In other words, there are
certain rules that each individual is supposed to follow in a specific culture. Violations of these
rules (e.g., having sex before marriage) can result in the loss of honor. Although 42.9% of the
British sample also described honor as rules and customs, 17.1% specifically stated while they
are aware that others describe honor in this way, they do not. For these responders, honor was
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described as more individual and based on being a good person. Of the 12 responders who
described honor as an ideology, 10 were Turkish. Five of the six responders who described honor
as a human right were Turkish, and all of the responders who gave this description were women.
Interestingly, although 12 of the 14 responders who described honor as a form of respect
or disrespect were British, each of the five responders who described honor specifically as the
respect of male figures were male Turkish police officers. Two female Turkish social workers
noted that many individuals believe that honor means respecting male figures, but they argue that
this is an incorrect definition of honor. Each responder who described honor as part of one’s
personality were British, and eight of the nine responders who described honor as pride were
British. Honor was typically described as reputation by British responders (19 out of 24),
meaning how an individual is perceived by others. This perception is often based on whether the
person exhibits good morals, and knows “right from wrong.”
Many responders described honor in terms of what they believe the concept is related to.
For example, responders stated that honor is related to patriarchy (51.4%), religion (32.4% yes,
27% no), culture (74.3% yes, 5.4% no), and control (33.8% yes, 1.4% no). According to the
Director of a Charity in London, for example,
“For me it’s patriarchy. It’s absolutely patriarchy in action. A system of beliefs that sees
the honor of the collective, but particularly a mans’ honor, vested within the behavior of
women and girls, but also those who they see in an inferior power position to themselves.”
Similarly, the Director of a women’s NGO in London argued that honor cultures are typically
associated with countries in the Global South. These countries are perceived as subscribing to
patriarchal definitions of honor in which the woman is the “holder” of family honor and the man
is the “enforcer” of honor. This is linked to the idea of honor as a form of control. Of the 25
individuals who argued that honor is about controlling others, 21 were Turkish. For these
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responders, honor was described honor as a way for parents to control their children and for male
family members to control female family members. All six of the responders who argued that
honor does not mean controlling others were British, five of whom acknowledged that the belief
that honor and control are related is incorrect. In other words for them, honor is a positive
construct that should be defined in terms of personal pride and respect, not used to police the
behavior of others.
The majority of responders described honor in terms of gender. Generally, 73% of the
population discussed whether honor applies to both females and males (54.1%), or only females
(18.9%). Of the 13 responders who believe that honor only applies to females, 12 were Turkish
police officers (11 male and one female). Thirty-two of the 40 responders who argued that honor
applies to both males and females also specified that the belief that honor applies only to females
is incorrect. Honor violence is learned and, as a female Social Worker in Diyarbakır stated, “has
been the system’s tool to dominate women for over centuries or maybe millennia.” Similarly,
when a Researcher/Activist in London was asked to define honor, she argued
“I think there are vestiges of it, or echoes of it, across many many countries, cultures,
and communities- it’s just not called honor. It’s called disrespect in some
communities…there are lots of ways that men and families seek to control women’s
behavior, and there are lots of ways that women’s behavior is seen to- that whole idea of
respectability in middle class and working class families, about respectable behavior for
women and girls. So honor codes are I think an extreme version of that, where there are
explicit almost, and they are treated almost as rules governing behavior, so they become
kind of familial governance. And certainly diasporic communities, there’s such a
variation in how they do gender, and how they think about daughters…”
Additionally, 16.2% stated that honor is related to gender roles (36.5% said this is an
incorrect association), female sexual behavior (17.6% yes, 45.9% no), female virginity (6.8% yes,
27% no), females wearing conservative clothing (13.5% yes, 12.2% no), marriage (17.6% yes,
10.8% no), and adultery (16.2% yes, 18.9% no). Each of the 13 responders who believe that
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honor is related to female sexual behavior were male Turkish police officers. The 34 responders
who argued that honor is not related to female sexual behavior also argued that this is an
incorrect assumption.
The five responders who argued that honor is related to female virginity were male
Turkish police officers, while 20 responders argued that this association is incorrect. Of the 13
responders who argued that honor is related to marriage, 11 were male Turkish police officers.
Eight responders argued that marriage is incorrectly associated with honor. The 12 responders
who argued that honor is related to adultery were male Turkish police officers, while 11 of the 14
responders who argued that honor is incorrectly associated with adultery were female social
service responders. Seven of the 10 responders who argued that honor is related to wearing
conservative clothes were male Turkish police officers (two were female social workers), and
nine responders argued that this association is incorrect. A Social Worker in Istanbul, for
example, stated that measures of honor frequently change, and any perceived violation of honor
can result in honor violence. As she spoke, she pointed to my research assistants’ tank top and
said wearing that shirt could cause someone to commit honor violence. A male Police Officer in
Diyarbakır also spoke about women’s clothing, saying
“This is the way people see the concept of honor. Honestly, when you compare women
with veil (türban) to more relaxed dressing, our society is so shallow, they consider the
veiled woman honorable and the other with dishonor. However, they have no idea about
their inner self. Their veil or conservative dressing does not indicate their honor, belief,
good personality. Or does not indicate the other person’s dishonor, disbelief, or their bad
personality. You cannot know that.”
Interestingly, he argues that it is not logical that a woman who wears a veil is considered
honorable, while a woman who does not wear a veil is dishonorable. What a person wears does
not tell us anything about their inner self.
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Furthermore, 21.6% said honor is defined differently for men and women, men can
commit adultery without losing honor (6.8%), and men and women cannot be friends (4.1%). For
example, a female Social Worker in Diyarbakır stated “I do not have a definition because it
depends if you are a woman or a man.” Similarly, a Police Constable with the WMP
“Police Constable: Have you heard the saying yet, “women are like silk, men are like
gold?”
Interviewer: I’ve heard it, but I don’t know where.
Police Constable: Oh, yeah. I heard it off a solicitor from London that women are like
silk- if you drop them in mud, they’re tarnished forever. Men are like gold- if you drop
them in mud it’s fine. There’s no issue.”	
  
Four of the five responders who argued that men can commit adultery without being dishonored
were male Turkish police officers, making statements such as
“Honor is about women. When it is used for me it is used in another meaning, about him
being honest, respectful, etc. People don’t think that a man loses his honor when cheats
his wife. That man is just an ordinary man who has cheated his wife.” (Istanbul)
Several responders discussed honor in terms of family. For example, 62.2% of the total
sample stated that there is psychological and social pressure to conform to honor codes. A police
officer in Istanbul, for example, was born and raised in northeastern Turkey. He described honor
in eastern Turkey as being “collective”, meaning there is social pressure for both men and
women to conform to established cultural rules and customs. Women are especially pressured to
conform to the rules and customs pertaining to honor because if she does not conform, she will
be alienated from society. Women also know that sometimes, violating norms and customs can
lead to violence. This police officer implied that although the threat of violence is real, the
psychological pressure to conform is much greater because of the potential to be shunned by
society. Cultural rules and customs limit behavior. Although these rules and customs may not be
written down, everyone knows them and also knows that if they violate these cultural norms,
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they will risk their place in society. Others discussed whether honor violations affect entire
families (29.7% yes, 44.6% no), and whether the head of the family enforces honor (8.1% yes,
43.2% no).
6.3: Definitions of Honor Violence
Like honor, defining honor violence was not a simple process for responders, and
involved many inter-related parts. These are discussed in terms of causes, motives, types,
perpetrators, and victims.
Causes of Honor Violence
As part of their answer, many responders listed events that can trigger honor violence. I
have divided these into two categories: Indirect and Direct Causes.
Indirect Causes
I define indirect causes as more macro level causes. Responders discussed these macro
level causes of honor violence as factors that play a role in all cases of honor violence, but do not
have a direct impact on specific honor crimes. In these discussions, responders tended to use
language like “honor violence is associated with” or “related to” specific concepts like culture,
race, ethnicity, religion, morality, education level, and socioeconomic status.
- Culture
The majority of responders discussed the relationship between culture and honor violence
(89.2%). Culture was often defined in terms of race, ethnicity, and religion. Although these
concepts greatly overlap, they are discussed separately below in an effort to provide a more clear
description of responders’ opinions. Most responders (79.7%) generally argued that honor
violence is rooted in culture, while 9.5% argued that the two are not related. To be clear,
responders specifically used the word “culture” in their answers.
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Turkish responders discussed honor violence in Turkish culture in two specific ways.
First, 41% of the Turkish sample argued that honor violence is a tradition in Turkey. For
example, when asked what causes honor violence a Police Officer in Istanbul stated
“Tradition. The society has always been like this.” Second, four Turkish responders (10.3% of
the Turkish sample) argued that honor violence is related specifically to tribal cultures. Similarly,
12.8% of the Turkish sample and one British Police Officer argued that honor violence is related
to feudalism.
Each responder who argued that honor violence has no relation to culture was British
(20% of the British sample). For example, a Detective Sergeant with the MPS stated
“But we find that it’s very difficult because we don’t want investigators to get very
mindset around ‘oh it must be HBV so we’re dealing with cultural issues’ it’s not aroundwe’re very quick when we do the training to say that it’s nothing to do with cultural
issues, it’s nothing to do with the Qur’an or things that are said in regards to religions.
And we get quite culturally blind around some of these issues as well, so ‘you can’t deal
with this because you’re offending my culture’- it’s actually got nothing to do with
culture, we’re looking at real offenses here. So HBV is the umbrella term that we use.”
- Race & Ethnicity
Linked to this discussion of culture was the role of race and ethnicity in honor violence
(81.1%). For example, seven Turkish responders believe that honor is an important part of the
Turkish identity (18% of the Turkish sample), six argued that honor is part of the Middle
Eastern/Muslim Identity (15.4%), and ten argued that honor is associated with eastern Turkey
(25.6%). For example, a lawyer in Istanbul stated,
“Actually we live in a region where ‘honor’ term is used constantly. I believe the Turkish
identity and the Muslim identity are both feeding the term of honor. In my opinion, honor
means living by the rules of men’s world, saying that the women’s body and soul belong
to the patriarchal system. I think this is the determining part of what we call ‘honor’. And
this feeling is very intense in our region, I think.”
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In the Turkish sample, 69.2% of responders discussed honor violence in terms of race or
ethnicity. This occurred in one of two ways. Kurds were mentioned specifically by 43.6% of the
Turkish sample, with 5.1% stating that Kurds are committing honor violence and 38.5% stating
that honor violence is incorrectly associated with the Kurdish population. I argue that Kurds
were also discussed indirectly when responders specified where honor violence occurs in Turkey
in that 33.3% of the Turkish sample argued that honor violence is committed most often in
eastern Turkey (which is commonly associated with the Kurdish population), and 37.1% argued
that people living in southeastern Turkey have different beliefs than the rest of Turkey. On the
other hand, 23.1% argued that honor violence occurs throughout Turkey.
In the British sample, 94.3% discussed race or ethnicity. The majority of the British
sample (76.8%) discussed the association between honor violence and the South Asian
population, with 25.7% arguing that honor violence is a predominantly South Asian crime in the
UK and 51.4% arguing that honor violence in incorrectly associated only with South Asians. To
be clear, these responders acknowledged that honor violence does occur in South Asian
populations. It is incorrect, they argued, to associate honor violence exclusively with South
Asians because it occurs in a variety of populations. For example, British responders argued that
honor violence occurs in African (34.3%), Eastern European (34.3%), Middle Eastern (31.4%),
Latin American (8.6%), and Caribbean (5.7%) populations. Similarly, 14.2% of the British
sample argued that honor violence is incorrectly associated only with the BME community and
54.3% argued that honor violence also occurs in white western populations.
When asked to define ‘honor’, a Researcher/Activist in London had an immediate
negative reaction, saying
“You see now, I have an issue with that [defining honor], because my philosophical
position is that all violence against women is coming from the same place. Which is the
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way in which women are constructed, perceived, historically, and how that then becomes
part of culture. And for me honor is so specifically linked to ethnicity that I prefer to use
violence against women rather than honor because honor is always linked to a
community and a family… And there’s this whole idea and other trajectory where you
become uncivilized and do those kind of things to becoming more civilized and not doing
honor crimes. ‘We don’t do honor crimes in our communities over here.’ But of course
we do.”
- Religion
Responders in this study were specifically asked whether they believed honor violence is
related to religion. Half of the total sample stated that honor violence is not related to religion,
17.6% said the two are related, and 28.4% argued that although religion is related to honor
violence, it is not the only cause. In many interviews, this discussion led to the description of
religions that are associated with honor violence. Honor violence was associated with Islam most
often, with 9.5% only mentioning Islam and 24.3% arguing that honor violence does occur in
Muslim populations but is incorrectly associated only with Islam. One responder stated that she
believes that honor violence is associated with Islam more often than other religions because
Muslims seek help more often than other religious populations. British responders also argued
that honor violence occurs in Sikh (17.1% of the British sample), Christian (14.9%), Hindu
(14.3%), and Jewish (5.7%) populations.
Responders provided arguments for why honor violence and religion are related, as well
as why they are not. More Turkish responders (28.2% of the Turkish sample) argued that honor
violence and religion are related than British responders (5.7% of the British sample) saying, for
example that all religions are patriarchal, oppressive, and appear to condone violence against
women. More specifically, 14.9% of the total sample argued that religion shapes culture and
13.5% of the total sample argued that Islam is a male dominated and patriarchal religion, which
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leads to honor violence. Two female Turkish responders (one Psychologist and one Social
Worker) argued that killing women is more common in Muslim societies.
Most responders, however, provided arguments for why religion does not cause honor
violence. Half of the total sample argued that religion is used as an excuse for honor violence, as
well as a way to relieve a perpetrator’s conscience. Interestingly, 20% of the British sample used
the phrase “religion is a tool” for committing honor violence. For example, a Detective
Constable with the MPS stated “I think that what families do is they use religion as a tool to beat
the victims with.” No religion, 44.6% of responders argued, condones murder. According to a
Lawyer in Istanbul,
“Killing women for one way or another has always existed. Honor violence is just one
form of it…this is just one excuse for killing women in the name of something.”
Eight responders (10.8%) argued that problems occur when people are not well-educated about
their religion, and two British responders argued that people frequently misinterpret holy texts.
For example, traditions are often confused with religious rules.
I followed up by asking responders if honor violence is not related to religion, then why
does it occur? Most responders argued that honor violence is motivated and caused by a variety
of other factors rather than religion, such as custom, morality, education, socioeconomic status,
disobedience, relationships, sexuality, and implied honor violence.
The majority of responders discussed custom as a cause of honor violence (75.7%), with
37.8% arguing that tradition is a cause more often than religion. For example, 71.6% of
responders argued that honor violence is caused by a violation of custom and 4.1% stated that it
is not. This association was more common among Turkish responders (92.3% of the Turkish
sample) than among British responders (57.1% of the British sample). Some responders argued
that honor violence is in itself a cultural custom. For example, several Turkish responders argued
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the Turkish Penal Code proves that honor violence is a custom because it is regulated through the
customary killing code. Others argued that a specific violation of custom often leads to honor
violence. Responders also argued that strict definitions of morality can lead to honor violence
(37.8%).
Approximately half of the total sample discussed the relationship between honor violence,
education (52.7%), and socioeconomic status (46%). Turkish responders (74.4% of the Turkish
sample) tended to talk about education more often than British responders (28.6% of the British
sample), with 24.3% of the total sample arguing that uneducated individuals tend to experience
honor violence and 28.4% arguing that there is no relationship between honor violence and
education level. For example responders noted that, in their experience, perpetrators and victims
are often not well educated and economically dependent on their abusers. Four Turkish Police
Officers argued that less honor violence occurs in western countries because their populations
are more educated (10.3%).
Other responders argued that education level is not a predictor of honor violence, saying
that honor violence occurs among professionals like judges and professors. The difference is that
“…they are willing to use more intelligent violence. So we can’t see or hear this violence case.”
Similarly, 14.9% of the total sample argued that honor violence is associated with low
socioeconomic status and 31.1% argued that there is no relationship.
- National-level Causes
Turkish responders discussed the link between honor violence, armed conflict (12.8%),
the Kurdish Question, and nationalism (7.7%). For example, a Researcher/Activist in Istanbul
stated that honor violence increased as state terrorism increased. She argued that an increase in
all types of violence against women is common in times of war because “when men feel
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threatened they abuse the women at home more to feel more powerful because they lost power
outside the home.” When discussing nationalism, two responders stated part of the Kemalist
perspective of Turkish nationalism is that there is no Kurdish population in Turkey. In other
words, everyone is a Turk. At the same time, Kurds are blamed for all honor violence that occurs
as means of separating the barbaric and uneducated people living in the east from the rest of the
Turkish population.
Three British responders linked honor violence to immigration policy (8.6%) and two
responders discussed national security (5.7%). British responders also argued that citizens of the
UK have extreme reactions to cultural crimes (25.7%), honor violence is used to police certain
communities (8.6%), and that BME communities are accused of using multiculturalism to excuse
offending behaviors (5.7%). Additionally, five Turkish (14.3% of the Turkish sample) and three
British (8.6% of the British sample) responders discussed links between honor violence,
terrorism, and the Kurdish Question, with Turkish responders specifying that honor violence is
often associated with PKK or KCK. For example, a Lawyer in Diyarbakır (T36) argued that
many Kurdish immigrants have been displaced in southeastern Turkey due to the conflict
between the Turkish government and the PKK. These circumstances led to a great deal of
violence against women (including honor violence), which was difficult to address because
women were both afraid and unable to seek help. As part of the Kurdish movement, several
women’s organizations were established to address this need.
In the UK, responders also argued that conversations concerning honor violence are
linked to terrorism in response to the attacks on 9/11 and 7/7. Since then, a number of policies
have targeted young Muslim men, with honor violence and forced marriage becoming a new
means of expanding these policies. For example, a Researcher/Activist stated that the Prevent

	
  

100	
  

strategy in the UK polices Muslim communities through schools by asking teachers to report
unusual activity to the police. For her, the government proclaims that they are attempting to
address honor violence and forced marriage, but only
“…violence in terms of being terrorists, not violence in their own communities to their
own women, that’s not their concern. And I think that’s a really interesting way in which
gender and ethnicity and multiculturalism come together….”
Direct Causes
I define direct causes as events that instigated a specific honor crime at a specific point in
time. Responders tended to discuss direct causes in terms of disobedience, relationships,
sexuality or sexual acts, and implied honor violence. Additionally, some responders argued that
what is called ‘honor violence’ is actually motivated by factors other than honor.
- Disobedience
Most responders explicitly stated that “disobedience” leads to honor violence (82.4%).
Others gave a variety of specific examples of disobedience. Failing to follow traditional gender
roles was a very common response (52.7%). Humiliating a man or challenging his masculinity,
16.2% of responders argued, is another form of disobedience that can lead to honor violence.
Eight British responders argued that women or girls who want to go to college (10.8%) or leave
home/run away (21.6%) can also cause honor violence.
Several responders noted that migration (24.3%) often leads to honor violence. I
categorize this as a form of disobedience because responders often reported that honor violence
occurred because a woman or girl began to deviate from cultural traditions as a result of living in
a different country (e.g., moving from India to the UK) or city (e.g., moving from Diyarbakır to
Istanbul). British responders (20.3%) often called this “westernization”, meaning that children
growing up in the UK with parents and extended family that immigrated to the UK begin to
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assimilate into British culture. A Researcher/Activist in London, for example, argued that
migration disrupts traditional gender roles. In her experience,
“Some migrant men desperately want to hold on to the gender order that they’ve come
from and the sense of entitlement that men have there, and the subservience that they
expect of women and girls. So women and girls migrate hoping for more space to explore
what and who they might be. So there’s a potential I think for an overly traditional older
generation, especially where they fix home and don’t think that actually all the time
they’ve been away, home might have changed…I think there’s a potential for honor to be
drawn on as a legitimation of trying to control the behavior of young women.”
- Relationships
Responders discussed a variety of potential causes of honor violence that are related to
relationships. Marriage, according to 52.7% of responders, can be a cause of honor violence.
More specifically, 21.6% reported that refusing a marriage that was arranged by a parent,
polygamous marriages (12.2%), marrying without the consent of parents (10.8%), and forced
marriage (37.8%).
Several responders (37.8%) also noted that forced marriage often leads to honor violence
because the victim does not want to be married. Responders also reported that a divorce or break
up can lead to honor violence (28.4%), as well as any relationship before marriage (33.8%). All
of the responders who mentioned engaging in a relationship with someone outside their race or
ethnicity were British (31.4% of the British sample), while Turkish responders tended to mention
jealousy (33.3% of the Turkish sample). The first responder to mention jealousy was a
Researcher/Activist in Istanbul, who spoke a great deal about the role of women in committing
honor violence. Some women are simply jealous of other women who are younger than them.
Others were abused, and want another woman to suffer in the same way that they suffered. In
this way, the responder argued that women are also perpetrators and instigators of honor violence.
Other responders tended to talk about jealousy in terms of intimate relationships. For example, a
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Police Officer in Istanbul stated “the basic reason for honor violence is the feeling of owning,
jealousy, the difficulty to share somebody.” In this way, jealousy is related to sexuality.
- Sexuality
Many responders noted a variety of ways that sexuality might lead to honor violence.
Almost half of all responders stated that honor violence is caused by adultery or cheating on a
partner (47.3%), most of whom were Turkish (79.5% of the Turkish sample; 11.4% of the British
sample). Sex before marriage was reported as a cause for honor violence in almost half of the
total sample (43.2%), although this response was more common in the Turkish sample (56.4%)
than the British sample (28.9%). Rape (17.6%), pregnancy out of wedlock (4.1%), and incest
(14.9%) were also reported as potential causes of honor violence. Each responder who noted
incest as a potential cause was a Turkish Police Officer. Honor violence might also be caused by
homosexuality (14.9%), a women being alone with a man (12.2%), and a women or girl talking
to a man or boy online or in public (6.8%, all British responders).
Several responders reported that honor violence is caused by a victim wearing
inappropriate clothing (29.7%). According to a Researcher/Activist in Istanbul, honor violence is
a transgression of sexual norms, but these norms are very vague and differ based on region. She
gave the example of wearing shorts and a low-cut shirt in Istanbul or Antalya (cities in western
Turkey with large tourist populations) as perhaps being acceptable. If, however, word gets
around that she has been wearing inappropriate clothing too often, then people may begin to have
a problem with it. A woman can choose to transgress those norms, but that choice comes with
the recognition that she will have problems with her family or people in the community.
- Implied Honor Violations
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Although responders in both samples reported that honor violence can be caused by
gossip (23%) or the simple thought that an honor violation has occurred (10.8%), these were
primarily Turkish responses. For example, a Psychologist in Istanbul stated that in conducting
her own research, she interviewed 699 women in Turkey about honor violence and found that
66% believed that “if their family thinks that they have transgressed the sexual norms, then they
would be killed in the name of honor.” Similarly, a Researcher/Activist in Turkey explained
“If the word is out too much, if the family name has been tainted too much, then they
make the execution done publicly to cleanse the name publicly. If the taint is not out too
much in public, it’s just a kind of whisper among a few people, she’s got murdered
indoors in the garden [backyard]. The more public it is, the more reason to cleanse the
family name…See be very careful. When a woman is murdered, her honor is at the trial,
not the perpetrators action. You have to get that. He’s doing a service to the community,
to the woman, sometimes to god, to cleanse the dirt.”	
  
- Not Honor Related
Some responders also argued that what is considered honor violence often has nothing to
do with honor. For example, seven Turkish responders discussed psychological disorders among
perpetrators. Three Turkish Police Officers (4.1% of the total sample) argued that what is
considered honor violence is actually the result of a psychological disorder in the perpetrator.
Four Turkish responders (two police officers, one Psychologist, and one Researcher/Activist),
however, argued that honor violence is not caused by psychological disorders. For example, a
Psychologist in Istanbul stated “…these people are not sick. They’re men who believe that they
have a right in doing such a crime”
Additionally, several responders argued that what is labeled honor violence is actually
violence concerning property. Although this was a typically Turkish response (48.7% of the
Turkish sample), 14.3% of British responders also mentioned property. For example, 9.5% of the
total sample argued that honor violence is not about sexuality. It is related to land ownership and
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inheritance. The perception that women are property also leads to honor violence was reported
by 12.2% of the total sample, 10.8% argued that both property disputes and women as property
lead to honor violence.
Motives for Honor Violence
As part of the definition, many responders suggested motives for honor violence. More
than half of the sample (62.2%) reported that honor violence is used to control women.
Approximately half of the sample argued that honor violence is used to restore honor to the
family (50%). Half of all responders stated that honor violence occurs because the victim
violated patriarchal structure. Interestingly, this included all of the social service/NGO
responders in both samples and each Lawyer in the Turkish criminal justice sample (all female).
For example, a Social Worker in Diyarbakır argued that both men and women have a
“patriarchal mindset.” Women, she argued, would have a greater status in society if they did not
share this belief. Almost half of all responders (41.9%), most of whom were Turkish (32.4%),
stated that one motive for honor violence is punishing the person who violated honor. Finally,
some responders reported that hiding an honor violation (23%) and preventing an honor violation
(18.9%) are motives for honor violence.
Types of Honor Violence
Honor Violence was typically described as an umbrella term for many different types of
offenses by 71.6% of the sample. Honor violence was also frequently discussed as both criminal
and non-criminal offenses (69.9%). Responders reported that honor violence includes the
criminal offenses of murder (91.9%), assault (75.7%), forced marriage (UK only, 41.9%), false
imprisonment (35.1%), kidnapping (29.7%), rape (13.5%), harassment (16.2%), and stalking
(9.5%). Several responders discussed specific types of assaults that occur in cases of honor
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violence, including mutilating (9.5%), throwing acid (1.4%), burning, (6.8%), and stoning the
victim (5.4%), burying the victim alive, (2.7%), and disguising violence and murders as
accidents (4.1%). Forced suicide was also mentioned by 24.3% of responders. A
Researcher/Activist in Istanbul (T9) specified that there are three types of suicides that can be
considered honor violence.: murder staged as suicide, physically forcing a person to commit
suicide, and driving a person to commit suicide.
Non-criminal offenses related to honor violence include psychological pressure (60.8%),
threats of violence (50%), verbal abuse (48.6%), disowning the family member (23%), constant
surveillance of victim (14.9%), sending the victim back to their country of origin (8.1%),
economic abuse (6.8%), taking the victims passport (6.8%), and humiliating the victim (6.8%).
Comparisons to Domestic Violence & Crimes of Passion
Responders also tended to discuss honor violence in terms of characteristics that make it
similar or different to other types of criminal offenses. For example, 41.1% of the sample
compared honor violence to domestic violence. Of those, 34.2% argued that honor violence and
domestic violence are two different crimes and 6.8% considered the two offenses to be the same.
Elements that differ between the two crimes include collusion between multiple perpetrators who
are family members rather than intimate partners.
Some responders also compared honor violence crimes of passion, with 12.2% saying
that the two are the same, and 1.4% saying that they are not. For them, crimes of passion were
originally included in the penal codes of most Mediterranean countries, stating that reduced
sentences would be given in cases where the perpetrator was provoked into committing an
impulsive crime. These responders argued that both crimes were based on honor, but the
difference lies in whose honor was violated. In crimes of passion, the person committing the
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crime feels that their own honor has been violated, not the victims’ honor. In honor violence, on
the other hand, the perpetrator typically says that the victim has violated their own honor, which
then extends to the rest of the family.
Similarly, honor violence was also compared to gang violence (2.7%), youth violence
(2.7%), and the mafia (1.4%). These responders argued that honor and respect are similar
concepts, and are both cited as motives in a range of different crimes. The way that honor
violence is socially constructed, however, implies that they are somehow different than other
types of crimes committed for honor and respect (e.g., gang violence).
Typical Perpetrator & Victim
When describing perpetrators, responders argued that honor violence is committed by a
family member (93.2%), there are multiple perpetrators (51.4%), the crime is premeditated
(33.8%), and often occurs over a long period of time (27%). Some responders mentioned the
gender of perpetrators, with 25.7% arguing that only males commit honor violence and 39.2%
arguing that both males and females can be perpetrators. Of the 19 responders who argued that
only males commit honor violence, 17 were Turkish (43.6% of the Turkish sample) and 10 of
those were Police Officers (58.8% of the Turkish responders who gave this answer).
When asked if there is a “typical” perpetrator of honor violence, 67.6% of the sample
said no, 16.2% said yes, and 4.1% said they did not know. Of the 10 responders who argued that
there is a typical perpetrator, 8 were Turkish Police Officers. The 3 responders who did not know
if there is a typical perpetrator of honor violence were British Police Officers. In the British
sample, 42.9% of responders discussed the use of victim and perpetrator typologies with 13.5%
arguing that typologies are not helpful, 2.7% that they are helpful, and 4.1% that they can be
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both helpful and unhelpful. Eleven British responders and one Turkish responder (16.2% of the
total sample) specifically stated that stereotypes impede police work.
Some responders (21.6%) specified that perpetrators are usually the youngest male in the
family, so that they will receive a lesser sentence. Many responders specified which family
members commit honor violence, such as fathers (48.6%), mothers (18.3%), brothers (85.1%),
sisters (6.8%, all British), uncles (17.6%), aunts (4.1%), and cousins (6.8%). Husbands or
significant others were named as perpetrators by 48.5% of the total sample, most of whom were
Turkish (69.2% of the Turkish sample). Similarly, only Turkish responders mentioned exhusbands or ex-significant others as perpetrators (30.8% of the Turkish sample). Responders in
this sample also stated that perpetrators of honor violence can be community members (85.1%),
contract killers (5.4%, British only), peer groups (4.1%, British only), and perpetrators from
outside the country (2.7%).
Although most responders argued that there is no typical perpetrator, many did describe
characteristics that many perpetrators share. For example, 85.1% of the total sample argued that
perpetrators are usually male (94.9% of the Turkish sample and 74.3% of the British sample).
Almost half of responders argued that perpetrators have a diverse background (47.3%), with
13.5% arguing that perpetrators are very religious, immigrants (10.8%), and from rural areas
(9.5%). Perpetrators were described as ignorant by five Turkish Police Officers, and uncivilized
by three responders (10.8% of the total sample). Responders also reported that perpetrators are
often involved in tribal or family councils (20.3%), honor violence is a source of pride for
perpetrators (14.9%), and perpetrators do not believe they are doing anything wrong (12.2%).
When describing victims, 70.3% of responders argued that there is no “typical” victim
and 14.9% argued that there is. Although 56.8% of responders argued that both females and
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males are victims of honor violence, 35.1% argued that only women and girls are victims and
91.9% argued that victims are usually female. Victims were described as having diverse
backgrounds (37.8%), but are often young (39.2%), married (24.3%), immigrants (14.9%), from
rural areas (12.2%), very religious (10.8%), forced into marriage at a young age (9.5%), and do
not speak the native language (8.1%). Victims were described as economically dependent on
someone else by 20 responders (27% of the sample), 19 of whom were Turkish (48.7% of the
Turkish sample). Some responders described victims as experiencing a range of psychological
symptoms (e.g., frightened, withdrawn, anxious, depressed, self-harming, experiencing PTSD)
(4.1%) and being unable to communicate with their families (8.1%). Two Turkish responders
also specified that perpetrators who were forced to commit an honor killing are also victims. For
example, a Psychologist in Istanbul argued
“For example there are cases where a 16 year old brother is commanded to kill his sister.
I think he himself is a victim...I don’t think it’s a free decision. I don’t think that he’s unguilty, but I think that this was a decision that was taken under incredible pressure. And
he’s the one who’s penalized, who gets the maximum penalty that is unpardonable… And
in regards to the family, the main decision makers, those who really forced him to commit
his crime, they don’t get any sentence... He’s sacrificed on behalf of the family. ‘It’s one
boy, so that one we can sacrifice.’”
Many responders discussed risk and vulnerability when describing victims. Thirty-five
responders (36.5%) stated that potential victims of honor violence are at higher risk of violence
and are more vulnerable than other types of victims. Of those, twenty were British responders
(57.1% of the British sample). Five British responders (14.3% of the British sample) argued that
it is very difficult to predict the risk level of potential victims of honor violence. Additionally,
25.7% of responders argued that victims of honor violence are hard to reach. According to 32.4%
of responders this is partly because victims are not comfortable seeking help, especially Muslim
victims in the UK (5.4%).
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Media & Honor Violence
Honor violence and the media were discussed by 24.3% of the sample, with responders
arguing that the media makes cases of honor violence more visible (16.2%), the media engages
in othering (6.6%), and the media sensationalizes honor violence (2.7%). According to a
Research Activist in Istanbul, for example,
“There was one time, 4 years ago, that I was watching TV, and this anchorwoman said,
get this ‘today’s honor killing is from Izmir.’ It’s like today’s weather. It was that
prevalent and that disgusting and that much common. Nowadays we don’t hear that much
because the agenda changed.”
Similarly, British responders argued that the media in the UK also sensationalizes coverage of
honor violence. In the UK, however, this coverage is used to drawer deeper distinctions between
the majority and minority populations, especially Muslims. The media tends to portray honor
violence as an exotic crime that is committed by foreign-born residents, which then results in the
demonization of certain communities. Tied to these descriptions of cases of honor violence are
governmental strategies to address the crimes of “those people” (e.g., immigration, terrorism,
and forced marriage policies). Four Turkish Police Officers (11.4%) stated that the media
exaggerates honor violence, and two responders argued that the media changed the perception of
honor and divorce (5.1%). For example, a Police Officer in Istanbul argued
“The media loves to use the term honor violence- sex sells, violence sells. Saying a
Muslim killed their wife makes it even sexier, and sells more papers…It’s all about the
media selling their story.”
Government & Honor Violence
Many responders discussed the government and honor violence. For example, 27
responders (69.2%) argued that the government is paying more attention to violence against
women. Of those 27 responders, 22 were Turkish (56.4% of the Turkish sample). Fourteen
responders stated that the government is focusing on more violence against women training
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(18.9%). Some Turkish responders, however, argued that the government may be paying more
attention to violence against women but is not taking violence against women seriously (13.5%).
For example, several responders argued that all attention to violence against women is superficial
in that promises have been made and laws ratified, but no further steps have been taken. The real
goal is to be accepted into the European Union, which makes laws meaningless. For example, a
Researcher/Activist in Istanbul argued
“For example, Turkey is very proud to sign first the European Convention Against
Violence Against Women. Yes, we are the first country to sign, and ratify this convention,
how proud we are, but inside in Turkey, you have to take necessary caution to prevent,
prosecute, and punish the perpetrators once violence against women is committed. But I
don’t think they are taking this very seriously and they are not following up as we said.”
For many responders, this is a reflection of the patriarchal mindset of the Turkish Republic,
which until recently blatantly protected perpetrators of violence against women through the penal
code. More specifically, Turkish responders argued that the government stresses traditional and
patriarchal gender roles (20.5%), current laws reflect societal views of honor violence (20.5%),
and that the former Prime Minister’s speeches reflect general views of women in Turkey (12.8%).
For example, current President and former Prime Minister Erdoğan has stated that women are
not equal to men, and that women should focus on being mothers. Several responders specified,
however, that this is a systemic problem regardless of which party is in power. Furthermore,
patriarchal ideologies all over the world treat women as second-class citizens. The Gezi Park
protests, according to one Lawyer in Istanbul, show that Turkish women are engaging in a social
revolution to change gender inequality. Female protestors are calling attention to the situation in
Turkey, stating that they do not want to be told that they should have three children, cannot have
abortions, and should not work. This, responders argued, may actually lead to lasting change.
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6.4: Opinions on Use of the Term “Honor Violence”
I was able to ask 48 responders (64.9%) for their opinion of the term “honor violence”
(61.5% of the Turkish sample and 68.6% of the British sample). Opinions could be inferred from
an additional six responders (8.1%). Thus, 54 responders provided opinions on use of the term
honor violence (73%). When directly asked what they thought about the term honor violence,
31.1% of responders expressed dislike for the term (46.2% of the Turkish sample and 14.3% of
the British sample). For example, an Advice Manager with a women’s NGO in London
immediately corrected my use of the term “honor violence”, saying
“Well, we don’t really define ‘honor violence’, we actually see violence in the name of
honor. We call them ‘so-called honor killings’ or ‘HBV’, so when you say ‘honor
violence’ it just sort of takes me elsewhere. We call it HBV in the UK.”
Many responders agreed, arguing that the term honor violence is inappropriate (12.2%),
ambiguous, and therefore not helpful (5.4%). More specifically, 18.9% of the total sample
argued that honor is a positive concept thus using the term honor violence is problematic because
it retains the positive attribute. In fact, 14.9% of British responders used the exact phrase “there
is no honor in violence”.
Responders also argued that the term honor violence is stigmatizing (6.8%), racist (5.4%),
makes the crime seem exotic, and leads to othering (14.9%). In a Turkish context, the term honor
violence implies offenses that are committed by Kurdish populations (43.6%). This has legal
implications, in that honor violence is considered a form of customary killings under the Turkish
Penal Code that, as will be discussed in the next section, is applied discriminatorily to Kurds.
Nineteen responders (25.7%) specifically argued that the term is stereotypically applied to
Muslims, with sixteen British responders (45.7%) specifying that the term is applied
stereotypically to South Asians. One British responder argued that the term homogenizes the
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BME community, implies violence is worse within this community, and that BME perpetrators
are worse than other types of offenders. Additionally, 35.1% of Turkish and British responders
believe that the term provides an excuse for violence while 4.1% did not. Most of these
responders argued that they would rather discuss honor violence as one aspect of the continuum
of violence against women.
Almost a quarter of responders (21.6%), however, did not have a problem with the term
(12.8% of the Turkish sample; 31.4% of the British sample). For example, 33.8% of responders
argued that the term honor violence provides context. This answer was typically a British
response (57.1% of the British sample). More specifically, British responders argued that the
context provided by the term honor violence is generally helpful for responders (45.7% of British
sample), especially when identifying risk level (22.9%), and implies that this is a serious crime
(4.1%). For example, using the term honor violence indicates that responders should be aware
that multiple perpetrators may be involved in the crime and that non-criminal offenses may
quickly escalate to very violent criminal offenses. Thus, the term triggers specific responses,
including referrals to specific police units and NGO’s. A few responders also argued that using
the term helped to create leadership at a local level (5.4%), as well as unite survivors and victims
(1.4%). For example, a member of the Survivor Advisory Panel of a women’s NGO (E28)
argued that the term provides a label that clearly identifies honor violence as a form of abuse that
many people experience.
Finally, 21.6% of responders were ambivalent about use of the term honor violence
(10.3% of the Turkish sample; 34.3% of the British sample). These responders tended to argue
that using the term honor violence has brought attention to an issue that was previously ignored,
which then led to great advocacy work. Responders are better trained to address the differences

	
  

113	
  

between domestic violence and honor violence, which helps to lower the risk to victims who
seek help. At the same time, the term leads to stereotyping, othering, and “some of the most
absurd behaviors” because responders believe that honor violence is an exotic practice that they
could never understand or properly address. Certain ethnic and religious groups are singled out,
blamed, and further marginalized.
When responders were asked whether they would prefer that a new term be created for
honor violence, 37.8% said no, 21.6% said yes, and 1.4% expressed ambivalence. Fifteen
responders (20.3%) prefer the term “honor based violence” while fourteen responders (18.9%)
do not like the term honor based violence. This was mostly a British response (40% of the British
sample). The term “so-called honor based violence” was preferred by 12.2% of responders, most
of whom were British (22.9% of the British sample). Three responders (4.1%) do not like the
term so-called honor based violence and violence in the name of honor was the term preferred by
6.8% of responders. Four Turkish responders prefer the term femicide (sometimes expressed as
gendercide) (10.3% of the Turkish sample).
Violence against women was the term preferred by 21.6% of responders, and 17.6% of
responders prefer using the specific name of the crime rather than the term honor violence (e.g.,
murder, assault). Twelve of these responders were Turkish (30.8% of the Turkish sample).
Turkish responders tended to argue that categorizing honor violence separately from other crimes
is not helpful in any way because “crime is a crime. Attacking someone’s life means hurting that
person. No matter what the reason is.
Similarly, some British responders also argued that the debate about the term honor
violence is only about semantics (14.3% of the British sample), detracts from the issue (8.6%),
and changing the term would cause confusion (8.6%). More specifically, three responders argued

	
  

114	
  

that they care about the crime, not the term that is used (4.1%). The goal is to address honor
violence rather than focus on changing a term that has already gained international traction. As
the Director of a women’s NGO in London argued, “I mean essentially what you’re trying to
shift is the thinking behind the words. Changing the words doesn’t actually change very much.”
6.5: Criminal Justice Response to Honor Violence in Turkey
Police Response
Prior to beginning the interviews with Turkish police officers, I was unable to find
documentation of how cases of honor violence are addressed in Turkey. Thus, the interviews
with Turkish police officers were intended to establish whether there were any routine practices
used by officers in these cases. Twenty-four responders (61.5%) stated that the Turkish police do
not have special procedures, or departments, for cases of honor violence.
Five police officers in Istanbul (12.8% of the Turkish sample) stated that there are
specific units dedicated to cases of violence against women, and two officers in Istanbul stated
that there are officers on the force who are experts in violence against women. According to one
officer in Istanbul, there is a special department in the Turkish National Police for cases of
violence against women called Preventing Domestic Violence Chief Office (Aile içi Şiddeti
Önleme Büro Amirliği). The personnel working in this department are well educated about
violence against women, and were trained by the “Department of Sexual Crimes” in London. He
also stated that all of the police officers in Istanbul should have attended at least one seminar on
violence against women.
Two additional officers in Istanbul were also aware of special departments for cases of
violence against women. One of these officers briefly mentioned that specific police bureaus for
violence against women were established in Turkey in 2010. Another officer stated that the
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Ministry of Family and Social Policy has recently focused on preventing and raising awareness
for violence against women. The Security Department now has a special branch for violence
against women, and the public safety units conduct research. It is also important to note that
although two officers stated that male victims will sometimes come forward, and are protected,
every officer referred to victims as female. In fact, few used the word “victim” and referred to all
victims as women and perpetrators as men.
Goals of Policing Honor Violence
Although responders were not directly asked about the goals of policing procedures,
eleven police officers (28.2% of the Turkish sample) discussed the goals of identification and
prevention. Seven police officers (18%) agreed that their main goal in investigating any case is
identification (e.g., the crime, perpetrator, witnesses, evidence). They disagreed, however, on
whether prevention should be a goal of policing honor violence. One police officer in Istanbul
and two officers in Diyarbakır argued that the police should both identify and prevent cases of
honor violence. None of these three officers, however, were able to articulate how the police
could prevent honor violence.
Four officers in Istanbul and four in Diyarbakır (20.5%), on the other hand, argued that
prevention should not be a goal of the police. In fact, these officers and two Lawyers in
Diyarbakır stated that the police are not capable of preventing honor violence. All of these
officers, first and foremost, argued that the purpose of the police is to deal with crimes after they
have already been committed. One officer in Istanbul elaborated, stating that harsh sentences for
perpetrators of homicides are supposed to serve as deterrence, but there are no true preventative
measures that can be taken. Interestingly, he made the following comparison:
“Can you stop a suicide bomber? No, you cannot. She/he gives up his/her life. This is the
psychology of it. Honor crime is like that. The perpetrator says he is already dead.”
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Here the officer is saying that perpetrators of honor violence commit crimes out of a sense of
duty. They have accepted that their actions will result in imprisonment, or even death.
Similarly, an officer in Diyarbakır argued that it is “impossible” to prevent honor
violence because “you cannot look at a person and guess what they will do.” This officer argued
this is especially true in cases of honor violence because people “do not always exercise free will”
in these situations. He stated that many families are pressured into honor violence as a last resort.
Families will often use other means (e.g., forced marriage) to rectify a shameful act (e.g., rape),
but they may eventually have to succumb to social pressure restore honor to the family. The only
way that the police could prevent an honor killing is if they become aware of a shameful act that
has occurred. In these situations, as one officer in Istanbul argued, the actions of police officers
are very important. Steps can be taken “to cool people down”, which may prevent further honor
violence from occurring.
General Procedures
There are no specific procedures for investigating honor crimes. Honor violence
investigations are handled like other investigations, and are often thought of as a form of
domestic violence. Victims can call the emergency phone number or go to the police station to
report a crime, as well as contact a governor, prosecutor, court, or NGO for help. If the victim
contacts the police they can report any type of violence, including physical, psychological, or
economic abuse. An officer will first take a private statement, meaning that victims should not be
spoken to at home or with family members present. The police will then prepare the necessary
documents to send to the proper authorities (e.g., court for a protection order), and ask the victim
how they would like to move forward.
- Protection
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Fifteen officers (75%) stated that safeguarding the victim is a primary duty. If a woman
trusts a specific officer, then that will be the person she continues to stay in touch with.
According to one officer, there are no female homicide detectives in Istanbul but female officers
can be called from other departments if needed. Another officer stated that there are female
officers who are often in charge of cases of violence against women, while a third officer added
that female police officers are often given these cases because they “treat them [women]
understandingly and in a better way.”
Two officers in Diyarbakır stated that threats of honor violence are automatically
considered high risk, and “set quick and serious measures into motion”. For example, victims
can be sent to a shelter, husbands can be suspended from the house, protection orders can be
issued, and a new identity can be provided if necessary. There about 10-15 shelters in Istanbul
according to one officer, and their locations are supposed to be kept secret, even from police
officers. When discussing shelters in Istanbul, one officer stated that some police officers believe
that they are not responsible for sending a woman to a shelter, because that is the responsibility
of social services. Personally, this officer will only refuse to refer women to shelters who need a
place to stay but are not in danger. In other words, the shelters are for protection, not the
homeless. Similarly, two officers argued that women take advantage of the protection offered by
the police. For example, one officer in Istanbul believes that women often use shelters as an
excuse to leave home when there was not any violence. Another officer in Diyarbakır argued that
some women make false claims and obtain a new identity in order to avoid being convicted of a
crime.
Two officers in Diyarbakır explained that a home suspension is valid for one month or
until cancelled by a judge. Five Diyarbakır police officers (12.8%) mentioned protection orders,
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but one officer stated that the police rarely provide protection. As one officer explained, the
police will first write a report to the district governor, who needs to approve it for protection
orders. Temporary protection orders are awarded for one to six months, during which time the
police will check on the victim in their temporary residence. Once the protection orders are in
place, further procedures are established. For example, an officer will take the victim to their
place of employment, and then take the victim home when their day is finished. Officers cannot
stay with victims while they are at work, but they tell the victim the fastest ways to access the
police. The victim may choose to go to a shelter, but is not required to. Sometimes victims refuse
protection, but one officer stated that this does not happen often.
Two other officers, however, stated that the police respond immediately to every call
concerning violence against women, but cannot safeguard everyone. Protection, therefore, is
only given upon request. Neither of these two officers handled many cases of honor violence, but
stated that there are typically one to three cases of honor violence per month, depending on the
district. Sometimes the police will get claims from the victim or a prosecutor about a threat. The
police do not always follow up on these threats because “there is no reality to the cases.” If the
police determine that it is a serious case, they will take the victim under protection and the
perpetrator into custody. “There is positive discrimination all around the world, because the
woman is weaker, we try to be on the woman’s side most of the time.” For that reason, they do
not always check to see if there has actually been violence, injury, or assault.
- Investigation
A case is opened as soon as a crime is reported, even if the victim does not file a
complaint. One officer noted that a commission is convened to hear about cases of honor
violence, and decide what to do for that individual. Sometimes if there is a threat to life, a police

	
  

119	
  

officer will be assigned to safeguard the victim without waiting for a decision from the
commission. Honor as a motive is considered, but it is not mandated that instances of honor
violence be tracked or monitored in any way. Three officers in Istanbul (7.7% of the Turkish
sample), however, did state that they record whether a crime was motivated by honor in the case
file.
An officer in Diyarbakır argued that cases of honor violence differ from cases of
domestic violence in that there will be multiple perpetrators who make the decision to commit
honor violence through a family council, but the family will typically pick one person to take the
blame for the crime (usually the youngest male member of the family). Another officer in
Diyarbakır expanded on this practice, stating that
“In general, the family exploit the ignorant children, the most aggressive and angry one.
They come down to him, saying that the sister is kidnapped and gone and left the family
and was not meant to be for them. With that impulse, they give the gun to the ignorant
child and the time does not matter, he eventually comes up with a plan…”
The police and prosecutors are aware of this collusion, so they typically investigate the rest of
the family to determine co-conspirators and abettors. Suspected perpetrators are put under
surveillance, and security measures are taken.
Five police officers (25%) believe that it is easy to distinguish honor crimes from other
types of crimes. According to one officer in Diyarbakır, it easy to establish whether a crime is
motivated by honor simply by talking to the victim. The perpetrator is often a member of their
“inner circle”, meaning family and friends. Unfortunately, the family will not want anyone to
know about the crime so they will hide what happened. Thus, the police are often the last to
know when an honor crime has occurred. Crimes like physical assault, rape, and incest are
reported the least because of the trauma that the family will go through after the crime is reported
and the risk of future honor violence.
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One officer in Diyarbakır, however, argued that it is often difficult for the police to
collect evidence and witness statements in cases of honor violence. He stated that people will
either refuse to make a statement, or will give a statement and then say it was coerced by the
police. Additionally, people in southeastern Turkey often will not take cases all the way to court.
As a result, the police often take a “traditional and conservative” approach to honor and
domestic violence by “letting things work themselves out between the two parties.” Mediators
are often used to try to reach a peaceful solution between the perpetrator and victim.
One officer stated that the police do think about honor in every homicide case they
investigate, “because the motive for murder is usually honor, debt, or hostilities”. Additionally,
three officers in Diyarbakır (7.7% of the Turkish sample) stated that the police are aware that
what appear to be suicides and accidents are often murders. As a result, one officer stated that the
police typically examine the fingers of suicide victims to see if there is any tissue under their
nails, which would indicate that they fought off an attacker. The police are also aware that
perpetrators often put a gun in the hands of suicide victims and shoot off one or more rounds.
Although not stated by the respondent, I would assume this is a means to place gunshot residue
on the hands of victims. Two other officers stated a common form of honor violence in
southeastern Turkey is when girls “fall from windows” while they are cleaning.
- Collaboration
A referral system is in place because the Turkish police do not have psychologists and
social workers on staff. Two officers in Diyarbakir also mentioned referring women who need
lawyers to the Bar Association. This referral system was only mentioned by eleven police
officers (55% of the police sample), nine of whom worked in Diyarbakır, so perhaps this referral
system is not well known in Istanbul. Seven officers (35% of the police sample) reported that
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they work closely with social service, civil society, and municipality organizations. Six of those
officers worked in Diyarbakır, two of whom stated that the police in Diyarbakir form
partnerships with any institution that will help them. Psychologists from these organizations are
typically asked to help with cases of honor violence. They will interview the children and
prepare reports. Six officers (30%) also reported working closely with the prosecutor assigned to
the case, with one officer stating that the police follow the instructions of the prosecutor when
they are working on cases of honor violence. Another officer reported that they have provided
expert testimony in court on at least one honor violence case.
Training
When asked if police officers receive training concerning honor violence, twelve officers
said yes (60% of the police sample), five said no (25%), and three officers did not answer the
question (15%). Of the nine police officers interviewed in Istanbul, seven officers reported
having received training on violence against women, while five of the ten officers interviewed in
Diyarbakır reported receiving training. One officer reported that the police generally are not
trained about women’s rights or honor crimes, but there is a domestic violence unit in each
district. Officers in these units receive special training, and are typically educated by
psychologists and police lecturers who specialize in the area. Officers who do not work on
domestic violence cases do not receive training in the area. Two officers in Diyarbakır stated that
there are specialized police departments in Istanbul for violence against women that have given
their police department forms and advice on how to handle cases of honor violence.
Only five officers were specific about their training. In Istanbul, one officer attended
many workshops and seminars on violence against women, and another reported participation in
one training session for domestic violence that was held overseas. Interestingly, one officer in
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Diyarbakır is under the impression that police officers in Istanbul receive fifteen days of training,
in an effort to be more effective. In Diyarbakır, one officer reported receiving two trainings on
violence against women (one training that took place at the police station, and one at Istanbul
Bilgi University). Another officer participated in several trainings that were typically in the form
of seminars consisting of fifteen to twenty people and lasting one week. He believes that the
police are becoming more professional with these trainings.
Two officers in Istanbul and three officers in Diyarbakır (25% of the Turkish police
sample) reported having no training on violence against women. In Diyarbakır, one officer stated
that violence against women laws are very new and every police department has their own way
of applying laws, thus there is currently no common practice for officers to be trained in. He
feels that there should be training on honor violence, and stated that there is a plan to gather the
officers who work on this issue in one main office and bring experts in to do trainings.
Furthermore, he argued that every officer should be trained in violence against women issues,
rather than a select few. Another officer in Diyarbakır, on the other hand, does not believe that
training is necessary. In his opinion, there is no need for specific training on violence against
women because people are raised to believe that women are weak and should be protected, the
law is very clearly written, and the police are very careful with their responses.
Responder Opinions of Police Response
When asked about their opinion of the police response in Turkey, responders tended to
say that the police response was 1) poor in the past, and currently poor; 2) currently good; and 3)
poor in the past, but currently good. While police officers tended to give positive opinions of the
police response, other responders tended to disagree. Of the nine responders who believed that
the current police response is good (23.1% of the sample), eight were police officers. Seven
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responders (18%) argued that the police response was poor in the past, but good now. This group
included four police officers and three social service responders. Eleven responders (28.3%),
however, argued that the police response was poor in the past and continues to be poor. This
group was made up of three researchers who are also activists, five lawyers, and three social
workers. Twelve responders (31%) did not give an opinion on the police response. Each of these
categories will be discussed individually.
- Good Police Response
An officer in Istanbul (T14) stated that “violence against women was very bad prior to
2010, but has gotten better in recent years.” Another officer in Istanbul agreed, and gave an
example of a high profile case to explain this view. Güldünya Tören lived in a small town in
Southeastern Turkey, where she was raped by her cousin. The rape resulted in a pregnancy, and
she gave birth out of wedlock. Her family deemed this dishonorable, and she fled to Istanbul to
live with other family members. Upon her arrival in Istanbul, she reported the situation to the
police and informed them that she would be living with her uncle. While living at her uncles, she
was shot and seriously wounded by her two younger brothers. The police took her statement in
the hospital, at which time she said she would not be filing a complaint against her brothers. Two
days later, her brothers entered the hospital and murdered Tören (Sundays Zaman, 2007).
The officer stated her case was not handled very well. When the officers assigned to the
case spoke to Tören’s uncle after she was first shot, he stated that the brothers were supposed to
murder the victim. Since their mission was not completed, they would try again. That night, the
victim was transferred from a private to a public hospital, where she was murdered. The officer
said that if the police had known that the brothers would attack the victim in the hospital, they
would have protected her. Family members helped the police locate the brothers, who were later
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tried and sentenced for murder. The older brother (Irfan Tören) received a 16.5-year sentence for
the attempted murder and a life sentence for the murder. The younger brother (Ferit Tören)
received an 8-year sentence for the attempted murder and a 15-year sentence for the murder of
his sister (because he was minor at the time) (Sundays Zaman, 2007). The officer expressed
regret for the way this case was handled, and believes that the murder of Güldünya Tören was a
turning point for Turkish police responses to honor violence.
According to a third officer in Istanbul, honor crimes have decreased because of the
safety measures provided by the police. For example, an officer in Diyarbakır argued that the use
of protection orders have helped to deter violence against women. Men are now aware that if
they assault a woman they can get a 6-month protection order. If a second assault occurs after a
protection order has been issued, the offender will serve prison time. In his opinion, protection
orders also prevent divorces because they keep husbands from assaulting their wives.
Another officer argued that the police are better prepared for cases of violence against
women than they were in the past. He considers himself very well informed about violence
against women issues, and keeps up with how other countries address the problem. In his opinion,
it is a good idea to adopt foreign laws that are working in other countries to address the problem.
Additionally, people are speaking openly in the media about their experiences with domestic
violence, which raises awareness. The Turkish system works very well, and if the system ceased
to work it would be corrected.
Two officers agreed that the Turkish police response is very good, but do not agree that
Turkey should look to other countries for response ideas. For example one officer in Istanbul
thought that it was important to point out that unlike the United States, Turkey does not have the
death penalty. He believes that this makes Turks “more conscientious” about human life.
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Similarly, an officer in Diyarbakır stated that the Turkish police are better at protecting women
than the U.S. “because we do not have individualism, because women are weak, everyone looks
after them. It is related to our culture.” He continued the discussion by giving several examples
of how Turkish culture differs from western cultures by stating the following:
“…being woman in Turkey is an easy thing. ‘Darling take me to the school, darling take
me from the office, darling take me to a hairdresser, darling... everything is handled by
your darling, by your man. There is no such a thing in the US. For instance look at
airports, bus stops, women are carrying their own luggage even if the man has a small
luggage…We have it in our culture, taking the woman under custody, looking after her.
Punishment is actually based on this issue...Actually, the punishment is the anger to
themselves. ‘I could not protect her, I could not control her.’ Because he is angry to
himself, he cannot manage his anger. He sees it as his mistake. So he wants to fix it by
trying to control her. Although now the families are falling apart, the main thing of our
society is the family. To protect the family, the leader of the family, the husband should
be strong and take the members under his custody. But there is no such a thing in the
West, they live totally as individuals. According to our culture, protecting woman is a
very common rule. If a woman says ‘help’, all of your neighbors would run there and try
to help her.”
- Poor Police Response
Several themes emerged when responders argued that there is a poor police response to
honor violence in Turkey.
1.) Police believe in honor codes
The previous passage is also an example of one of the criticisms of the police response in
Turkey. Six responders (one researcher/activist, two lawyers, and three social workers; 15.4%)
argued that the police are not effective because officers believe in the honor code that causes
honor violence. In the previous passage, the officer begins by describing what he believes being
a woman in Turkey is like. Women in Turkey should be taken care of by the men in their lives,
which he describes as being controlled and protected. He judges the United States for not
protecting women or being chivalrous enough.
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This officer seems to say that Turks love their women so much that they lose control of
their anger. He almost seems to be justifying honor violence in these passages, by saying that
honor violence is actually a punishment to the man because he loses control when he cannot
protect and control his woman. In this way, her “mistake” (in disobeying) is his mistake because
he could not control her. The purpose of honor violence is to fix that “mistake”, but those living
in the West do not understand this because western culture is too individualistic to protect
women properly.
It is this mindset that several responders had a problem with. The police have also been
criticized for failing to handle cases appropriately because they believe the perpetrator was
justified. For example, one Researcher/Activist argued that the police do not respond well to
honor violence or protect women because of religious and personal beliefs concerning the roles
of men and women. In her opinion, police officers in Turkey often believe in traditional gender
roles (e.g., women should obey their husbands). If a woman files a complaint with the police, the
officer’s response will often be “what did you do to make him abuse you?” This is especially
problematic, she argues, because the Turkish police is a traditionally male organization.
Similarly, two Researcher/Activists argued that police officers, prosecutors, and judges do not
give honor violence and other forms of violence against women “sufficient importance” or “do
their jobs meticulously”. More specifically, they believe that the response to violence against
women in Turkey is “about social rules and their mentality”. They explained that violence
against women is very common in Turkey, thus men think that it is acceptable to be violent and
it is men who are providing institutional responses to violence.
Two officers in Istanbul spoke to this issue. One officer stated that “we may sometimes
find the suspect right [in honor killings] but it does not change anything.” Police officers may
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have personal beliefs about the case, but that does not affect the investigation because it is not
their job to make decisions about the suspect. As a police officer, he still has to follow the law
and build a case against suspects. Another officer stated that sentences are currently harsh and
“police officers were even going to prison for beating their wives.” This implies that police
officers were not going to prison before, and were perhaps considered above the law.
2). Inadequate Police Procedure
A second theme of criticisms of the police response concerned police procedure. Two
Researcher/Activists in Istanbul believe that the police are not doing a good job responding to
honor violence. They, along with a Lawyer and a Social Worker, argue that the police typically
say they cannot do anything about honor violence because it is a “family issue”. These two
responders believe that the police are doing a better job than in the past, but it is still not enough.
Similarly, two Social Workers in Diyarbakır stated that the police often want to protect the union
of the family, which is not the right thing to do in cases of honor violence. Additionally, two
responders in Diyarbakır (a Lawyer and a Social Worker) stated that orders of protection come
very slowly from the police, sometimes taking months to notify the other party. Waiting two
months to make a decision is not at all helpful because “until the notification, the other party can
do whatever he wants to the woman.”
A Lawyer in Diyarbakır stated that the police do not follow official procedures in cases
of violence against women where there are no visible injuries or if there was not a homicide. She
does not think that the police take these issues seriously, or are sensitive to female victims. In her
experience with the organization she currently works for, many victims report that they have
already sought help from the police but were treated badly (in many cases like prostitutes). In
these situations, the victim often feels re-victimized by the police. Similarly, a Social Worker in
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Diyarbakır noted that women are often turned away from the police station when they apply for
protection. Sometimes the police insult women, accuse them of lying, or ask what they did
wrong to deserve the violence. For these reasons, two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul argue that
there is massive under-reporting because women do not want to seek help from the police. A
psychologist in Istanbul, however, argued that this is not the experience of all victims. She
further argued that although the police response to honor violence is “non-existent”, it is not their
fault. The police are often helpless in honor violence cases in that they are often very willing to
develop a response, but there is a lack of a coordinated response initiated by the Ministries of
Interior and Family.
3). Police Send Victims Home
A major problem noted by twelve responders (30.8%) is that the police are known to send
victims of honor violence home without offering help. According to two responders in Istanbul
(a Legal Activist and a Lawyer) and two in Diyarbakır (a Lawyer and a Social Worker), when a
woman wants to escape violence, she has to file a complaint with the police. Police officers are
usually men, often believe in the patriarchal honor code that causes honor violence, and think
that what happens in the family should be solved by the family. As a result, the police response is
often to send the woman home to work things out with her husband. Too often, the woman is
eventually murdered.
Two Lawyers, one in Istanbul and one in Diyarbakır, provided examples of cases they
handled. The Lawyer in Diyarbakır has not had very good experiences working with the police in
Diyarbakır, and gave an example of a case where a woman sought help because her husband had
beaten her and thrown her out of the house. The police sent her home, saying that her husband
would never hurt her. They did not follow up on her complaint. She argues that this is a typical
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reaction from police officers because they are not educated about violence against women, but
they should be. Interestingly, the Lawyer in Istanbul once consulted on a case where a husband
went to the police, told them his wife had an affair with his brother, and asked the police to take
her away because he was going to hurt her. The police did not take her into custody and he killed
her with an ax a few nights later. One Lawyer in Istanbul did acknowledge, however, that some
police officers can be very protective and helpful.
A Social Worker in Istanbul stated that honor violence is a new area for the police to
address. With the new laws, however, the police have more responsibilities. They now have to
issue an order of protection, provide protection, and take the victim to a shelter if there is an
“urgent need.” If an officer fails to follow procedure, they can be punished. Thus, officers are
now afraid not to follow procedure. She attributes this as an achievement to the women’s
organizations in Turkey, who have written articles that remind the police that they have a
responsibility towards women. This has also resulted in female police officers working in
domestic violence departments.
Three Police Officers (one in Istanbul and two in Diyarbakır) also commented on officers
who send victims home. The officer in Istanbul argued that ten to fifteen years ago, there were
officers who simply did not help women who were victims of violence. Those officers were
“punished”, however, because there is no excuse for domestic violence and refusing to help
women. An officer in Diyarbakır stated that women were afraid to go to the police for help in the
past. He believes that this is because of the patriarchal structure in Turkey. Men are considered
the leaders of the family, and “whatever he says is accepted as the rule”, and women could not
stop men from abusing them. Since new laws have been introduced things have changed, and
women are more comfortable seeking help from the police as a result of this raised awareness.
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4). Police Training
Seven responders (18%) argued that a lack of training is a major problem with the police
response. Two Lawyers and a Legal Activist argued that police officers often are not aware of
the legal framework for addressing violence against women, and the education that they do
receive “doesn’t work in practice.” According to another two Lawyers, police officers do not
consider cases of violence against women as their job and often do not know the legal procedure
for rapes or sexual assaults. In the experience of these two responders, the police work these
cases the same way they would a robbery, and do not care about how damaged the victim is.
They believe that the state should provide special workshops for officials working on these
issues. Two responders argued that it is important to raise awareness about gender through
projects and workshops, which police officers can participate in at their organization. These two
responders believe that working together can affect both the police and social services positively.
Two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul noted that the government has stated that 40,000
police officers have been trained in gender equality and violence since 2009. Unfortunately,
these trainings are not transparent. It is unknown who trains the police (e.g., are they experts in
violence against women, what are their views on gender roles?), the curriculum of the training,
or the results of these trainings. Additionally, these two responders argued that the budget for
addressing violence against women is very small and there are not enough training sessions for
responders. However, they do not want the entire budget to go to training because victims also
need support.
5). Police Do Not Care About Victims
Four responders argued that the police do not care about victims of domestic and honor
violence. In Diyarbakır, two lawyers argued that the police now have to follow the law, which
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means following certain procedures, but they often act arbitrarily. For example, the police often
do not want to open new files because “they just want to finish the procedure and go back
home….They do not care.” Two Social Workers in Diyarbakır stated that they have had a
difficult time working with the police in the past. In the past, police officers also engaged in
domestic violence, and thus did not care about victims. They still sometimes encounter problems
in cooperation, but their organization “forces” the police to apply the new laws concerning
violence against women. If a specific officer becomes a problem, their organization will report
the officer to the Ministry because “there is nothing more important than a woman’s life, than
improving the standard of a woman.” When asked how effective the police are in responding to
honor violence, two responders said that the police officers in Diyarbakır are more effective than
those in western Turkey. More specifically, they believe police officers in the east are more
sensitive, care more for victims, and are more willing to use every resource to help a victim.
Legal Response
Twenty-four responders (61.5%) discussed the legal response to honor violence and
violence against women in Turkey. Lawyers, social service responders, and researcher/activists
tended to give more detailed explanations than police of how the legal system addresses cases of
violence against women generally, and honor violence specifically.
Turkish Penal Code
Thirteen respondents (33.3%) began by discussing changes to the old penal code.
According to one Psychologist in Istanbul, there have been great strides in reforming the penal
code. Two responders used rape as an example. The former criminal code differentiated between
a girl, a married woman, and an unmarried woman in rape cases. For example, raping a girl was
an aggravating factor. Raping a married woman had a higher sentence than raping an unmarried
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woman because the husband is also offended when a married woman is raped. The court had the
power to decide whether an unmarried woman would marry her rapist.
A Lawyer in Istanbul argued that the former penal code was “really against women’s
rights, women’s bodily rights, and women’s right to live”. Another Lawyer in Istanbul made
similar statements, and argued that this was further exemplified by the former title for crimes
against women, “Offenses Against the General Moral Principles and the Family Order.” One of
the biggest struggles of the women’s movement was to change this title, because women
deserved to be recognized as individuals under the penal code, rather than as simply part of the
family unit.
Five responders (12.8%) argued that the women’s rights movement played a major role in
changing the penal code and although it is better, the penal code is not perfect. Many articles that
violated women’s rights have been abolished (e.g., marital rape has now been criminalized) but
there are still gaps in the penal code and the allowance of mitigating factors. In many cases, the
current court still practices the former penal code in cases of the murder of women.
An example of this is honor violence. Twelve responders (30.8%) noted that honor was
considered a mitigating circumstance at trial in the past. Four responders specifically explained
how this mitigation worked through the unjust provocation clause in the Turkish Penal Code.
Before the penal code changed, the courts allowed male perpetrators to use Article 29, through
which men claimed that an honor violation caused an unjust provocation. A Lawyer in Istanbul
described a past case, which she called a “classic example”, in which a man claims that he killed
a woman after “she said something about his masculinity.” The unjust provocation code was
applied, and he was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison for murder. She describes this scenario as
very common. Another Lawyer in Istanbul described this use of honor as a mitigating factor to
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murder as governmental protection for honor violence, and a reflection of the patriarchal system
on which the Turkish Republic was founded. Age was also previously considered at sentencing,
with minors receiving lesser sentences for honor killings. As a result, family members frequently
forced the youngest male to commit the honor killing.
The same twelve responders noted that the New Turkish Penal Code was enacted in 2005.
Now honor is considered an aggravating factor at sentencing in order to deter honor crimes,
which one Lawyer in Istanbul stated is addressed through Article 82 paragraph J, through the
phrase “assassinations with the aim of custom”. Although the word ‘honor’ is not used, the
customary killing code can be applied in honor cases as an aggravating factor at sentencing. Thus,
as five officers (25%) stated, there are no specific laws for honor violence in Turkey, and
perpetrators are charged with the crime they committed (e.g., murder, assault). More specifically,
two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul clarified that perpetrators are not tried under the customary
killing code. They are tried for murder, and customary killing code comes in at sentencing (i.e.,
the customary code does not apply to assaults, only murder). The new criminal code also states
that Article 29 no longer applies to customary or honor crimes, and the court has limited the
general use of unjust provocation.
Several responders still consider the current Turkish Penal Code to be problematic,
especially the customary killing code. In practice, perpetrators do not always receive a higher
sentence for honor violence. For example, adultery, divorce, and running away from home can
be considered mitigating factors if a husband murders his wife. This code is currently used to
increase sentences when the motive for a homicide is custom, but the code does not specify
“honor killings.” Honor, however, is generally accepted as one possible motive for customary
killings. According to three Researcher/Activists in Istanbul, the Turkish Penal Code is a huge
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source of contention for the Turkish women’s movement. One problem is that the customary
killing code specified that killing a man as the result of a blood feud was an aggravating factor at
sentencing, yet the same aggravation did not apply for the murder of women. A Lawyer in
Istanbul explained that the women’s movement argued that “female assassinations are political”
and should also be considered an aggravating factor.
A second problem for these responders is that committing a crime in the name of töre and
honor are not necessarily the same and should not be vaguely subsumed under the customary
killing code. The problem is that töre is associated only with Kurds and populations living in
eastern Turkey, which leads to the idea that honor killings only occur in eastern Turkey. This
also can lead to discriminatory sentencing. Take for example, two perpetrators who commit an
honor killing, but one is charged with a customary killing and the other is charged with murder.
The perpetrator charged with a customary killing will automatically receive a maximum sentence,
while the other will not. This is a double standard in the law, and is discriminatory towards
Kurds.
According to one Lawyer and one Psychologist in Istanbul, it is for this reason that
women’s groups want the customary killing code to specifically say ‘honor’. When the penal
code was being changed, women’s groups lobbied for the word to be included and perpetrators
who claim honor as a motive to receive heavier sentences. Although they were not successful,
and the word honor was not included in the penal code, the customary killing code is being
applied to honor violence. When asked why Parliament would not include the word honor, one
Researcher/Activist said that the world “honor” is sacred in Turkish culture. Telling people that
the government was going to regulate crimes committed in the name of honor was therefore
unthinkable, and would cause an uproar. This responder stated that she was shocked by this
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argument because there was huge support from Turkish society to legislate against honor
violence. Similarly, a Lawyer in Istanbul stated that men in Parliament voted against using the
word “honor” in the customary killing code because “they can control every woman in their lives
and all women in Turkey by relying on the term ‘honor’. They do not want to lose that control.”
A second Lawyer in Istanbul explained that the word honor is never used in the court
system because the National Assembly argued that decisions concerning ‘honor’ could not be
“executed universally”. Definitions of honor and “other traditional factors” vary throughout
Turkish society. Terms that have several definitions depending on the values of individuals in
society cannot be integrated into the legal system. Otherwise, similar cases can be decided
differently. A judge in southeastern Turkey will not make the same decision as a judge in
Istanbul, so it was a logical decision to not include the word honor in the penal code.
Despite the problems with the new penal code, six responders (15.4%) believe that the
change in the penal code in Turkey has deterred honor violence because of the higher sentences.
Also under the new penal code, co-conspirators and abettors are charged with planning or
instigating the crime and can now be punished with severe sentences. Finally, a Social Worker
and a Psychologist in Diyarbakır both argued that the Law on Protection of the Family and
Violence Against Women (Law 6284) has also become more comprehensive and is used more
often by women. For example, it is now possible to receive quicker decisions from the district
governor on a protection order if the woman is under serious threat. The husband can also be
suspended from the house.
Court System
Two lawyers in Diyarbakır stated that for them, cases begin when an NGO contacts them
concerning a woman who is a victim of violence, including honor violence. If the matter is
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urgent, the NGO will request that the lawyers obtain a protection order and have the husband
suspended from the house (if applicable). They also help victims obtain divorces. In murder
cases, the prosecutor starts the case in the name of the public. If the relatives of the victim cannot
hire a lawyer, an NGO will help them (e.g., like the organization these two lawyers work for).
The two responders stated that they also apply to be intervening parties, although this is almost
always rejected in Diyarbakır. Even though by law their organization does have the right to be an
intervening party, they stated that
“According to the courts, for someone who was raped and murdered, we [lawyers]
should be raped and murdered as well to become an intervening party.”
To get around this they obtain letters or authorization from the victim’s family, but the Ministry
still rejects their requests to intervene in the cases.
According to a Lawyer in Istanbul, perpetrators are proud of honor violence they have
committed. Honor is a very important part of Turkish culture for both men and women, who
learn about it from a young age. Another Lawyer in Istanbul stated that perpetrators often find a
way to legitimize their crime, most often by saying their wife committed adultery. If this defense
does not work, then they will try for an insanity defense. If the defendant can find witnesses to
convince the court that his wife was committing adultery, then the court will apply “incitation
rules” (i.e., unjust provocation) and decrease the punishment.
This respondent also argued that the information in the autopsy report is very important
in cases of honor violence, but medical examiners are often very slow in providing these reports.
In several cases that she was currently working on, the perpetrators were waiting for mental
health reports from the Institution of Forensic Medicine. In the past, it was very easy to bribe an
official at the Institution of Forensic Medicine for a report saying the perpetrator is insane. This
responder still believes that it is a “horrible institution”, but awareness-raising has changed the
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institution a great deal. This, in her opinion, has a lot to do with Turkey’s application to the
European Union. Applying for the mental health report also buys the perpetrator time. Two
reports are issued. One addresses the general mental health of the perpetrator, the second
addresses whether they were “under a lot of stress and trauma” while committing the crime.
Thus in practice, cases of honor violence continue to sometimes result in reduced
sentencing. Three Lawyers, two in Diyarbakır and one in Istanbul argued that this greatly
depends on the opinion of the first level court judge. Judges use their discretion when it comes to
sentencing. There is an applicable minimum and maximum sentence but, unfortunately, some
judges consider the status and name of the perpetrator and rule in their favor. Each responder
argued that there are not enough legal restrictions in these cases and that judges have the power
to act arbitrarily, which implies that rich people get lesser sentences than poor people. As an
example, two of the Lawyers spoke about a case in Bingol [a city in southeastern Turkey] where
a 15 year old was raped by 8 “specialized sergeants”. The court was lenient with the
perpetrators because they were prominent men in the community. The law says that a person is
considered a minor under the age of 18, but can consent to sex at the age of 15. If the victim
gives consent, there is no rape. A doctor is asked to evaluate the mental state of the victim, and if
this doctor finds that she gave consent, then the court will evaluate the case as if she did consent
even if she said that she did not. The respondents are angry about this case, and hope that the law
is changed so that this can no longer happen.
They also believe cases are decided differently based on the region of Turkey, laws are
applied more harshly to people in eastern Turkey, and women face too many barriers in
obtaining help. A Legal Activist in Istanbul argued that women often do not have the economic
resources to separate themselves from violent relationships. Taking a case to court is expensive,
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and pro bono lawyers often do not take violence against women cases seriously (unless they are a
feminist lawyer). Court cases also often cause revictimization because of the demand for
evidence of abuse. Thus, this responder does not believe that the Turkish response to honor
violence is at all effective. Women’s groups have pushed the agenda, which has led to changes in
legal and policy frameworks, but there has not been enough progress.
Two Lawyers in Diyarbakır argued that there have also been very good decisions made
by the courts in cases of honor violence, especially when a case is discussed in the media. When
a case becomes more publicly visible, this often affects the decision the judge will make. The
problem is that “the idea behind the system is how the society sees honor,” meaning that the way
the laws are set up in Turkey reflect societal views on honor violence. This causes a slippery
slope because simply using the term “honor crime” implies that any case of sexual assault in
Turkey can be considered a matter of honor, thus confusing the issue because perpetrators can
get reduced sentences for rapes that have nothing to do with honor.
6.6: Criminal Justice Response to Honor Violence in England
Police Response
In the UK, a special network of services has been created to specifically address honor
violence. It is first important, however, to describe the honor killing of Banaz Mahmod. This
particularly heinous crime had a profound effect on a variety of institutional responses to honor
violence in the UK, and was mentioned by eighteen responders (51.4% of the sample).
Banaz Mahmod
Banaz Mahmod was a nineteen-year-old woman originally from the Kurdish region of
Northern Iraq. At a very early age, her father arranged her marriage to a man who later abused
and repeatedly raped her. Mahmod sought a divorce and began dating another man. When the

	
  

139	
  

couple was seen kissing by members of the community, her father claimed that she had
dishonored the family. At this time, Mahmod sought help from the police because she feared for
her life (The Independent, 2012).
Mahmod contacted the police five times between December 2, 2005 and January 24,
2006. On December 31, 2005 Mahmod’s father attempted an honor killing for the first time. In
order to make her death appear alcohol-related, her father forced Mahmod to drink from a bottle
of brandy. Before he could complete the murder, Mahmod escaped, broke her neighbor’s
window in an attempt to draw help, and then ran down the street. The responding police officer
believed that Mahmod was being dramatic and exaggerating due to her intoxication. As a result
of these beliefs, the responding officer did not follow up on the allegation that Mahmod’s father
was trying to kill her, shared the allegations with Mahmod’s family, and failed to refer Mahmod
to the Domestic Violence Unit (Payton, 2011).
Almost a month later Mahmod was strangled by two cousins that her father and uncle had
brought to the UK from Iraq to commit the murder, stored in a suitcase, and buried in a
Birmingham backyard. After her boyfriend reported her missing, detectives from the
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) began an investigation. Mahmod’s father and uncle were
convicted of her murder, and the two cousins were eventually extradited from Iraq and convicted
as well (The Independent, 2012).
Departments
Several officers described the framework for the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and
the West Midlands Police (WMP) response to honor violence and other crime. There are many
different departments in both the MPS and WMP that deal with specific types of crime. In the
MPS, for example, each borough has a Community Safety Unit (CSU). The CSU is considered
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the specialist unit for cases of honor violence, as well as domestic abuse and hate crimes.
According to a Detective Sergeant with the MPS, there is one department in the MPS that is
responsible for policies on honor violence and forced marriage, as well as compliance on how
the boroughs and officers investigate these types of cases. If officers are not investigating
properly, this department will get involved. In other words, this is a strategic unit that is not
investigating crime. Rather, they are an oversight unit to make sure that best practices are
followed.
Two officers with the WMP stated that cases of honor violence are handled by the Public
Protection Unit. As one Detective Chief Inspector explained, this unit is responsible for helping
vulnerable people. She coordinates activity around honor violence and forced marriage. For
example, her department investigates honor violence as well as conducts research. They record
where honor violence has occurred which, she states, is generally in ethnic minority communities
within big cities.
I also had the opportunity to interview two Safer School Officers in London. School
officers and teachers look for signs of honor violence and forced marriage (e.g., going on holiday
to certain countries) in order to intercept the student before something happens. Sometimes
friends of a potential victim will tell a teacher that they are worried that something is going to
happen, stating "I know that they are going on holiday for a long period of time, they're at this
certain age that they could potentially be forced into marriage." The teacher will report this to a
school officer, who will file a report with the appropriate police department. They will look into
the family, and possibly involve social services.
One of the Safer School Officers described a case concerning the forced marriage of a
young Somali boy. She admitted that she did not have the knowledge she needed to deal with
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this case of forced marriage, and did not get the help that she needed from anyone else. Thus, she
argued that the Safer School Officers need to be trained more on cases of honor violence and
forced marriage. She suggested that a flow chart would have been helpful, which explains who to
contact and what to do in these situations.
Classification of Honor Violence
Five officers (26.3% of the police sample) discussed the differences between honor
violence, domestic violence, hate crimes, and forced marriage. A Detective Chief Inspector with
the WMP noted that the police department is considering new policies specific to honor violence
because honor violence currently falls under domestic violence policy. Two officers with the
MPS argued that many officers think that honor violence is the same as domestic violence, but in
her opinion the two are not the same.
Two officers in London argued that honor violence can be a form of domestic violence or
a hate crime. A Detective Sergeant in London described why honor violence is different from
other violence:
“It’s very difficult to 1.) Police it and 2.) Manage the risk of that, and that’s where we,
risk management at least, is phenomenal, because it doesn’t stop. If I’m walking down
the road one night and I get robbed, a stranger takes my iPhone. I call the police, they
get stopped 10 minutes later, my iPhone gets found. It’s been traumatic for me, but I’ll
get over it. The person gets caught, they get dealt with by the court (probably not much)
but will maybe go to prison for a couple of weeks, and get a fine. I never see that person
again, and I can live my life. That person doesn’t know who I am, and that’s it. But I
think what happens when we deal with cases of honor-based violence, or anything
around that umbrella, our victims don’t have that luxury. Because of that family
connection, that emotional connection, and we may end up for example putting father
and brother away in prison for a long time for murder or whatever, but you’ve still got
that whooooooole family who will then continue, in vain, to create that honor.”
He went on to say that it always shocks him how “ferocious and clever” family can be when
committing honor violence. There is often 24-hour surveillance by family members in cases of
honor violence, whereas in domestic violence if there is surveillance it is usually done by one
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person. The unique part of honor violence is that there is one victim, “but there can be 50 or 60
perpetrators because they all have this common cause to not create dishonor in the family”.
Sometimes if the honor violation is about a significant other, another victim emerges that the
police need to protect. Thus, he argues that there is so much more risk involved in cases of honor
violence than other cases.
General Procedures
There are a variety of procedural elements in cases of honor violence that are different
from other types of crimes. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) provides
procedural guidance for police officers throughout the UK. According to a Chief Prosecutor of
the Crown Prosecution Service, many of these procedures were implemented after the death of
Banaz Mahmod. These procedures will be discussed in terms of initial contact with the victim,
risk assessment, protection, and investigation.
- Initial Contact
A victim of honor violence can make contact with a police officer in two ways. As with
all crimes, the victim may call the police for help and an officer will respond to the call. First
responders are taught to separate victims from others at the scene so that they can speak freely.
Many victims, however, will come to the police station rather than call for help. A Detective
Sergeant with the MPS explained that many victims do not want to be overheard by their family
members and they do not want the police coming to the house, because both actions would be
considered shameful. She went on to say that many people who are affected by honor violence
do not have the same means of communication as others (e.g., cell phones and laptops) because
they are closely monitored by their families. Two Detective Sergeants with the MPS stated that
those who do come to the police station typically say that they are scared that something is going
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to happen, but they do not want to move forward by filing a claim against their family members.
They simply want to file report with the police in case something happens to them.
According to a Chief Superintendent in Birmingham, all contact staff recently received
two weeks of training on how to assess vulnerability on the point of first call. This applies to all
crimes, rather than only domestic or honor violence. According to a Detective Constable in the
MPS, an officer will administer part of the Domestic Abuse Stalking and Harassment (DASH)
risk assessment if they suspect that this may be a case of domestic or honor violence. The DASH
is a series of fifteen questions in a booklet. If five questions on the DASH are answered
positively then the person is considered medium risk. If ten questions are answered positively
then the person is considered high risk, but there is a degree of discretion here. The initial officer
will complete this first part, and then pass it to a detective.
If a first responder believes that the case may concern honor violence or forced marriage,
they will begin following established protocol. To begin with, first responders are trained to flag
potential cases of honor violence and forced marriage so that they can be tracked and responded
to differently. If possible, the officer or civilian taking the report will call a detective trained to
handle cases of honor violence to talk to the victim immediately. This could be an officer from
the Community Safety Unit in the MPS, or the Public Protection Unit in the WMP. If a serious
crime like homicide or kidnapping has been reported, however, the Major Crimes Department
will be contacted to handle the case. If a uniformed officer responded to the call, the hope is that
they will be able to get the victim to safety before handing the case over to a detective. If a
detective is not immediately available to take a non-emergency call, the victim will be given
information and a code word for future contact with a detective (i.e., to let the detective know it
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is safe for the victim to have a conversation over the phone). The call handler will also try to
collect the contact information of friends who may assist an officer in contacting the victim.
According to seven police officers (36.8%), if there is a crime involved then an
investigation will begin immediately. If no crime has yet been committed, but the victim is
frightened, the police will create a non-criminal case file. This case file will have no criminal
offenses attached to it. The purpose of this file is to have a record of what happened to the victim
entered into the system. If the victim gives signed consent, the responding officer will collect
their DNA, fingerprints, and photograph for the case file. The police will also note whether the
victim has access to their passport. This information is collected in case the victim goes missing
or is murdered, and is kept in a separate database from criminal offenders. The victim is advised
that this information cannot be used against them to search for criminal offenses. According to a
Detective Sergeant in Birmingham, about 95% of victims agree to providing this information.
She thinks those records are then kept for 10 years.
If the victim is afraid they will be taken out of the country without their consent, the
police will ask if the victim wants to give them their passport to minimize that threat. They also
try to get a statement from the victim at this time, and then proceed according to the victims’
wishes. This could include safeguarding, going home, or assistance leaving this part of the
country. The police cannot force a victim to do anything they are not comfortable with. If the
victim chooses to return home, for example, the police officer will explain the risk of this
decision and state that the police cannot provide protection in the home. This explanation is
recorded. The victim will also be given protection tips. For example, a Detective Sergeant with
the WMP stated that if a victim thinks that they are being taken out of the country to be forced
into marriage, they can put something made of metal in their clothing to set off the metal
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detectors at the airport. When they get pulled aside for a search they can tell the officer that they
are being forced into marriage. This makes it discreet, takes the blame off the victim, and lowers
their risk of harm.
A risk assessment will be conducted and if the victim chooses to accept help from the
police, a series of referrals are made and an investigation may be initiated. An officer from the
Community Safety Unit or the Public Protection Unit will continue to interact with the victim,
design a safeguarding plan, and support the victim through the rest of the process. Additionally,
an entry will be made in the Police National Computer. This national database has the details of
every person the police have come into contact with, arrested, or charged with an offense. A
marker can be put on a file in the database that identifies the person as a potential victim of
honor violence, provides details of the case, and notifies responders that any call from this
individual should be treated as urgent.
- Risk Assessment
Risk can be very hard to determine for victims and potential victims of honor violence,
which is a problem for police. As a result, every potential victim of honor violence is
administered a risk assessment. The process begins with a specially trained detective (e.g., in the
Community Safety or Protection Units) conducting an intake interview, followed by a risk
assessment. The mandatory risk assessment used by police in the UK in cases of honor violence
is the DASH, although the DASH was created as a domestic violence tool. As noted in the
previous section, the DASH is completed in two parts. The second set of questions is intended
specifically for honor violence, whereas the first set of questions are aimed towards domestic
violence. She further explained that this second assessment is to help both the victim and the
officer because many officers go their entire careers without handling a case of honor violence.
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The risk assessment, therefore, provides some direction for the officer on what they should do
for the victim.
After the risk assessment, the victim will be assigned to a category of standard, medium,
or high risk. The term “standard” risk is used rather than “low risk” because it has been
determined that is no such thing as low risk in a domestic or honor violence case. If detective
thinks the case might be honor violence, then the victim is automatically considered high risk. A
Chief Prosecutor with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) made an interesting observation
about risk level among potential victims of honor violence. In normal risk assessment models,
once the risk has been identified it diminishes. For victims of honor violence, however, the
opposite occurs because of the vast network of potential offenders.
A supervisor is then immediately called and has to actively engage in the case. According
to three members of the Safeguarding Team in the WMP, a Threat to Life assessment will be
completed if the initial risk assessment suggests further exploration. This asks about topics
including but not limited to threats, suspects, and community impact implications. The Threat to
Life assessment is scored on a matrix, and that score suggests future courses of action. The three
members of the Safeguarding Team think this is a good assessment, and it is continually
reviewed to see if the threat level has changed for the victim. Once a victim is in custody and
being safeguarded, their threat level is switched to low.
- Protection
The police have a variety of options and responsibilities for protecting, or “safeguarding”,
potential victims of honor violence. A Detective Chief Inspector with the WMP first pointed out
that police officers are typically taught to treat everyone the same. He stated that this is “rubbish”
in a case of honor violence, however, because “that can get someone killed”. For example, in a
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normal runaway case it makes sense to take the child back to their parents. In a case of honor
violence it does not. He went on to say “in families where honor is at stake, then you’d be
putting somebody back into the lions den potentially. Back into real danger.” He argued that
safeguarding teams first have to understand this mindset.
Two detectives (one with the WMP and one with MPS) stated that they typically begin
by asking the victim to create a family tree. This is helpful in identifying all of the family
members who may wish to harm the victim. It is then important to ask the victim if they want
police protection. The police will try to get victims to a refuge, but as one Detective Sergeant in
the MPS (E3) stated, “listening to what the victims say molds our investigation.” He went on to
say that an officer cannot tell an adult that they cannot return home after they report a crime or
potential violence.
Several officers noted a variety of discussion topics concerning the protection of victims.
For example, two officers advised that interviews with victims should be recorded. One Police
Constable with the WMP stated that officers should establish what access the victim has to
technology (e.g., a mobile phone, tablet, or laptop), and whether their family knows about their
access to these devices. He and another detective noted that officers sometimes provide the
victim with a phone, and that code words should be established to both let the victim know they
are talking to a officer and let the police officer know if the victim is in danger or is surrounded
by people listening to the conversation. Additionally, a special branch of police officers in the
airports are kept up to date on honor violence and forced marriage protocol. For example, the
police can put markers on the victims’ passport, which show up at Passport Control. Airport
officers can then pull the victim aside to talk without the family knowing why.
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Five police officers stated that if the victim requests safeguarding, they can be taken to a
shelter in their home city or in another location. The police will often try to move the victim to
another city, and can also establish a new identity if necessary. The victim will be informed that
it is more difficult to safeguard them if they return to their family. A Crisis Interventionist in
London also stated that it is important to keep in mind that perpetrators of honor often will not
give up on finding the victim, even when victims are in witness protection. Victims often have to
be moved seven or eight times.
Six officers (31.6% of the police sample) also discussed the expectations of both police
officers and victims concerning safeguarding. One Detective Sergeant stated that victims often
do not want to leave home because they feel that they need to protect their siblings, or sometimes
their mother. Three officers and a Chief Prosecutor, for example, stated that many victims will
enter a refuge but it is hard for them to maintain a life there. The victim is giving up everything
they know. This is very difficult for anyone, but especially for young girls.
Eight responders (22.9% of the British sample) noted that it is understandable why
victims may choose to remain at home rather than enter a shelter, or return home after the police
have placed them in a safe location. As one Detective Inspector with the WMP noted, this occurs
“usually because of pressure, panicking, scared, better the devil you know than the devil you
don’t.” A Detective Sergeant with the WMP stated that the police often lose sight of the fact that
when they offer to put the victim in a shelter, they are asking the victim to leave and then
prosecute their family. Most victims do not want to do that, and would rather be victimized than
face a life without their family. As one Police Constable with the WMP stated “to lose all
contact with everyone that they love, to lose contact with the family, start fresh, totally
unsupported, it is incredibly difficult for them to maintain.”
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A Chief Prosecutor with the Crown Prosecution Service argues that responders should
not be surprised when victims want to leave their protection and go home, stating “they’d prefer
suffer more harm than what we’ve been able to offer them.” A Detective Constable with the
MPS expressed frustration, stating
“I’m sorry, we’ll help you out for a few nights or a few months, but after that you’ve got
to fend for yourself. ‘So I’ve left my lovely house, my children’s belongings, their schools,
their friends, I might as well go back.’ Because getting knocked around a few times every
month is better than that. Resources. It’s so sad.”
The Director of a NGO in London further elaborated, stating that
“They want it to stop- most victims are engaging in some degree of magical thinking. And
they just want it all to go back to normal before this all started, they don’t want to see
their family put in jail, they don’t want to go into hiding. Most of the options that are
offered particularly around HBV are not great. I wouldn’t want them, would you?”
Similarly, a Crisis Interventionist in London stated that victims need to have realistic
expectations of what is going to occur, so the process needs to be clearly explained to them. She
went on to say “police officers haven't got a magic wand and just make everything alright, and
victims have to appreciate that.”
- Investigation
After initial contact is made and a protection plan is established, the police will begin an
investigation. Honor violence investigations proceed much like investigations of other crimes,
but there are some important differences. Detectives will look through their databases for
background information, such as how many times the police have been called to a scene
concerning the victim, what is known about their family, and if any discussions or strategies
have taken place concerning the victim.
Two officers stated that there is often a conspiracy among several family members
(making honor violence like an organized crime), but they also noted that the police must be very
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careful with how arrests are made. For example, making arrests can often increase the risk level
for the victim. Arresting one perpetrator may not solve the problem, and may in fact make things
worse, because there are often several other family members who are ready to proceed with the
crime. Thus, officers are taught to think about how they can manage risk in cases of honor
violence.
An additional consideration is that many victims will come to the police for help but not
want the police to intervene in any way. When I asked why this might occur, a Detective
Constable with the MPS said she was unsure. She first stated that the complainant might be
thinking “I just want you to know in case something happens.” The Detective Constable went on
to say she does not understand this mindset because simply having a police report does not help
the victim. It may only result in the police reviewing a case if a homicide occurs. As she thought
about this mindset some more, she stated what people may actually be saying is that they want to
let go of the responsibility to decide by putting the situation in the hands of the police.
Some victims, on the other hand, do not want the police to arrest family members. One
Detective Constable with the MPS discussed a case where a girl said that she would commit
suicide if a family member were arrested. Others will come forward and then be pressured by
their parents into withdrawing their claim. In many cases, however, a crime has not been
committed so the police cannot move forward. In these cases, the victim will be referred to a
charity specializing in honor violence and forced marriage cases. If the victim is a child, there are
specific child protection laws to be followed and social services must be called. A Police
Constable with the WMP argued that it is important to let social services know what is going on
when children are involved, but they have to be told not to “go steaming in.” The situation can
be volatile, and the police and social services have to carefully work together.
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- Positive Action
Four Police Officers and a Crisis Interventionist (21.1% of the British sample) mentioned
the “positive action policy” in response to domestic violence cases. If an allegation is made of a
crime when responding to a case of domestic violence, then the police will make an arrest unless
there are significant reasons not to. This applies to both males and females, although there often
is not an actual offense that has been committed in cases of honor violence. A Detective
Inspector with the WMP noted that the police want “to be able to deliver a criminal justice
outcome even when the victim doesn’t want to support us.” She thinks it is the responsibility of
the police to “go forward in the criminal justice process” even if the victim does not want to
because it is their responsibility to act on the victim’s behalf.
A Crisis Interventionist with the MPS, however, stated that the wishes and safety of the
victim are taken into account in cases of honor violence because positive action can put them at
greater risk of danger. Additionally, arresting a perpetrator is often a “badge of honor” and does
not deter perpetrators from future violence. A Detective Sergeant noted that the situation is
further complicated in cases of honor violence by a lack of witnesses. While there is almost
always someone at the scene of a domestic violence case who is willing to make a statement
about violence they witnessed, this almost never happens in cases of honor violence because that
is considered another violation of honor within the family.
- Collaboration
According to a Detective Constable with the MPS, one goal of the police in the UK is to
create a holistic approach to honor violence. They acknowledge that a police response is only
one part of the solution, and the police want to give the best possible services to victims. This
includes collaboration between departments within the police service and border control, as well
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as statutory partnerships with social service, education, health, and government organizations.
They also have voluntary partners, like many charities and NGO’s. For example, a Detective
Sergeant with the MPS stated that the police work closely with border agencies and the airport
police force. He discussed cases, for example, where the police have been called to the airport to
help a victim off a plane who is about to be forced into marriage in another country. In these
types of cases, the police are very careful about how they take that person off the plane. Honor
violence and forced marriage are never mentioned. In many cases the person will choose to
continue on the flight because they feel that it would be worse for them in the long run to leave
with the police. Under these circumstances, the police will give the individual contact
information and be in touch with the consulate in the destination country.
Three officers stated that the police commonly make referrals to social service
organizations and NGO’s for support. The police website also has a list of resources, and there is
a booklet that the responding officer has to complete in cases of domestic violence. This booklet
includes a tear off slip of numbers of organizations that can help the victim. One Detective
Constable with the MPS stated that officers are trained to recognize that some organizations are
better than others in certain situations. Another Detective Constable with the MPS went on to say
that the police are there to investigate and arrest, and she does not believe the police should
support victims like NGO’s. She thinks NGO’s have more of a positive impact on victims
because many of the employees at NGO’s have experienced what the victim is going through.
The victim knows that, thus she thinks NGO’s will have a greater chance of getting the victim to
leave the situation.
The police will also often get referrals from other agencies, friends, or teachers that
victims have reached out to. One Police Constable with the WMP explained that if an NGO
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contacts the police, they often advise the agency on how to help the victim and form a
safeguarding plan. A Detective Sergeant with the WMP stated that part of a country wide
training program called Operation Sentinel (which will be described in the “Training” section)
targeted schools this year. A Police Constable wrote to each school in the West Midlands and
reminded them of their responsibility to be aware of honor violence and forced marriage.
Two Detective Sergeants with the MPS and a Detective Inspector with the WMP
mentioned the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH). The purpose of the MASH is to get a
variety of responders together to work on cases concerning vulnerable adults and children. A
mixture of police officers and social workers work together to share information, assess risk, and
refer individuals for support services. Four officers with the WMP also mentioned Multi-Agency
Risk Assessment Conferences (MARAC), which can be convened for medium and high-risk
domestic violence cases. Cases must be referred to MARAC’s. If the referral is made, a variety
of agencies discuss the case together. This may include probation, police, children’s services,
social workers, housing, women’s aid, mental health, education, health, and any other key
workers associated with the case. The group discusses how to effectively manage the victim,
keep the risk reduced, keep the victim engaged, assess additional support available, and address
the situation of the offender. One officer stated that she would like MARAC’s occur in earlier
stages of victimization for honor violence and forced marriage.
Three social service/NGO responders also mentioned MARAC’s, although I am aware
that five of the six responders interviewed for this study participate in MARAC’s. A Research
Officer from one women’s NGO believes that MARAC’s are good for the victim, and that her
organization attends MARAC meetings to ensure that victims are receiving the right amount of
protection. An Advice Manager from another women’s NGO stated that her organization asks
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that if cases are sent to MARAC, they are restricted to a need to know basis. Only people who
are directly working on the case should be included in these meetings.
The Director of a second tier women’s NGO noted that
“Women [victims] don’t attend MARAC’s because they’re doing multiple case hearings.
And actually the case will often proceed without the woman’s knowledge. [In] a
protection case, even if you think that the parents are neglecting the child, the parents
are informed and invited to attend. We have it a bit weird in terms of the woman’s human
rights, so my concern is that we have her at the center of it, but it requires somebody
become her advocate in that space. And a lot of that can be useful, but what we don’t do
is empower women to be able to speak for themselves in those spaces and go ‘this is what
I want’. So the power imbalance is a bit weird.”
Thus, she thinks that it is strange that parents who are accused of neglect are invited to attend
MARAC’s, but victims of gender-based violence are not. In her opinion, the victim should be
more at the center of MARAC in addition to someone serving as an advocate. MARAC does not
empower women to be able to speak for themselves.
- Training
Thirteen police officers (68.4% of police officers) reported that they received training on
honor violence (68.4%) and one Chief Prosecutor with the CPS discussed training in the MPS
and WMP. Conflicting descriptions of training were provided. According to a Detective
Constable with the MPS, the MPS tries to keep training current, especially if a new law is passed.
A Detective Inspector with the WMP stated that officers currently receive a great deal of training,
including mandatory training days for thematic issues (e.g., honor violence, vulnerable victims,
referral processes) and new legislation.
A Detective Sergeant with the MPS who trains other officers spoke at length about
training procedures. He began by explaining that training varies depending on the position. In
terms of honor violence and forced marriage, first responders are given a basic overview, how
they should respond to cases, and who can help (e.g., departments within the police department
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or specific NGO’s). Higher-ranking officers are instructed on how to supervise cases of honor
violence. These are not the officers who are actually interacting with victims of honor violence
and forced marriage, but they need to make sure that the officers who are interacting with
victims are complying with established procedure. The material in both trainings is very similar
(e.g., how to identify honor violence, who is at risk, do’s and don’ts) and is standardized. For
example, new recruits should receive domestic violence training, which will touch on honor
violence but will not be an in depth training on the issue. They have a variety of materials
available to officers, on both internal and external websites (e.g., leaflets, training curriculum
materials, presentations).
The Director of a women’s NGO also trains police officers. In her experience, first
responders are far more difficult to train and always “much more of a pain.” Senior officers are
more fun to train because they have more of a personal motivation for doing the training. She
uses practical exercises to train, providing instruction on separating the involved parties,
considering the children in the household, risk assessment, talking to the neighbors, taking
photographs, and beginning with the assumption that the victim will not cooperate with the
investigation.
A Detective Inspector with the WMP discussed computer-based training, saying that she
believes video box trainings are very effective. Video boxes provide ten-minute recordings of
individuals providing information segments on specific subject areas. The individual speaking
can be a police officer, for example, describing a past case of honor violence. She went on to say
that
“Video box is really powerful because they used a live case, real victims to talk, and
that’s very emotional and resonates really well. It’s a very powerful clever way I think to
tinge your psyche.”
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A Chief Prosecutor with the CPS stated that new police officers go through an 18-week
training course. One week involves case studies, including honor violence and forced marriage.
These trainings started in 2009-2010 with the goal of mainstreaming honor violence and forced
marriage so that more people can recognize it. He stated that “the best way to learn is when you
don’t even know you’re being taught”, specifying that the police are being trained without using
the terms honor violence and forced marriage because those terms bring certain prejudices to
mind.
A Detective Constable with the MPS, however, gave a conflicting statement about
training. She stated that she trains other officers, but only detectives in the CSU receive
specialized training. A few days of the training focus on domestic violence, part of which
focuses on honor violence. New recruits do not receive training concerning honor violence. They
are instructed, rather, not to arrest anyone and to contact the CSU if they suspect they are
responding to a case of honor violence.
A Detective Constable with the MPS stated that part of her job is to make sure that
officers who have been on the job for many years receive updated training on specific issues.
Recently she has been trying to provide a “5 minute snapshot” to officers of key points and do’s
and don’ts to keep in mind when addressing cases of honor violence. She believes this is helpful
for police officers because they are responding to many different types of crimes, and are
encountering maybe one case of honor violence per month. Thus, giving in depth trainings
frequently is not time or cost efficient.
Generally, it is only the Community Safety Unit (CSU) officers who receive face-to-face
training. All other officers receive this type of training electronically. CSU officers take a oneweek course, and half of one day of that course is focused on honor violence and forced marriage.
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Officers are trained that these issues are not related to religion. Honor violence are real offenses
(e.g., kidnapping and murder), and they want to make sure that officers do not become culturally
blind to this violence. They also receive training on how to be empathetic and sympathetic, as
well as how to understand the context of the crime. The goal is to include cultural variety in
these trainings, and allow officers to learn from each other about the customs of other cultures.
If, for example, a victim of another type of crime were to say “if I report this to you they
will kill me”, an officer might think the victim is being dramatic. CSU officers are taught that
this feeling is the reality of victims of honor violence. Trainings also discuss definitions of
marriage in order to clarify the difference between a legal and religious marriage, as well as who
is permitted to marry in the UK (e.g., familial relationship between spouses, age of consent).
CSU officers are also taught about the history Forced Marriage Protection Orders (which will be
described in detail in the “Legal Response” section) and how to apply for them.
Operation Sentinel
Four police officers mentioned Operation Sentinel (21.1% of the police sample) when
discussing police training in the West Midlands, which was occurring at the time of these
interviews. As a Detective Chief Inspector with the WMP explained, Operation Sentinel is a
force wide police operation running for six months. Attendance is mandatory, and includes
supervisor training. A different type of crime is examined for five months and ends with an
evaluation period, with child sexual exploitation examined in August, honor violence and forced
marriage in September, human trafficking in October, forced genital mutilation in November,
and domestic violence in December.
In each of these months the police engage in a variety of activities concerning the topic.
For example, there is a video of Detective Chief Inspector with the WMP discussing the details
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of and lessons to be learned from the Banaz Mahmod case. Officers are given briefings and
checklists that explain how to respond to these types of cases, and little notebooks are provided
to help them remember the different types of responses they can take. The goal of Operation
Sentinel is heightened awareness so that officers know what to do if they are called in on specific
types of cases that they may know very little about.
No Training
Although one Detective Sergeant with the MPS stated that every officer should get at
least some training on honor violence, six police officers (31.6%) interviewed for this study
stated that they received no training on honor violence or forced marriage. Four officers with the
MPS noted that they are aware that there is information on the police intranet concerning
resources and identifying which organizations help victims of honor violence, forced marriage,
and forced genital mutilation. Three Constables are aware that there is a special unit that can help
with cases of honor violence if needed, and two stated that if they were to respond to a potential
case of honor violence or forced marriage, they would pass the case off to a higher ranking
detective.
Two officers with the MPS (an Inspector and a Constable), however, both stated that the
little they know about the topic was learned from the media. Neither were sure what the police
response to honor violence would be, other than to refer the case to a special unit that would take
over the case. When asked where she would pass it off to, the Inspector said to the “Honor
Crime Unit at the Yard. Because there is an Honor Crime Unit, isn’t there?” The Constable
reasoned that first responders never interview vulnerable victims (which is what a victim of
honor violence would be), so this may explain why she has not received training.
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Criticisms of Training
Six officers (31.6%) provided criticisms of police training in the UK. They first argued
that there was supposed to be specific honor violence training, but it was never implemented.
This is problematic, three officers with the WMP argued, because officers who are used to
working in an all white area “would not have a clue how to identify honor violence in a place
like Birmingham” [meaning racially and ethnically diverse]. This is because first responders get
most of their training on the job, and will not have experience with cases of honor violence if
they are not personally responding to them.
Three officers with the WMP stated that training was better in the past because it was
conducted in person. Training is now mostly computer-based training, which they think is
“appalling”, wastes time, and is difficult for officers to focus on because time is not carved out
for them to complete their training. Rather, they are supposed to complete computer-based
trainings on top of their workload. Additionally, a Detective Sergeant with the MPS argued that
computer-based honor violence training does not embed the information in an officers’ memory.
Another Police Constable with the WMP stated that emailed training also is not very helpful, and
she does not think everyone reads everything because they get so many emails each day. Thus,
several officers stated that they would prefer face-to-face training.
A Crisis Interventionist in with the MPS suggested that training should be done by
organizations that work with victims because police need to understand the perspective of the
victim. Additionally, officers should have refresher courses to keep them up to date. Four
officers (21.1%) stated that they prefer to be trained by a knowledgeable speaker who is
passionate about the topic. Three officers noted argued that knowledgeable police officers can
explain how to properly respond to the crime, what worked, where things went wrong, and
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lessons learned. Survivors can relate their experience and give their opinions on what their
interactions with the police were like (both positive and negative). Interactive training is easier to
learn from and easier to pay attention to. One Detective Inspector with the WMP argued the
opposite, however. She would prefer to receive less training, stating
“I think, to be perfectly honestly with you, the amount of things this staff need to knowand this is really important- but there’s a whole host of really important things that the
staff needs to know about. And I can’t have them always being trained, I need them out
there actually delivering.”
Responder Opinions of Police Response
When asked about their opinion of the police response in the UK, responders gave three
answers. Eighteen responders believed that although the police response was poor in the past, it
is currently good (51.4% of the sample). This included thirteen Police Officers, a Senior Policy
Advisor for the CPS, a Researcher/Activist, a survivor of honor violence who is a Member of the
Advisory Board of a women’s organization, a Chief Executive of a charity, and a Researcher
Officer for a women’s NGO. Four responders (11.4%), however, argued that the police response
was poor in the past and continues to be poor. This group included two Directors of women’s
NGO’s, one Advice Manager of a woman’s NGO, and one Researcher who is also an activist.
Three responders argued that the UK response to honor violence is neither good nor bad, and ten
responders (28.6%) did not give an opinion on the police response. Several themes emerged in
these responses, which will be discussed individually.
- Poor in the Past, but Currently Good Police Response
Approximately half of the sample believes that although the UK response to honor
violence was poor in the past, it is currently a good response. A Chief Superintendent with the
WMP argued that the response can still improve but has come a long way, saying
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“Let's just create a picture. The 70's, you'd have been ignored, and we'd have just said
‘Look this is a family matter, we will leave it to you.’ The 90's, it would've been classified
as domestic violence, and now it would be classified as honor-based violence. So, our
understanding of it has probably improved….so people understand honor-based violence,
so they understand better what causes someone to retract a complaint, why someone isn't
coming forward, why someone is lying to protect their family, why a family might get
together to intimidate a witness or withdraw statements of complaint, and I think because
it is up there on the agenda, people are prepared to invest more time in it than normally.”
A Policy and Research Manager at a London NGO stated that the Banaz Mahmod case was a
turning point in the UK because of all of the mistakes that were made. Mahmod had disclosed
the violence that she was experiencing to the police many times, but she was not taken seriously.
They did not understand the context of the risk in her situation, dismissed her concerns, and had
no conception of what she was experiencing.
Similarly, two officers argued that the police and social service responses were quite bad
prior to 2008. The police were frightened to try to protect people, and victims were frightened to
ask for help. A Police Constable with the WMP noted, for example, that victims used to be
turned away because honor violence was considered a family dispute, and the police thought
there was nothing that could be done. Now, a Detective Sergeant with the WMP argued, honor
violence protocols are firmly in place and running smoothly with “no flaws in the system.” Each
officer may not be trained to the same level, but they are aware of the protocols and know who to
call for help within the police department. A Detective Chief Inspector went on to say that the
police are now much more willing to try to help and there have been major steps in safeguarding.
A Detective Chief Inspector with the WMP believes that the UK police response is a
good one, but can get better. Most officers can define honor violence, and have at least a vague
idea of how to deal with it. Front line officers, however, often are not comfortable with this
subject matter, especially male officers interacting with young female victims. She would like to
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see officers more comfortable with making referrals to the right detectives to handle these types
of cases.
When asked what she thinks of the police response to honor violence, a Detective
Constable with the MPS stated that when compared to the responses of other countries, the UK
response is not a bad one. In her opinion, the MPS does a good job compared to police
departments the rest of the UK. Some forces, like the West Midlands and Bedfordshire police
services, do amazing work. She also thinks they have a better police response in Birmingham
because they have such a high population of ethnic minorities, so they had to become good at
doing this job. A Police Constable with the WMP believes the UK model would be a good one
for other countries to follow.
A survivor of honor violence, who also serves on the advisory board of a women’s NGO,
also believes that the police response has become very good. Police officers are better trained,
and are taught when and how to intervene. They now know that arresting family members and
then leaving the victim in the home creates more danger for the victim. She mentioned the “One
Chance Rule”, meaning that when a victim does choose to contact some type of service for help,
that service has one chance to help them. Interventions need to be done more carefully, and the
police have recognized that. In her experience, the removal from her home was carefully planned
out and she appreciated the response the police provided.
- Poor Police Response in the Past, and Currently Poor
Four responders argued that the police response was poor in the past and continues to be
poor. A Director of a women’s NGO in London began by stating that the police ran around “like
headless chickens trying not to look too bad after the murder of Banaz Mahmod.” Three
responders argued that the police response in the UK is very inconsistent. The Director of a
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women’s NGO stated that some boroughs have good police responses, others do not, and “the
patchiness of the response is a concern for me.” She and an Advice Manager of a women’s
NGO also argued there has been a lack of investment in training recently, which is going to undo
all the progress that has been made. A Research Officer at a women’s NGO added that rural
police forces are often worse than urban police forces because they are less diverse and have less
experience with honor violence.
An Advice Manager with a women’s NGO in London has had some good experiences
with the police, but the majority of her organizations’ experiences with the police have not been
good. The organization has to do a lot of explaining to the police about what honor violence is,
how they should handle the case, and how they should protect the client. They need to empathize
more with victims and understand their needs better, especially how a woman feels in that
moment that she is reporting to them. It is important not to challenge what the victim says, listen
more, and believe what she says.
A Researcher/Activist in London voiced concerns about having special units that focus
on honor violence, arguing that honor violence is part of the continuum of violence against
women. Focusing on honor violence tends to stress cultural differences between offenders and
victims in an unnecessary manner. She said, for example,
“I’m sometimes asked to go and talk to the police force, or prison wardens and tell them
about how to do good intercultural relations with Somali’s or- as if there’s- they want a
tick box rule book, a how to tool kit, ‘how to talk to certain women’, ‘so we shouldn’t
shake their hand?’… I don’t know if you need special units for honor. I think violence
against women is much broader than that.”
Two Directors of women’s NGO’s questioned the term “victim-led” or “victim-centered”
police responses. They both stated that these have become catch phrases within the police
response. For one Director, the term “victim-led” is vague and makes assumptions. Assuming
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that a victim has some sort of over arching understanding of the structural issues involved in a
response is incorrect. The goal is to have police officers understand the structural issues as well
as the victim pathway, not just the victim pathway. Another Director of a NGO stated went on to
express frustration over the way that police officers treat victims, saying
“Every single time I train the police…they will all give me some version of ‘how can I
make victims do what I tell them?’ And that’s kind of part of the copper’s mindset, that I
mean, for police officers to continuously talk about how hopeless the criminal justice
system is, and how it’s all a big mess, and yet they expect victims to have 100% faith in
it! ”
The Director also stated that the police have gotten into trouble quite a few times by taking DNA
and fingerprints from victims. She argues that it does not make sense to collect this information
from victims on the off chance that the information might someday lead to an arrest. Although
this Director believes that the police response to honor violence has not been very good in the
UK, she does think the police in London are doing a better job than in the rest of England.
- Police Response is Neither Good nor Bad
Three responders stated that the response to honor violence in the UK is neither good nor
bad. Two Police Constables with the MPS, for example, stated that the response to honor
violence in the UK has only evolved over the last five years. A Researcher/Activist in London
does not think the UK actually has a “model of response” to honor violence. According to her,
there are still ongoing debates between the criminal justice and social service sectors on what
should be done in cases of honor violence.
In her opinion, the first order response to violence against women should be protection.
The problem with the UK and US is that both countries have gone “full steam ahead” into
prosecution and criminal justice responses, and she is not convinced that is the best approach.
There should be criminal justice responses, but protection and prevention should come first. It is
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hard for victims to criminalize the ones they love. They simply want the violence to stop. The
hard part is figuring out a way to make that happen, to use intervention and justice in a way that
works best for the victim. She thinks the Forced Marriage Protection Order (FMPO) fits with that
goal, and is a good first step in creating an effective system of protection.
Legal Response
Fifteen responders (42.9%) discussed the legal response to honor violence and violence
against women in the UK.
UK Penal Code
There is no specific crime in the penal code for honor violence, but many offenses can be
used to prosecute offenders who commit honor violence. Three police officers and a
Researcher/Activist in London (11.4% of the total sample) stated that honor violence is a hate
crime. Because of these responders’ statements, I asked the Senior Policy Advisor and Chief
Prosecutor at the CPS about this classification. Both said that honor violence is not considered a
hate crime. The Chief Prosecutor went on to say that he tries to avoid labels like “hate crime”,
which includes not categorizing honor violence as domestic violence.
According to a Senior Policy Advisor with the CPS (E19), the approach to honor
violence in the UK began in 2008, although it was in development before the Banaz Mahmod
case. The CPS led the charge on honor violence and forced marriage by putting the issues “right
in people’s faces.” The CPS and the police began trying to engage the public, especially in
communities where honor violence occurs the most, because there often are cases where the
victim will not cooperate. They eventually realized that responders did not understand the
victims’ perspective, and the reasons that victims were not cooperating. The police and the CPS
proceeded with the idea that engaging local communities in the fight against honor violence can

	
  

166	
  

provide the support the victim needs to move forward, because the number of people who engage
in honor violence in each community is often very small. Communities then began having more
confidence in the police and CPS, began working with both organizations, and invited legal
guidance on these issues.
She went on to say that the CPS consulted local communities while they were drafting a
response to honor violence, and there are now many support agencies that are partnered with
CPS and “scrutinize our work.” Legal guidance for prosecutors can be found on the CPS website
because they feel it is important to be transparent and give the public access to this information.
The information is very detailed in case a prosecutor who does not work with ethnic minorities
very much, and does not understand cultural cases, is working on a case of honor violence. If a
citizen has a question, they can also write to the CPS and the CPS has to answer. A Chief
Prosecutor with the CPS stated that the organization currently tries to develop new approaches to
crimes like violence against women and girls, forced marriage, and child abuse, as well as ensure
that approaches are used consistently across the country. The CPS speaks domestically and
internationally on their approaches in order raise awareness, identifies and addresses gaps in
services, and conducts trainings with a variety of responders (e.g., prosecutors, police officers,
social service workers, NGO’s, and educational institutions). When asked whether he thinks the
UK response to honor violence is effective, he said “we’re on a journey. Ten years ago, people
would die and nobody would know that they were dead.”
According to a Chief Prosecutor with the CPS, the CPS started flagging and monitoring
cases of honor violence in 2010. The police have been flagging cases for a longer amount of time.
When asked how many cases of honor violence have been prosecuted in the UK, a Senior Police
Advisor for the CPS stated when she was a prosecutor, she did not see many cases of honor
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violence referred to the CPS. She stated that there have not been many convictions, guessing that
the number is “in the 100’s”. Support agencies, however, will say they get 1000’s of cases.
There is no data, so it is difficult to say. A Detective Inspector with the WMP stated that the
police are seeing more victims coming forward, more prosecutions, and more cooperation from
CPS.
Sentencing
According to a Senior Policy Advisor with the CPS, honor violence is not an aggravating
factor for the courts, but is an aggravating factor for the CPS. Honor violence falls under the
umbrella of domestic violence, but is flagged as honor violence. This tells the prosecutor what
guidelines to follow. The crime that the person committed is what they are charged with (e.g.,
murder). Aggravating features are determined through legislation (e.g., race, hate), which the
court considers. Honor is not one of those aggravating features in actual legislation, but judges
are taking honor into account during sentencing. Judges cannot consider honor an aggravating
factor by law, but they can increase the sentence within the normal sentencing guidelines (e.g.,
giving the maximum sentence). A Detective Constable with the MPS stated that she is in favor of
having mandatory sentencing and procedures that limit the discretion of responding officers,
prosecutors, and judges, and penalties should be harsher in domestic violence cases.
Training
According to a Chief Prosecutor with the CPS, training of police officers and prosecutors
was a problem in the past. Prosecutors now have specific procedures that they follow. There are
approximately fifty prosecutors specially trained in honor violence and forced marriage around
the country who act as specialists on cases if needed. Prosecutors are trained through webinars
that build on current knowledge and experts from NGO’s. There is also an intranet that people
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can use to share ideas or concerns on cases, and seek help if necessary. The Director of a
women’s NGO in London commended the CPS for using their own experts as well as experts
from women’s organizations to co-deliver training to prosecutors. She believes this is a richer
training experience because different points of view are conveyed together.
Forced Marriage
A discussion of forced marriage in the UK is important for several reasons. First,
discussions of honor violence and forced marriage were linked throughout most of the interviews
with responders in the UK. Many responders talked about forced marriage as either a form of
honor violence or something that frequently leads to honor violence. British responders also
frequently talked about forced marriage legislation because interest groups in the UK have
suggested using the forced marriage framework as a model for criminalizing honor violence.
Finally, the vignette that was given to responders at the end of the interview is an example of
forced marriage. Three responders provided most of the information on forced marriage: a Senior
Policy Advisor with the CPS, a Chief Prosecutor with the CPS, and a Joint Head of the Forced
Marriage Unit. The Joint Head of the FMU believes the British model for responding to forced
marriage is very effective, and should replicated.
- Forced Marriage Unit
According to the Joint Head of the Forced Marriage Unit, two major departments in the
UK make forced marriage a priority (the Foreign Commonwealth Office and the Home Office).
These two offices manage the Forced Marriage Unit (FMU), which was established in 2005,
collectively. The FMU addresses forced marriages domestically and overseas, as well as
develops policy, provides statutory guidance to support professionals, works closely with several
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charities, and raises awareness. Each year, the FMU conducts approximately one hundred
awareness sessions, both domestically and internationally.
The primary role of the FMU is casework. A helpline is available Monday through Friday
from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm, and a 24-hour Global Response Center operates outside of normal
business hours. Staff members are trained to respond to calls and provide referrals. The FMU
also has rescue teams in South Asian countries, but not the Middle East. The victim must be a
British national, however, so that limits what can be done for non-citizens. FMPO’s may help in
situations where one parent has taken a child out of the country but the other parent is still in the
UK and can be arrested (Joint Head of the FMU).
In 2012, the FMU received 1,500 calls in relation to possible forced marriages. Of these
calls, 18% were male. He considers this to still be quite a considerable number, however, since
most people believe that forced marriage only happens to women. Approximately 49% of calls
were from individuals between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, however about one third of
the calls involved individuals under the age of sixteen. The youngest case involved a two year
old, while the oldest involved a 71 year old (Joint Head of the FMU).
Ethnically, 47% of calls to the helpline were linked to Pakistan, 11% to Bangladesh, and
8% to India. There were also some reports of victims from other countries, like Somalia,
Afghanistan, and Turkey. The FMU did not receive large numbers of cases from Middle Eastern
countries, although he is aware that this region is typically associated with forced marriages. He
believes this is simply reflective of the diaspora living in the UK. There is a longstanding
relationship between the UK and South Asian countries, thus there are large populations from
those communities in the UK. There are not as many communities from Middle Eastern

	
  

170	
  

countries in UK, which may explain why the number of reports is not as large (Joint Head of the
FMU).
- Forced Marriage Legislation
According to the Joint Head of the FMU, there was a lot of interest in making forced
marriage a criminal offense in 2005. There were heated debates both in favor of and against
criminalizing forced marriage, with those against criminalization arguing that forced marriage
would be driven underground because victims would not want to see their family members
prosecuted and would thus be less likely to report. A Researcher/Activist in London reflected on
these debates, stating that this discussion was occurring in the middle of the worst part of post
7/7 Islamaphobia.
The Forced Marriage Civil Protection Act came into effect in November 2008, which
provided civil remedies to victims of forced marriage. Under this act, Forced Marriage
Protection Orders (FMPO’s) could be issued. They function like a restraining order, and can be
requested by a variety of interested parties (e.g., the victim/complainant, police, social service
representative, teacher) on behalf of the victim. FMPO’s state that the individual is at risk of
forced marriage, and carry a variety of conditions. For example, parents can be prevented from
taking an at risk child out of the country, families can be required to return to the UK from an
overseas vacation on a certain day, individuals can be forced to surrender their passport to the
police, parents may be prohibited from contacting a victim, or specify that a victim must attend
school. Powers of arrest are attached to FMPO’s, and it is considered contempt of court if that
order is breached. Thus, pressure is applied to the person who the order is served upon to
actually comply and make sure that the victim is safe. Additionally, a Senior Police Advisor with
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the CPS stated that although forced marriage was not a criminal offense at the time, perpetrators
could be charged with other applicable offenses (e.g., kidnapping, assault, false imprisonment).
Since November 2008, over 500 FMPO’s have been issued. Breaches of FMPO’s have been
frequently occurring, which is considered a major problem because the only sanction is contempt
of court (Joint Head of the FMU).
A Detective Sergeant with the WMP stated that criminalizing forced marriage will garner
more attention for these crimes and give potential victims more power, in that “for the first time,
somebody can say to their parents, ‘you can't force me to marry because it's illegal.’”
A Researcher/Activist in London, however, did not agree. The justification for criminalizing
forced marriage is the UK’s signing of the Istanbul Convention. The United Nations states that
all forms of violence against women should be criminalized, which should be done through the
creation of specific offenses. She does not agree with this argument, and used domestic violence
as an example. In the UK, there is no specific crime called “domestic violence”. People who are
prosecuted for domestic violence are charged with other crimes. She is afraid that criminalizing
forced marriage will turn into a competition for who can get the first (and then the most)
prosecutions under the new law, rather than focusing on preventing forced marriage and
protecting victims.
At the time of these interviews (October through December of 2013), forced marriage
had not been criminalized. As of June 16, 2014, forced marriage has been criminalized in the UK.
When discussing the development of this legislation, the Joint Head of the FMU stated that the
goal was to frame the legislation in such a way that it would not deter people from coming
forward. At the same time, the message that forced marriage will not be tolerated in the UK
needs to be conveyed.
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Victims, to a point, have a choice in how a case proceeds. If a victim contacts the FMU,
there is no obligation that the case be reported to the police. The victim can seek protection by
FMPO, and as long as that order is not breached and the victim remains safe, the case is closed.
If the order is breached, it becomes a criminal offense. With the criminalization of forced
marriage, victims now also have the option to prosecute offenders. The CPS, however, will
override the decision not to prosecute if they feel that it is in the best interest of the public to take
the case to court. When asked how the CPS would determine whether it is the best interest of the
public to prosecute against the wishes of a victim, he stated that clear guidelines had not yet been
developed (Joint Head of the FMU).
6.7: Social Service & NGO Response to Honor Violence in Turkey
Two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul agreed that “women’s organizations in Turkey are
one of the most powerful civil society sectors.” Turkish responders described two different types
of organizations that respond to violence against women: one that provides direct services to
victims and one that focuses on training, capacity development, and research. Services at each
organization are discussed below.
Victim Service Organizations
Governmental and non-governmental organizations provide a variety of services to
victims of honor violence, such as legal support, shelter, healthcare, psychological support, job
training and seeking, education, and childcare. For legal services, women are often referred to
the local Bar Association and someone will be assigned to support them during their trial (e.g.,
attend court with the victim, protest the decision if necessary). Lawyers go to court for special
cases, prepare special reports, or give speeches to the media to try to disseminate information.
Three Social Workers in Diyarbakır noted that some organizations also support women while
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they go through the criminal justice process (e.g., filing a claim with the police, meeting with
prosecutors), or if the woman cannot read, write, or speak Turkish.
According to a Social Worker and Psychologist from an organization in Diyarbakır, some
women come only to talk about their options and what will happen to their children. In these
cases, victims are informed of their options and referrals are made to other organizations if
appropriate. Two Social Workers from another organization, however, stated that they try to
encourage victims to go through the legal process without assistance because they believe it is
empowering for victims. Kadın Merkezi Vakfı (KAMER), Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınağı Vakfi
(Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Federation), and ŞÖNİM (Centers for Avoiding and Monitoring
Violence) are examples of organizations that provide direct services to victims.
Two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul stated that KAMER was one of the first
organizations to address honor violence in Turkey. KAMER has an emergency hotline, will help
remove the victim from the house, and cooperates with the local police and government.
KAMER provides many kinds of supports, including being there physically and emotionally for
the victim. In their first year the organization received three applications, and then thirty-one
applications in 2012. When they first receive an application, they ask the victim “whose word is
most important in their family” (i.e., the family leader). Someone from KAMER will then talk to
the family leader, and try to convince them not to commit violence. If KAMER determines that
the person is not likely to be convinced, they will then hide the victim with the cooperation of the
police. In some cases, they take her out of the country. The same goes for victims of domestic
violence.
A Social Worker in Diyarbakır stated that women who seek help at her organization are
first set up with social service specialists. They go through an intake process, and the victim is
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asked to discuss the violence she has experienced and the type of support services she wants. The
victim is a major part of the treatment plan “because she is the one who knows best.” They will
do everything in their power to make the woman safe, even if she does not want to go to a shelter.
For example, they took one woman out in a car with their personal group of friends to disguise
her as she visited a notary for her petition against her husband. They will try to find other forms
of protection with the police and prosecutor. Additionally, there are volunteer lawyers on staff to
help with any legal processes. All of the women’s centers are trying to collaborate, and form
partnerships, with many other centers in Kurdistan on political attitudes toward women’s issues.
Shelter
A major focus of other organizations like Purple Roof and ŞÖNİM (government
sponsored centers which focus on preventing violence) is providing shelter. One Social Worker
described her work in a Turkish women’s shelter in Istanbul. The police refer women
experiencing violence to this particular shelter, and her job is to handle these referrals, find
victims a secure place to live, provide support, and give advice. The goal is to support women
legally, psychologically, and personally. Women can stay in the shelter for 15 to 20 days, and
can then be referred to a longer term housing situation. Women are mostly referred to this shelter
by the police, but can also be referred by district governorships and ŞÖNİMs.
In her experience, most of the women who submit applications to this shelter are
attempting to leave violent marriages but are being threatened because of this decision. Women
who apply to this shelter have generally been experiencing long term violence, and can no longer
take it. She calls her shelter “the last point”. For these women, verbal abuse, public humiliation,
isolation, and behavior control are all “bearable” forms of violence. In other words, women can
often continue to experience these types of violence without trying to escape. Physical violence,
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however, is often the tipping point. Once their lives are threatened, they have been beaten, or
suffered a miscarriage due to violence they seek help at a shelter. It is at this point that they think,
“’ok, this can kill me now.’ Or they cannot find the strength to stand the physical violence
anymore.”
I also interviewed a Social Worker and a Psychologist who work at a shelter in
Diyarbakır that cooperates with ŞÖNİM. Victims are initially taken by a police officer to guesthouses affiliated with the Ministry of Family and Social Policy. A female police officer is
assigned to this specific shelter. They conduct the intake interview there, and then the woman
stays for a few days. This gives the victim time to think about what they want to do, and change
their mind if they want to go home. A report is written about the meeting, as well as a report
containing their observations about the case. Previously, women could only stay for 3 months
and then request an extension. After Law 6284 was passed, there are no limitations on how long
a woman can stay in the shelter. If she tries to go home the employees at the shelter will try to
talk her out of it by informing her of her rights and the risks of returning home, although they
specify that this is not their legal obligation.
Risk Assessment
Four social service responders briefly discussed assessing risk when talking to a victim.
No responders from any organization, however, discussed the use of a specific risk assessment
tool or other procedures for formally assessing risk. A Social Worker and Psychologist in
Diyarbakır, for example, stated that cases where a woman cheated on her husband is considered
“a serious issue.” They went on to say
“usually in such cases we transfer her to another city. Because she always lived here. All
people who can hurt her live here. Her family is here.”
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Two Social Workers in Diyarbakır differentiated honor violence from domestic violence
cases. In cases of domestic violence, this organization requires the victim to seek help for
themselves. They feel this is an important first step in empowering women. Cases of honor
violence are treated differently, they explained, because there is a much higher risk of women
being murdered. They will immediately seek to remove the woman from their current situation,
and will never let the woman remain alone. For example, this organization will escort a woman
in danger of honor violence to the police station and other appointments, as well as change her
appearance. Additionally, a third party (e.g., relatives, friends, or neighbors) can call and ask for
help in cases of honor violence.
Training & Research Organizations
Several organizations in Turkey do not provide direct services to victims of violence, but
do provide services to other organizations and training programs for women in general. For
example, two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul stated that Women for Women’s Human Rights
(WWHR) provides trainings for women in almost every Turkish city. These trainings are for
fourteen weeks, and address women’s rights, constitutional law, the penal code, divorce rights,
child custody, employment, and education. According to a Social Worker in Diyarbakır, her
organization trains others to address violence against women, provides workshops, and conducts
research. If a woman reaches out to their organization for help, they will be referred another
women’s organizations that provides victims services or a women’s shelter. Additionally, this
organization can appoint a lawyer for legal assistance. Their research focuses on the “ideology of
women’s liberation” and violence against women.
According a Lawyer and volunteer Social Worker at an organization in Diyarbakır,
women who seek help at their organization are interviewed about the violence they have

	
  

177	
  

experienced. An employee will determine what type of support services are necessary, and then
make appropriate referrals to any of the fourteen NGO’s working on women’s issues in
Diyarbakır. This organization does not provide direct services, but they do organize workshops,
neighborhood meetings, and conferences. They focus on what the women’s movement wants to
accomplish, how it is reflected in the field, and what policies pertaining to women should be.
Many women who sought help at this organization later become volunteers and involved in the
women’s movement.
Workshops & Raising Awareness
Both types of organizations provide workshops and raise awareness. For example, one
organization hosts seminars to inform women about their legal rights, explain the cycle of
violence, explore ways of protecting women from violence, and discuss methods of ending
violence against women. The goal of these seminars is to “form notions of self, identity, and
social gender roles.” They also conduct seminars with men that define and discuss violence
against women, the legal consequences of violence against women, and how violence affects
children. Other organizations provide workshops that typically focus on gender, feminism, and a
history of women, as well as organize neighborhood meetings and workshops to meet with
women from low-income migrant families. The purpose of these workshops is to understand how
these families think about violence against women, discuss the history of women, religion, and
generally raise awareness about violence against women. Two Social Workers argued that these
workshops would be much better if police officers or other related authorities were involved.
Another women’s NGO discussed their ongoing workshops for children. In these
workshops, they attempt to change the tradition of patriarchy because “everything is learned in
childhood.” They believe that it is very important to consider children in cases of honor violence,
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because children also experience violence. Thus, having mothers and children interact in a fun
way is an important part of these play group/workshops.
Nine responder in the NGO and social service group (75%) discussed awareness-raising
activities. Two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul stated that several women’s groups engage in a
variety of activities to make the general population aware of violence against women. For
example, they distribute pamphlets and posters, organize marches in major cities twice a year,
fundraise with artists and celebrities, and give lectures at schools (with cooperation from the
Ministry of Education). Three Researcher/Activists reported that several organizations also used
the media to raise awareness. For example, some organizations created television commercials,
but they were limited to 2 am airings.
Two Social Workers discussed reaching women who do not speak Turkish and telling
them about their options for help if they are experiencing violence. They make contact by doing
things like knocking on the door and striking up a conversation and playing with their children.
These visits are always initiated around 10:30 am, when husbands are most likely to be at work
because they believe that women cannot speak freely when men are around. If someone knocks
on the door and men are present, they will involve them in the conversation, but men are often
aggressive in these types of conversations. The goal of these visits is to build a presence and trust
in the neighborhood.
Effectiveness
There were varying opinions among responders concerning the effectiveness of NGO and
social service responses to honor violence in Turkey. One Social Worker in Diyarbakır believes
that women’s organizations have come a long way, but still have a long way to go. Two different
Social Workers in Diyarbakır stated that they do not yet know how effective social services are
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in helping women, but they have planned a three-year research project to examine it (e.g., how
social services work, how they respond to women’s applications, how the process at the shelters
work). Generally, they know that they are not as efficient as they want them to be. Similarly, a
Social Worker at a shelter in Istanbul argued that it is hard to tell whether the response is
effective because it is a new response. The goal is to understand how victims of violence can
overcome trauma and form a new life. Facilities for vocational and employment training are very
limited, and need to be developed. Financial support is limited, which is difficult because women
will have to rent a house and care for their children after leaving their husband. This makes
victims very hesitant to embark on a new life.
Another Social Worker in Diyarbakır believes that independent organizations are better
than governmental organizations because they are more objective. There is a more trusting
environment in independent organizations, and all of the workers are volunteers. She argues that
volunteers do this type of work because they believe in and are dedicated to it, and thus do a
better job. Employees at government institutions view their work as “just a job”. She argues that
women are viewed as “possessions or goods” in government institutions, and as someone who
“was delivered to them and who would live in their shelter for some time.” She does not think
these institutions provide enough support and training to women. Additionally, the system in
Turkey is geared towards protecting men, not women. Women are often treated as if they were
the ones who committed a crime, and the shelters are often more like prisons. Women are not
free to come and go as they please, and they cannot have a phone. The experience is a secondary
trauma for them. A Lawyer Diyarbakır further argued
“But we find protection decisions from victims purses, bags, from murdered women’s
pockets. So the women know what to do, but the state does not protect them.”
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The government is using workers in those shelters who have no experience with violence against
women, which is wrong and unacceptable in her opinion. She related this to patriarchy within the
government, arguing that the state has rejected the women’s movement from the beginning, and
running their organization has always been a struggle. They feel that if they worked with the
state, they would be “feeding” their ideology, which they don’t agree with.
Thus, three responders from two organizations in Diyarbakır stated that they will not
form partnerships with certain organizations, especially KAMER. Both organizations consider
themselves to be part of the Kurdish Women’s Movement, and believe that the policies that
KAMER has instituted do not fit with the Kurdish struggle. According to one Social Worker, the
state has banned women in the KCK from organizing, which they consider discrimination. The
state will fund small projects on violence against women, but none of this organization’s projects
have been approved. For this reason, they want to totally separate themselves from the state. For
them, this is “not hostility, but ideologic separation.”
Additionally, these organizations stated that they refuse to work with ŞÖNİM’s because
they do not like the ideology of those shelters. One Social Worker specified that those in
positions of power have tried to standardize the social service process by requiring that all
women who are victims of violence be sent to specific centers (ŞÖNİM’s). Her organization
does not like being told where to send victims, and prefers using their own methods to help
women. ŞÖNİM also decides what time women can come and go from shelters and which
trainings women should receive. Recently they announced that each room in the shelters will be
watched by a surveillance camera, which she believes interferes with the victims’ rights. Other
organizations are not allowed to voice their opinions to ŞÖNİM on their policies, and the director
of ŞÖNİM is more concerned with family issues than women’s issues. Women are also now
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forced to sign a form that they will not speak out against the “central authority [of ŞÖNİM]” or
become a prostitute.
PKK/Kurdish Movement
Two responders discussed the PKK and the Kurdish movement at length. A
Researcher/Activist in Istanbul argued that social service organizations in southeastern Turkey
are far more advanced than in western Turkey because of the Kurdish political party Barış ve
Demokrasi Partisi (BDP, Peace and Democracy Party). The role that women have played in the
Kurdish movement has increased awareness of women’s rights, which has led to better responses
to violence against women. On the other hand, women are killed en masse in the Kurdish region
of Turkey and there will never be an accurate estimate of the number of murders because people
will not speak out about it. She went on to say that many women are murdered in the name of
honor in the PKK, but she does not think that more murders occur in southeastern Turkey than in
western Turkey, although that is the perception.
A Lawyer in Diyarbakır explained that her organization began as a political organization
for the Democratic Women’s Movement, which is part of the Kurdish Democratization
Movement and PKK. This connection allowed her organization to collaborate and build
diplomatic relations with other countries. Their focus was to organize women from different
classes and backgrounds to communicate about politics affecting women. This organization
originally developed during the foundation of the Kurdish women’s movement because women
were forced to migrate to large cities from small villages, and had no place to express themselves
in these cities.
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6.8: Social Service & NGO Response to Honor Violence in England
Responders described two different types of organizations that respond to violence
against women: first tier organizations that provides direct services to victims and second tier
organizations that focuses on training, capacity development, and research. Services at each type
of organization are discussed below. Six responders from first tier organizations were
interviewed, three from second tier organizations, and three Researchers who are also Activists.
Victim Service Organizations
According to the Director of women’s NGO in London, the term “social services” has a
very distinct definition in the UK. Social service programs have statutory responsibilities to
vulnerable adults and children under 18 years old, although she stated that minors between the
ages of 16 and 18 receive far less help than those under the age of 16. A vulnerable adult is very
specifically defined statutorily (e.g., disabled, elderly, HIV positive, in receipt of drug services,
recently released from prison), and does not include individuals experiencing honor violence.
Women experiencing honor violence must go to an NGO for assistance, which often have
very specific services they provide. A Director of another women’s NGO in London explained
that in the ethnic women’s sector, organizations have a range of services that they can provide
(e.g., shelter, advocacy, community based services, resettlement provision). They will “map the
risk” of each victim, and attempt to really understand the network of people who the victim is
dealing with (e.g., doctors who are related to specific family members, cities with close knit
communities where she could not remain hidden). Some women do not want to deal with the
criminal system, and prefer women’s NGO’s, because they want to have more control over what
steps are taken (e.g., choosing not to press charges). This organization advocates for giving
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women choices, unless there are child protection issues. In those cases, there is mandatory
reporting.
The responders interviewed for this study described a variety of services that are
provided to victims. One organization, for example, assists victims with police interactions,
accompanies women to court, assists with relocation, and provides translation, counseling, and
asylum-seeking services. A Research Officer at this organization stated that while only 10% of
the cases her organization deals with are honor violence, these cases consist of approximately
90% of the organizations’ workload because cases of honor violence are so complicated and
have such a high level of intervention. For this reason, she believes that the police should
instantly refer cases of honor violence to women’s NGO’s specializing in the area.
Several responders noted that, for this reason, risk assessments are important but need
improvement. For example, a Research Officer believes that the DASH is a good risk assessment,
but the questions need to be reformed because they do not reflect the current state of knowledge.
The Director of a women’s NGO argued this is because the DASH is a domestic violence risk
assessment that is used for honor violence. Risk assessments depend on the knowledge, expertise,
and intuition of the person administering the assessment, but “you can’t bottle that.” Most of the
individuals administering risk assessments do not have this expertise, and instead are “ticking
boxes“ without really understanding the victim. This is especially problematic because victims
do not immediately trust practitioners, and often cannot verbalize what they are going through.
They rely on the practitioner understanding where they are coming from without them having to
explain it. She went on to say that
“Women might come in and for the first 24 hours she might not be willing to speak, might
just go ‘you know what I mean don’t you?’ And then you have to rely on what your
knowledge is of that ‘you know what I mean.’ You can ask her, but it’s her trusting a
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specialist organization that they have some degree of expertise and familiarity with the
context that she’s coming from.”
Thus, an Advice Manager at another women’s NGO stated that each visit begins with a
risk assessment specially designed by her organization. Their risk assessment asks questions that
are similar to DASH, but in a different way. They have also added questions specifically
concerning honor violence and forced marriage. A crisis intervention team will administer the
initial risk assessment, but all cases of honor violence are automatically considered high risk.
Case files are restricted so that only the case worker and manager can see the file, and this
organization also requires that the police restrict the case files of anyone they refer. This is to
ensure that police officers cannot provide information to perpetrators. This NGO also requests a
police escort for victims when they visit the police station. Referrals for legal services are only
made to firms that the organization trusts. Finally, this responder noted that her organization
provides trainings for the police, prosecutors, social servicers, and other practitioners. A member
of the Survivor Advisory Panel at another women’s NGO described similar services, adding that
her Panel meets two or three times a year in order to strengthen the survivor voice by talking
about real experiences. Their goal is to influence policy and raise awareness.
A Crisis Interventionist with the MPS works with high-risk victims of domestic violence
whose cases are handled by the Community Safety Unit (CSU). She explained that when a
victim goes to the police for help, the responding police officer stops the interview as soon as
they think it might be a case of honor violence and calls this responders’ office. They will then
secure housing for the victim in the short term and long term, have police officers retrieve the
victims’ passport and other possessions, and provide them with a “text phone”. The text phone
looks like a regular cell phone but has one middle button that can be pressed for two seconds,
and then sends a message to the police. The text phone is also equipped with GPS for the police
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to find the victim. The goal is making it easy for the victim to call for help without alerting the
perpetrator (e.g., pushing the button while the phone is in a pocket).
A Detective Constable with the MPS stated that women’s NGO’s fill an important gap in
the response. It is often difficult for the police to address cases of honor violence unless a murder
occurs, because so much of the violence is hidden or not even viewed as violent behavior. The
family will often hide the violence, so there is no way to know what is actually happening to the
victim. Women’s NGO’s, however, can support the victim, get them to a safe place, and help
them to begin rebuilding their lives.
Training & Research Organizations
Second tier women’s NGO’s provide a variety of services to other organizations. As one
Policy and Research Manager at a women’s NGO in London explained, there is a long history of
grassroots organizations working in specific communities in the UK. Many of these
organizations were founded as black feminist political movements, beginning in the 1970’s. Her
organization has “a membership of primarily organizations that are led by BME women, for
other BME women.” These member organizations form a network to address specific issues that
have an impact on BME women and girls. Her organization has working groups on violence
against women and girls (VAWG), create national action plans, and works with different groups
in an advisory capacity to help them frame their views on VAWG. She explained that honor has
always been a problem in the work that this organization has done on VAWG. This organization
does not identify honor as a singular issue to be addressed. Rather,
“Honor might be a context which helps you understand who she is at risk from, where
she is at risk, how it is having a particular impact on her life.”
Two responders from tier two women’s NGO’s stated that their organization provides trainings
for the police, prosecutors, social servicers, and other practitioners. They see this training as
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helpful to their organization because they learn from participants where gaps are occurring, and
what their concerns are.
Criticism
Few responders expressed criticisms of the NGO and social service response to honor
violence in the UK. According to one Advice Manager at a women’s NGO, many social service
organizations are suspicious of women’s claims of abuse. Her organization takes the woman’s
word because if they are challenged, they sometimes become afraid and take a step back.
Victims also often experience a lack of trust in organizations to fully disclose the abuse they are
experiencing. A Policy and Research Manager with a women’s NGO argued that this problem is
compounded by the fact that agencies are not able to identify what is happening to victims, and
do not know how to respond. When this happens, it is left up to victims to come forward and
figure out what to do on their own. This is problematic because they are often not confident
enough to seek help or look for solutions.
She went on to explain that women often do not identify as victims of honor violence,
forced marriage, or rape. As a result, her organization puts the woman at the center of their
activities and considers the different impacts of patriarchy and gender inequality. If the victim is
not at the center, the response is going to be “siloed”, which is a term that eleven other
responders also used. She defines a siloed approach as one that creates very specific responses to
very specific crimes. This is her main criticism of the response to honor violence in the UK,
saying
“So I think in terms of where we are with honor-based violence, we are not as far as we
should be with it. Also, I think if you separate forced marriage, HBV, DV, SV, you know,
it becomes removed from what women experience, because women experience a range of
things. It’s not like this day I experienced HBV, on Tuesday, I experienced SV.”
Honing in on very specific responses has created barriers to professionals intervening in that
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“They think they have to have a thesis of understanding around honor to be able to
respond effectively. They don’t.”
Effectiveness
Only six responders (17.1% of the total sample) provided opinions on the effectiveness of
the NGO and social service response to honor violence in the UK. For example, one Police
Constable with the WMP believes that the police have led the way on responding to honor
violence and forced marriage, but social services have been “slow on the uptake”. Here he is
referring to government funded organizations, rather than women’s NGO’s. Similarly, the
Director of a women’s NGO argued that the response to honor violence in the UK is “pretty
poor”. She believes that the government may have the best of intentions but there is almost
always a lack of support for the organizations providing services. Making honor violence a
subset of domestic violence helped organizations to receive some resources, but the response
continues to function more as an “afterthought”.
Two responders argued that the social service and NGO response is very inconsistent,
with some boroughs doing much better than others. A Program Manager at the Mayor’s Office
noted that it is hard to know what a community needs because there is a great deal of under
reporting and failure to flag cases properly. A Policy and Research Manager at a women’s NGO
stated that although she complains about the response in the UK, she does think that positive
things have occurred and there is a much stronger societal recognition of the issue. The only
social service or NGO responder to report that the UK response is effective was a Crisis
Interventionist in London, especially in the borough she works in.
6.9: Challenges
Responders identified a number of challenges to providing an effective criminal justice,
NGO, and social service response to victims of honor violence in Turkey and England, including
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investigation, protection, actions and experiences of police officers, resources, shelters, lack of
support services, and barriers for victims. Each is discussed below.
Criminal Justice Response
Investigation & Protection
Police officers and prosecutors in Turkey and England noted that honor violence
investigations are challenging. For example, collecting evidence is often difficult because family
and community members work together to commit honor violence. According to one Turkish
police officer, it is much easier to investigate a case if there is one family member who did not
want to commit violence. Furthermore, a Detective Inspector with the WMP stated that she has
difficulty locating cooperative witnesses, no proof of abuse (e.g., evidence from doctor’s visits,
medical reports), and the victim often is not a native English speaker. Under these circumstances,
she asked, how can she get a lawyer to move forward with this case and a jury to convict? She
went on to say,
“It’s his word vs. her word, but actually it turns out to be her word vs. his word, his
fathers word, his mothers word, everybody’s word...The community don’t want to get
involved, don’t want to speak out, because in a lot of circumstances of HBV the
community know about it and they are involved.”
Investigations are also difficult, police officers in both countries noted, in terms of victim
interaction. For example, three Turkish police officers argued that the police are never called in
cases of honor violence. In some cases, this is because people would rather solve what they
consider a family problem themselves. In other situations, victims are afraid to file complaints
with the police at the risk of incurring more abuse. Many victims are not aware that there is an
emergency phone number, do not have a phone, or do not speak the native language. One officer
in Diyarbakır argued that cases are further complicated by false claims of rape, which he thinks
are made if a woman is caught having sex before marriage, or committed adultery.
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In the UK, police officers noted that intervention is often difficult because people request
help before something has happened. Additionally, many victims will file a complaint but then
tell the police they do not want any family members arrested. A Detective Constable with the
MPS stated that she recognizes that going against the victims’ wishes can put them in more
danger, but she finds this situation very frustrating. It is difficult to work with a victim who
wants the violence to stop without leaving their family. A Police Constable with the WMP stated
that he contacts border control to alert them of potential victims of forced marriage in an attempt
to prevent the victim from leaving the country. Passports are not scanned when people leave the
country, however, making it impossible to know if a victim left the country.
Six responders (17.1% of the British sample) then stated that the CPS has a difficult time
prosecuting cases of honor violence if the victim will not cooperate. A Detective Constable with
the MPS stated that victims, for example, are often scared and do not want to go to court. It is a
very difficult process for them, especially if they have to give evidence against a family member
or someone close to them. This can be done in private (e.g., via video link or behind shields) but
they are still condemning a family member. A Detective Chief Inspector with the WMP noted
that victims are also going to be discredited by the defense.
Thirty-five percent of Turkish police officers stated that there are not enough police
officers to protect victims. More specifically, the police are insufficiently staffed to enforce
orders of protection. Two police officers in Diyarbakır stated that, for this reason, the police are
often only able to respond to the most serious threats. In these cases, they give victims their cell
phone numbers, check their home regularly, and talk to family members and neighbors about the
situation at home.
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Six Turkish police officers (30%) expressed frustration with the way that politicians
discuss the police response to violence against women through the media. For example, three
officers in Diyarbakır argued that the media reports about orders of protection without explaining
what they are, so the public thinks that women get “personal security guards”. When a woman
is hurt while she is under the protection of the police, the police come under extreme scrutiny.
Two officers in Diyarbakır argued that the police are doing everything they can on honor
violence cases, but “everything is on the shoulders of police officers”. They also do not think
that home suspensions protect victims of family violence. No one is guarding the victim in their
home, so the offender can show up at the house at any time to harm the victim.
Three British criminal justice responders explained that victims of honor violence are at
tremendous risk, in a way that is different from other victims. There needs to be a lot of victim
support because victims are often intimidated by friends and family, and they also do not want to
further shame their family by testifying. A Detective Inspector with the WMP also noted that she
sees Facebook as a major problem in these cases because it provides another outlet for peers and
family to pressure victims to back down.
A Chief Prosecutor with the CPS noted that witness care was another serious failure in
the past because the risk level was not understood. It is important to understand that victims are
being asked to give up everything when they go into witness protection, and responders should
consider
“The complexity of victims themselves because we’re asking some victims who have
known nothing other than their family to give up everything. Don’t go on Facebook
anymore, all of your Facebook friends don’t exist anymore. All of your neighbors don’t
exist anymore, you are somebody new, somebody different. That is an enormous- what do
you replace that with? We haven’t got a great replacement for it. The survivors network
that we have now didn’t exist a few years ago, Karma Nirvana and there’s a few other
charities in this country who have set up survivor networks, so we left them to their own
devices, we thought ‘oh, we saved you now. There you go!’ We sent one girl to this little
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village in Scotland, which is 500 miles away from where it was all happening, she was
the only one of her color and her ethnicity in this little village, she knew nobody there!
Just little simple things like she’d been eating Asian food all her life, and now there’s no
Asian food. You know? What do you think she wanted to do? Come back home! What is
my life worth if I can’t do the things that I love?”
A Detective Inspector with the WMP also stated that victims and witnesses of honor violence are
bribed not to testify. For all of these reasons, a Chief Prosecutor and a Detective Inspector with
the WMP argued that time is of the essence and speedy trials are necessary.
Actions and Experiences of Police Officers
Several challenges related to the actions and experiences of police officers were
described in both Turkey and England. In Turkey, for example, three officers stated that there is
a high burnout rate for police who handle sensitive cases like honor violence. A female officer in
Diyarbakır mentioned that worrying about victims of violence against women “keeps her up at
night”, and after the first 6 months she had to take a vacation because her mental health was
being affected. She was depressed, and felt responsible for helping all of the women who came
to her in need. For this reason, she thinks specially trained and educated officers and experts
should handle these sensitive cases. A male officer in Istanbul argued that it is difficult to
frequently deal with violent cases, and the dark side of human nature. He went on to say that
there are psychologists available for police officers, but officers do not use these services
because they are afraid that it will negatively impact their careers. Eventually, he argued, it is
easy to become jaded and cynical as a police officer because desensitization occurs.
British police officers noted several challenges. A Police Constable with the WMP and a
Chief Prosecutor with the CPS stated that confidentiality is often a problem in cases of honor
violence. For example, police officers and prosecutors are trusted with victim information, but
sometimes their loyalties lie with their families or communities. In these cases, professionals
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have revealed confidential information about victims. Many responders suggested addressing
violations of confidentiality by restricting access to databases with victim information. Police
officers currently need approval from a supervisor to read honor violence files. Some police
forces do not enter victim information in a database, opting to keep a paper case file instead to
ensure confidentiality. Interpreters should be chosen carefully and not come from the same
neighborhood as the victims. Responders also suggested being wary of taxi drivers because they
are often from the victims’ neighborhood.
Six police officers with the WMP, one Senior Policy Advisor with the CPS, and one
Director of a London NGO (22.9% of the British sample) noted that domestic violence
committed among South Asian Muslim families are often mislabeled as honor violence. One
Police Constable noted that the label “honor violence” is not problematic, but “the way it’s
bandied around is problematic.” For example, a Senior Policy Advisor with the CPS discussed a
case where a South Asian woman was given an exorcism. The police flagged the case as honor
violence because the victim was South Asian, even though the case had nothing to with honor.
One South Asian responder in this study, noted that she was accused of honor violence when her
daughter ran away after running up an expensive phone bill. A Detective Sergeant stated that the
police are still confused about what honor violence is, so they often mark any case with a South
Asian male or female as honor violence. A Police Constable went on to say that it is important
not to see every case with Asian Muslims as HV because then the “organization will become
blind and the ones [victims] that are genuine…”
At the same time, six police officers (31.6%) stated that police officers are generally
afraid of making mistakes in cases of honor violence, which is what often leads to the
mislabeling of cases. Three officers with the WMP described this in terms of a culture of fear
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within the police department, with one officer stating that the police would rather give an
incorrect label of HBV than miss a potential victim. Officers are frightened that if they do not
take action, it could escalate to a homicide, at which point they will lose their job.
The Banaz Mahmod case was mentioned during these discussions, with three officers
explaining that a female officer assigned to the case did not take Mahmod seriously and thus
failed to respond appropriately. They stated that this officer was initially suspended, but then
later promoted. This discussion took place between three police officers, who stopped speaking
about the matter at this point. The three officers exchanged looks that implied that there was a lot
more to say, but they would not speak about this matter while being recorded. This case is now
used as an example in trainings, because it was handled so badly and ended with the death of
Mahmod.
Related to the discussion of mislabeling crimes as honor violence and fear among police
officers of making a mistake is multiculturalism. According to one Detective Chief Inspector
with the WMP, responders used to look the other way in cases of honor violence, arguing that
the harmful practice is simply a part of other cultures. A government minister at the time called
this “moral blindness”, saying that perpetrators cannot be protected in the name of culture.
Twelve responders (34.2%) made statements that were variations of this idea that a crime is a
crime, not matter what culture the person comes from. As a Chief Prosecutor with the CPS stated,
“multicultural sensitivity is no excuse for moral blindness.” He went on to say that there are
many “cultural crimes” which are really just “harmful practices” that should never be allowed.
Everything needs context.
A Detective Sergeant with the MPS discussed mislabeling, culture of fear, and
multiculturalism a bit differently. He argues that officers are currently so scared of making a
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mistake that they are sure to do everything by procedure. They know that their response can
drastically affect what happens to a victim. At the same time, officers are also afraid of labeling
something honor violence if it is not. They do not want to be accused of being racist or culturally
intolerant, so they walk a fine line. Officers are trained not to worry about religion or culture, and
to simply focus on the crime that has been committed. If someone says “you don’t understand,
this is my religion”, the officer is trained to say “but this is a crime in the UK.”
These challenges are compounded due to the frequent reassignment of police officers.
According to a Police Constable with the WMP, it was decided in 2010 there should not be
experts in certain areas. Each officer is now supposed to have knowledge about all types of
crimes. This officer considers himself an expert in honor violence, but even though he has this
expertise, he was transferred to a different police unit. Similarly, a Detective Constable with the
MPS stated that someone who is well trained in a particular area only remains in the same
position for about a year. Once they are moved to another department, someone else needs to be
trained. For her, this results in constant training.
A Detective Constable with the MPS also noted that being unable to follow up with
victims is a challenge. She would like to follow up on these cases, but there currently are not
enough resources to continue with cases after they have been concluded judicially. In an ideal
world, she would like to follow up with victims for five years. Although she does not think that
the risk ever really goes away, it is necessary to be realistic. It would be necessary to develop
some sort of matrix that provides guidance on how long to follow up, and that would probably
have to do with age. She thinks that a 30-year old woman who was already forced into marriage
and trying to get out of it is completely different from a 15 year old who is about to be forced
into marriage.
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Social Service/NGO Response
Resources
Social service/NGO responders in both Turkey and England argued that resources are a
major problem for women’s organizations. According to two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul the
Turkish government does not provide much funding for women’s organizations, and when they
do there are strings attached, so many NGO’s prefer to get their funding independently. The
downside to avoiding government resources, however, is that public authorities often do not
want to work with NGO’s who have not received government funding.
Similarly, three officers in Istanbul (15% of the Turkish police sample) argued that
Turkey does not have a strong social service system, which makes it difficult to respond to honor
violence. Focusing on the police providing safety measures is not enough to stop crime. There
needs to be more shelters, responders, education, and trainings for responders. As one officer
described the current response to honor violence, “it looks like a sportsman with strong arms but
weak legs. His legs should be strengthened too.” For him, the arms of the sportsman represent
the police carrying the majority of the burden of the response. Similarly, another officer argued
that there are not enough social workers, stating “if there are 30,000 police officers, there should
be 30,000 social workers but there are only 300. It should be much more.” These officers
reported that the police often have trouble helping female victims of honor violence because
there is nowhere that victims can immediately be sent. It is protocol to contact social services,
but they often do not immediately respond.
In the UK, twelve responders (34.2% of the total sample) noted that a lack of resources is
a major challenge for women’s NGO’s and social services. One major problem is that many of
the organizations that have a long history of working on cases of honor violence are having their
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funding cut. These are the services that women need the most in order to escape, receive
counseling, and consider their civil and criminal routes of action. Similarly, three responders at
NGO’s argued that there are specialist services available for women and BME communities, but
there are not enough resources being channeled into those organizations. These NGO’s can only
support a woman or girl for a few weeks, but these victims need more long-term intervention and
support. Because of this, many victims are slipping through the net and not getting the attention
that they need.
An Advice Manager at a British women’s NGO spoke at length about her organizations
lack of resources. She wishes she had a bigger staff to support victims in the long term,
following up with victims for at least four weeks. This would help women rebuild their
confidence, provide language support (e.g., many women are turned away from shelters because
they do not speak the language), help with immigration issues (e.g., apply for Destitute Domestic
Violence Concession which provides three months of immigration status to apply for welfare
benefits), provide financial support because they do not have access to public funds, and provide
letters of support. More simply, she wishes that her organization had enough funding to support
each woman who comes to them for help. Each funder, however, has different requirements for
who an organization can provide services to. For example, some funders will only support
women from certain boroughs or certain language speakers. This organization will not turn any
women away. They will at least do a risk assessment and refer them to an organization that can
help them, but the organization wants to do so much more. A Researcher/Activist in London also
touched on this subject, stating
“You can empower your community through certain kinds of funding, or you can be
disempowered by certain funding, but you have to apply to wherever is on the political
agenda at the time- you have to apply for the funding in that way, which creates the
problem as well as can solve the problem.”
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Finally, four responders noted that funding cuts causes NGO’s to lose employees who are
the most skilled at handling sensitive cases like honor violence, because the NGO is constantly
fighting for and losing funding. Thus, skilled workers are leaving organizations because there is
no job security. Funding cuts also means that the necessary outreach and awareness raising is not
being conducted, and there are also less NGO’s in rural areas to help women.
Shelters
Both Turkish and British responders argued that the shelter system is weak. Twenty
responders (27% of the total sample) British responders (37.1% of the total sample) argued that
there are not enough women’s shelters, and that existing shelters are not as safe as they should be.
A Researcher/Activist in London, for example, stated that women are more vulnerable to being
found by their families in temporary shelters. The initial stage of crisis, according to an Advice
Manager at a women’s NGO, is the most dangerous time to be in a shelter. It is also at this
beginning stage that a victim is more likely to be forced to stay at a police station for several
days because no shelters have space available. Many of the shelters that are available are coed,
with even less security than all female shelters.
In Turkey, shelters often are far outside of city centers. Although they were previously
hidden to protect victims, the location of most shelters are known and perpetrators are often able
to easily locate the victim. It is difficult to preserve confidentiality, especially when the
perpetrator is in a position of power (e.g., a lawyer). Two police officers noted that in their
experience, most women do not want to go to shelters and the police do not know where else to
send victims for their protection. According to a Psychologist in Istanbul, the women’s
movement has been demanding special shelters for 20 years. A Social Worker in Diyarbakır
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stated that women’s organizations try to help all women, but they do not have the resources to
provide sustainable solutions.
For example, one Turkish Social Worker stated that women who leave their husbands are
often not welcome back in their family’s homes, so they have nowhere to go. Another Social
Worker in Diyarbakır added that it is also difficult to relocate women because they typically are
not comfortable living in a place other than their hometown. They would rather stay and risk
death than start over in a new city. Additionally, there are special considerations for women who
experience war and immigration because they do not trust official institutions. Victims tend to
feel that they are alone, and women’s shelters and other organizations make the transition easier
for them.
According to two Social Workers in Diyarbakır, shelters are too limited in what they
offer. For example, they argued that shelters should teach women how to resist violence and
stand up for themselves, as well as be places where women can gain their independence while
remaining safe. It should be possible for women to learn job skills and be productive in a
communal lifestyle. There also should be permanent houses for women to live in, so they can
learn to support themselves and be secure. Shelters are only “triaging the wounds” that women
are experiencing. They cannot completely heal abused women because they are fighting the
whole system, which is male dominated. Unfortunately, according to one Social Worker in
Diyarbakır, the government is known for saying that the “shelters are not hotels”. This reflects
the mindset that shelters are viewed as an extravagance rather than a refuge for women who need
help escaping violence.
A Detective Constable with the MPS added that there are not enough shelters
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specifically for teenagers in the UK. This is because teenagers are not considered adults by law,
and have to be sent to foster care that is linked to their community. They are also often unable to
receive social security benefits, so teenagers begin to struggle financially. For many children and
teenagers, it seems easier to say “I will go for that forced marriage after all.” Shelters for
specific populations, however, is a difficult consideration for one Researcher/Activist in London.
She does not like inter-cultural or cultural sensitivity training, and questions whether a special
shelter for specific ethnicities is needed. One possible problem, she argues, is that shelters for
specific populations will turn victims away instead of assisting anyone who needs help. At the
same time, not having shelters for specific populations may effect the funding that certain groups
receive. For example in the past, some groups received no funding for their shelters until specific
funding lines were established. Without these specific funding lines with requirements, certain
groups may receive no funding at all.
Lack of Support Services
Several responders noted that support services are lacking in the social service/NGO
response due to a lack of funding. For example, three responders stated that mental health
services are needed for victims of honor violence in both Turkey and the UK. Counseling is very
important in these cases because the abuse is coming from family members rather than a partner.
This is particularly distressing because it is a huge violation of trust, often resulting in depression
and PTSD. A survivor of honor violence who is a member of the Survivor Advisory Panel of a
women’s NGO in the UK provided her personal experience with a need for mental health
services. She began by stating that the social services programs in UK are not satisfactory. They
are getting better, and awareness is being raised, but “the mental health side of things is just a
shambles.” Personally, her mental health problems were not only difficult to live with but also
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kept her from working full time. As a result, it has been difficult for her to survive on her own.
Survivors, she explained, are not only alone but also forced to be completely self-reliant. In
many cases, this is difficult for survivors because they lack job skills and a means of financial
support. She argues that it is a challenge to get survivors of honor violence to engage in a healing
process from a mental health standpoint, but it is very important.
Similarly, this survivor also wishes there were a referral network of services for support,
stating
“They [survivors of honor violence] need advice on what kind of support is available
financially, how to access the system in terms of- I really wish someone had sat me down
when I left and said ‘right, you’re on your own now, you’ve got bills to pay. These are the
bills you have to pay, this is what it takes to live an everyday life. These are the forms you
have to fill out, these are the organizations you need to approach to do that, this is where
you go to get benefits, this where you go to get…’ Just the basic stuff, you know?
Interpretation skills.”
Survivors need legal advice, especially when there are issues with the custody of children,
vocational training, and language skills. Three police officers with the WMP would also like to
see better support when the victims have left their families, because without that support they are
going to return to their families and put themselves back in danger.
Turkish lawyers noted that they have tried to provide additional support services to
victims, but are often denied access by the court system. For example, a Lawyer in Diyarbakır
stated that it is very difficult to become an intervening party in cases of honor violence. The
government often rejects applications from private attorneys, but will allow the Ministry of
Family and Social Policy to become an intervening party without question. A Lawyer and a
Social Worker in Diyarbakır also complained that the government and court system refuses to
include providers in any decision-making processes, but call when they need something (e.g.,

	
  

201	
  

like a psychologist). They went on to say “they treat you like cheap workers. They do not value
your work, they try to use you.”
Two British responders, a Detective Sergeant with the WMP and a Chief Prosecutor with
the CPS, briefly discussed the healthcare system. The Detective Sergeant argued that healthcare
professionals should be trained to recognize the signs of honor violence and forced marriage. She
stated that she has been training doctors on cases of honor violence, and next year she will be
training midwives. These trainings are not funded by the police department, so she does these
trainings for free.
According to a Detective Sergeant with the MPS, the argument is that it is not always
possible to reach victims of honor violence, so it is important to teach service professionals and
the friends of victims to recognize the signs of honor violence and forced marriage and know
what to do in that situation. A Chief Prosecutor with the CPS noted that health professionals are
now trained to at least know where to refer people who are at risk of honor violence and forced
marriage. Prosecutors have also been working to find ways to assist doctors in finding ways to
help people who are being abused or self-harmed, rather than be bound by confidentiality.
Implementing such a consistent, cohesive, and holistic response, however, is difficult. A
Policy and Research Manager with a women’s NGO noted that what she calls “localism” in the
UK is a problem, meaning that each locality can respond in ways that they choose. She argued
that locals should not be able to choose their own response to honor violence, and there must be
ways to hold organizations accountable. In the research her organization has conducted, they
found increased levels of reporting where there were strong voluntary women’s service
organizations; specialists; trained police officers, social workers, and health professionals; and
work in higher education institutions.
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According to two British responders, one way to begin working towards a consistent and
holistic response is through program and legislative evaluation. More specifically, a Research
and Policy Manager with a women’s NGO noted that there has only been one evaluation of
FMPO’s, and the frustrations that people are expressing about FMPO’s are not being addressed.
Procedures are still not being embedded in policy and practice in social service and healthcare
agencies. She argues that this is because it is not a priority on the local level. Additionally, too
many NGO’s have to justify their existence, which makes it difficult for them to provide services
to their communities.
Barriers for Victims
Responders discussed several barriers for victims who are seeking help from the police
and social service/non-governmental organizations. Seven British officers (36.8%) stated that
simply walking into the station and asking for help is incredibly difficult. A Chief
Superintendent with the WMP argued that once a victim of honor violence has actually called the
police, they have “overcome probably a thousand internal barriers”. He went on to say that the
police should immediately treat each case seriously because the victim has “probably suffered
years of abuse”. A Detective Sergeant with the MPS understands why victims would be
uncomfortable going to the police or NGO for help because it is a very dangerous situation for
them, saying “but to make that leap of faith? I think that’s an incredibly brave move.”
The argument here is that victims of honor violence are extremely hard to reach and very
vulnerable populations. Ten responders in Turkey and England stated that the situation becomes
more difficult because many victims do not report honor violence because they do not trust the
police. This distrust may stem from the belief that the police will seek criminal action against the
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victim or their family, will proceed in a manner that is against the wishes of the victim, or take
their children away.
One Detective Inspector with the WMP stated that victims do not always know that what
they are experiencing is criminally wrong, so she wishes there was more awareness raising in the
community. She wants the community to know that this is an “indefensible” crime, and believes
this would allow the police would make more headway with victims and families during the
investigation. Three British police officers believe that sometimes victims feel that it would just
be easier to go along with the abuse rather than suffer the potential consequences of reporting.
In the experience of a Chief Executive of a charity, victims also do not feel comfortable
seeking help from the criminal justice system because of the counter terrorism work currently
being conducted in the UK. A Research Officer with a British women’s NGO stated that victims
need help when speaking to the police because first responders often do not understand the risks
associated with honor violence. In the opinion of an Inspector with the MPS, a greater police
presence in the community could foster trust in the British police, especially in those who do not
speak English as a first language. Similarly, a Lawyer and a Volunteer Social Worker in
Diyarbakır do not believe that their organization has been effective enough, so their organization
has been “going to where the trouble is.” They no longer wait for applications, but rather seek
out victims if they hear about a case of violence against women.
Interestingly, one Turkish Police Officer voiced a criticism of the governmental and nongovernmental women’s organizations. He stated that he was once invited to be a police
representative at a violence against women meeting. When he was introduced to the group, the
felt attacked by the other participants (who were mostly women) because they did not like the
police response. One woman said that a police officer told a female victim that she deserved
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what happened to her. He listened, agreed that this has been known to happen, and did not try to
defend the officers behavior. He also said, however, that the police often have a difficult time
contacting social service workers. As a result, women often have nowhere to go and are forced to
remain in the police station until a social worker can help them. This, he stated, opened a
dialogue of sharing experiences working with victims of violence against women.
A Social Worker in Diyarbakır also noted problems with the Turkish social service/NGO
response. For example, victims often do not want to go to social services for help, even though
they provide shelter and psychological services. The problem is that many social service
employees try to resolve conflict between the family members “for the sake of family values”,
even if there was honor violence or a rape. Her organization has a problem with this, and also
argues that children should not be sent back to their families in cases of abuse. The same is done
with adult female victims of abuse, which she argues is a patriarchal response. Additionally, two
Social Workers in Diyarbakır stated that in many villages ruled by clans, social service
organizations are staffed by family members, so women cannot go to them for help.
Three Turkish responders in Diyarbakır (two Social Workers and a Lawyer) stated that
they also do not think that women’s organizations have been successful enough in helping
women find employment. They believe that female unemployment is one of the biggest reasons
women face violence, because they become dependent on a partner who abuses them. There have
to be job opportunities, and ways to help women start a new life. According to one Social
Worker unemployment is a major problem for everyone in Diyarbakır because the city has
experienced the effects of war very intensely. This makes it especially difficult to address the
employment issues of women who are experiencing violence. If women are assisted in finding
employment, they tend to become babysitters, housekeepers, and aids to the elderly. The
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problem with this is that these are jobs that are considered traditionally female, and there is no
job growth. Her organization believes
“The more free the women be, the more free the society be. This is our backbone
philosophy. Freeing the society by freeing the women.”
Another challenge noted by several responders is that language is a huge barrier for
victims, so they would suggest better access to interpreters. According to three British police
officers with the WMP, the quality of interpreters currently working with the WMP is
“appalling”. A Detective Sergeant at the MPS, however, stated the MPS has good resources for
different language speakers, including a language line for victims to call and speak to someone
on the phone in their native language. Two Turkish Social Workers in Diyarbakır noted that the
state’s official language is Turkish, and Turkish is used in all the official institutions despite the
wide use of the Kurdish language in southeastern Turkey. Thus, one Social Worker argued that it
is important for organizations like hers to function as a “bridge between women and official
institutions.”
Relatedly, ten British responders (28.6% of the total sample) noted that immigration
status is a barrier for women seeking help. As five responders explained, immigration status is a
major problem because there is nothing that can be done to help first generation immigrants with
no recourse status. For example, these victims cannot go into shelters or receive counseling
because public funds are very rarely available to non-citizens. Three police officers with the
WMP stated that the police do not have funds to help non-citizen victims in this situation.
Housing is extremely limited in the UK right now, which compounds the problem. The police
will sometimes place women in a hotel for a few days if a shelter is not available, but the police
do not have the resources to protect victims in the hotel.
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Finally, the Director of a women’s NGO in London argued that the services at NGO’s are
often very “fractured”. She describes this fractured response as being both good and bad. If each
type of NGO is located close together, and they are only a bus ride away for the victim, then that
could be beneficial. If each service is 120 miles away and there is no bus service, however, this
makes it very difficult for victims to receive help. She stated that maybe in this case, a victim
would be happy to have at least one NGO near them, even if the NGO had very limited services
to offer.
6.10: Responses to Vignettes
Demographics
Of the 74 responders interviewed for this study, 62 completed vignettes (83.8% of the
total sample). Turkish responders answered 34 vignettes (87.2% of the Turkish sample), and
British responders answered 28 vignettes (80% of the British sample). Responders who did not
provide an answer to the vignette either did not have time, or did not work directly with victims.
Fifteen responders answered the Turkish vignette (8 Police Officers, 2 Lawyers, 4 Social
Workers, and 1 Psychologist) and nineteen responders answered the Kurdish vignette (11 Police
Officers, 4 Lawyers, 3 Social Workers, and 1 Psychologist). Fifteen responders answered the
English vignette (9 Police Officers, 2 Lawyers, 2 Directors of women’s NGO’s, 1 NGO
employee, and 1 Researcher/Activist who works with victims) and thirteen responders answered
the South Asian vignette (9 Police Officers, 1 Director of a women’s NGO, 2 NGO employees,
and 1 Crisis Interventionist with the MPS). All percentages provided in this section are derived
from the total number of responders who answered vignettes.
Table 3. Description of Vignettes (N=62)
Type of Vignette

	
  

207	
  

Responder
Type
Police Officer
Lawyer
Social Worker
Director of an NGO
NGO Employee
Psychologist
Researcher/Activist
Crisis Interventionist
Total

Turkish
Vignette
8
2
4
0
0
1
0
0
15

Kurdish
Vignette
11
4
3
0
0
1
0
0
19

English
Vignette
9
2
0
2
1
0
1
0
15

South Asian
Vignette
9
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
13

Total
37
8
7
3
3
2
1
1
62

Vignettes Answers By Country
General Comments
Many responders began by stating that the individual in the vignette is an adult who can
make their own decisions (41.9%), and 9.7% clarified that juvenile victims must be handled
differently (5 Turkish responders, 1 British). For 37.1% of responders, listening carefully to the
individual in the vignette and trying to understand what happened is very important. Eight
British responders (28.6% of the British sample) argued that an in depth interview should be
conducted. For example, the Director of a Women’s NGO noted that responders should get to
know the victim in order understand their experience.
Eighteen responders (9 British, 9 Turkish; 29%) stated that they would discuss the
woman’s options, and eight argued that the woman should be informed of her legal rights (7
Turkish and 1 British; 12.9%). Thirty-eight responders (19 British, 19 Turkish; 61.3%) stated
that they would tell her that what happens next is her choice, and five British responders (17.9%
of British sample) specified that there is no standard response to this situation but it must be
victim led. Eight responders (12.9%) stated that they would counsel the woman in the vignette.
Pregnancy, Marriage, & Family
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Almost half of responders discussed the pregnancy (41.9%), with 41.9% specifically
stating that they would ask if the woman wants the baby, 22.6% would ask if the woman wants
an abortion (5 British, 9 Turkish), and 12.9% would offer to help the woman obtain an abortion
(1 British, 7 Turkish). Two Police Officers in Istanbul reacted very negatively to the pregnancy
in the Turkish vignette,
“The baby is a big thing in Turkey, because you can’t raise a bastard. You can’t be a
single mom. There is no tolerance for that.”
“I’d ask her ‘If you will not get married, why are you having a sexual intercourse?’ This
would be my first response. But when I get angry, I do not decide on anything, would
count to 10 inside and probably for this case, I would not decide on anything, I would
just count inside.”
Twelve responders (3 British and 9 Turkish; 19.4% of the total sample) discussed the
potential marriage in the vignette, beginning by stating that they would ask the woman in the
vignette if she wanted to marry the father of her baby. Two Turkish responders (5.9% of the
Turkish sample) further stated that they would try to convince the woman to marry the father.
Seven Turkish responders (20.6% of the Turkish sample) specifically stated that they would not
try to pressure the woman to marry the father.
Five British responders stated that they would collect detailed information about the
family of the individual in the vignette (17.9% of the British sample). Two Turkish responders
specified that they would investigate the family (5.9% of the Turkish sample), and one Turkish
Police Officer said that he would confiscate all weapons that the family owned (2.9%). Several
responders discussed different ways that they would interact with the family. For example, 13
responders discussed mediation (21%). Nine Turkish responders and one British responder
(16.1% of the total sample) stated that they would attempt to mediate with the family, and three

	
  

209	
  

British responders (4.8% of the total sample) argued that mediation is not in the best interest of
the woman in the vignette.
Twenty responders (32.3%) discussed talking with the family without attempting
mediation, with sixteen responders recommending this approach (13 Turkish and 3 British) and
four British responders arguing that no one should talk to the family. Four British responders
(14.3% of the British sample) recommended having a third party present if the victim decided to
discuss the situation further with their family.
Risk & Protection
Twelve responders (19.4%) stated that they would conduct a risk assessment (11 British
and 1 Turkish), and five responders (3 British and 2 Turkish; 8.1%) argued that they would
explain the risk level of this situation to the woman in the vignette. Three British responders
(10.7% of the British sample) stated that they would convene a MARAC. Protecting the woman
in the vignette was discussed in many different ways. Forty-one responders (66.1%) made
general statements that they would discuss protection strategies with the woman in the vignette.
Almost two thirds of the sample (62.9%) stated that they would discuss options for shelter, with
61.3% recommending that the woman stay at a shelter and one Turkish responder arguing that
shelters are too dangerous. Nineteen responders (30.6%) stated that they would discuss
relocating the victim to another city, and five would discuss changing identities (8.1%). Seven
Turkish responders (20.6% of the Turkish sample) specified that they would put the woman
under “state protection.” Fourteen responders (22.6%) argued that confidentiality must be
ensured to keep the woman safe, and four responders would follow up with the woman after the
situation has been addressed (2 British and 2 Turkish; 6.5%).

	
  

210	
  

Criminal Justice Involvement
Responders discussed a variety of options for criminal justice involvement. Eleven
responders (8 Turkish and 3 British; 17.7%) recommended that the woman in the vignette file a
complaint with the police, and nine police officers (6 Turkish and 3 British; 14.5%) said that they
would take a statement if she came to them for help. Twenty-one responders (15 British and 6
Turkish; 33.9%) identified this as a case of forced marriage. Eight British Police Officers (28.6%
of the British sample) specified that they would then refer the case to a special department (e.g.,
the Community Safety Unit or Public Protection Unit). Seven British Police Officers (25% of the
British sample) said they would create a case file, seven said they would flag the file as forced
marriage (25%), and three (10.7%) said they would also flag the case as honor violence. One
British Police Officer stated that they would collect DNA, fingerprints, and photographs for the
case file.
Six British responders (21.4% of the British sample) stated that they would apply for a
FMPO, and four (14.3%) stated that they would develop a safety plan with the woman in the
vignette. Seven Turkish responders (20.6% of the Turkish sample) argued that they would
contact a prosecutor about the case and follow their instructions, and four British responders
(34.9% of the British sample) stated that they would discuss pressing charges with the woman in
the vignette. Ten responders (16.1%), however, argued that no criminal offense has occurred and
there may not be anything that can be done from a criminal justice perspective. Nine of those
responders were British (32.1% of the British sample).
Social Service & NGO Involvement
Eleven British responders (39.3% of the British sample) stated that they would refer the
woman in the vignette to other agencies for assistance, and thirteen (46.4%) stated that they
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would work closely with social services. Twelve responders (6 Turkish and 6 British; 19.4%)
stated that they would contact a women’s center or NGO for assistance, and seven Turkish
responders (20.6% of Turkish responders) specified that they would contact the Ministry of
Family and Social Policy. Eight Turkish responders (23.5% of Turkish responders) stated that
they would help the woman in the vignette find employment, five (14.7%) stated that would
obtain psychological services, and four (11.8%) stated that they would take her to see a doctor.
Discussed the Vignette
Several responders discussed the example used in the vignette. For example, eleven
responders (8 Turkish and 3 British; 17.7%) stated that the situation depicted in the vignette was
very common in their country and one Turkish responder argued that this is not a typical
situation. She stated
“This is an extreme case because she’s pregnant. The issue is not in the name of honor,
but in the name of general discrimination against women. Any woman in Turkey, from
any class, is not supposed to have a child without marriage, which is a general
patriarchal thing, apart from- she’s Kurdish, Turkish, whatever.”
According a Social Worker in Istanbul, however, “there are many cases like this that we witness
every day.” Three Turkish Police Officers (8.8% of the Turkish sample) expressed anger at the
construction of the vignette. For example, one Police Officer stated “this question has been
prepared with mainstream prejudices….We don’t care about her being a Kurd.” Three British
Police Officers (10.7% of the British sample) did not feel that they were qualified to provide an
answer to the hypothetical situation.
Vignettes By Type
There was not enough variation in responses by vignette type to inform a meaningful
discussion. This could be because there were not enough vignettes answered in the study, or
because the vignettes were too open-ended. The responses to specific vignette types, however,
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could serve as a means of developing guided questions for answering the vignettes in a future
study. Specific questions may make it easier to identify patterns in responses to the hypothetical
situations in the vignette.
There were several themes in responder’s answers to the vignettes that may indicate
othering upon further examination. For example, six responders who answered the English
vignette stated that no criminal offense had occurred, while only two responders who answered
the South Asian vignette made the same statement. Similarly, six responders who answered the
Kurdish vignette stated that the woman should be informed of her legal rights while only one
Turkish responder gave the same answer. The four responders who stated that they would
discuss pressing charges with the woman answered South Asian vignette, and five responders
who answered the Kurdish vignette stated that they would contact a prosecutor and follow their
instructions while only two responders given the Turkish vignette gave the same answer.
It may be telling that five responders who answered the Kurdish vignette stated that they
would put the woman in the vignette under state protection, while only two responders given the
Turkish vignette offered the same response. Similarly, nine responders who answered the
Kurdish vignette and five who answered the South Asian vignette stated that they would discuss
relocating the woman, while only two responders who answered the Turkish and three who
answered the English vignettes gave the same response. Six responders who answered the
Kurdish vignette stated that they would help the woman find employment while only two
responders given the Turkish vignette gave the same response.
Finally, seven responders discussed ethnicity or religion when providing their response to
the vignette. Three of these responses occurred when providing an answer to the English vignette,
three for the Kurdish vignette, and one for the Turkish vignette. Three responders stated that
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ethnicity and religion should not factor into a response to this situation. As one Police Officer in
Diyarbakır stated,
“She does not have to be Turkish or Kurdish, we evaluate all the applications regardless
of their race and gender and help all people. This Turkish/Kurdish separation is useless,
we do not discriminate just like they do not discriminate in the US.”
Two responders stated that ethnicity and/or religion would definitely affect their response to the
situation presented in the vignette, saying
“The example talks about a Protestant family. We would deal with it a similar way, but in
a Protestant family we wouldn’t expect honor violence as such an issue, but we might talk
to the family in that particular case ‘do you understand what your daughter’s position is’
and try to explain it.” (Detective Chief Inspector with the WMP)
“We would offer the shelter to her, and if she accepted, then we would put her there.
Because if they were from Trabzon [city in Northeastern Turkey] or Southeastern Turkey,
they will do something bad to her.” (Police Officer in Istanbul)
This interesting exchange occurred in an interview with two British Police Officers with the
WMP:
“ Officer 2: I’d say it’s not a police matter. Because it’s a family matter.
Officer 1: It depends on what she says. It says ‘intense response’. What’s her
interpretation of an intense response by her parents. What does she fear? What does she
believe, what does she want? [long pause] And if she came from a Pakistani community,
would you still react the same?
Officer 2: Whole different ball game.
Interviewer: So if her name were Geetanjali, that would trigger something, and you
would react differently?
Officer 2: Yes, because we know they’ve got the potential, and the propensity and the
capacity to go and get that young girl whisked off to Pakistan and married, or even worse.
The girl called Emily from a Protestant family- that’s not likely to happen. I’ve been a
police officer 28 years. [laughs]…
Officer 1: I’d still take that on face value. You’ve got a 19 year old pregnant girl, you go
to your victims and find out what their fears and expectations are, and what they want
first. And based on that response [you act]. But I also agree with Officer 2, if that was an
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Asian name, HBV alert would be right there at the forefront, rather than ‘let’s just see
what we’ve got.’ It would be HBV.”
6.11: Best Practices
Throughout the interviews, responders described best practices for addressing honor
violence. In some cases, they described best practices that were already taking place in their
country. Responders also, however, described best practices that they wished they were able to
implement and made recommendations for what an ideal response to honor violence would
include. The following sections describe general recommendations for responses to honor
violence; best practices for criminal justice, social service, legal, and government responses;
prevention; and recommended models.
General Recommendations
Having a holistic multi-agency response was recommended by 48.6% of the total sample,
although this was most often a British response (82.9% of the British sample; 17.9% of the
Turkish sample). Responders stated that a coordinated and holistic response with multiple
partnerships is key to any good response. British responders also recommended that honor
violence should be viewed as one part of a continuum of violence against women (22.9%), rather
than “siloed” (31.4%). A Policy & Research Manager at a women’s NGO in London argued that
victims do not identify with one specific crime, because they are often experiencing a range of
abuse. For example, a victim of honor violence may also be a victim of sexual violence, and
“…unless you have the woman at the center of it, in terms of all the different dynamics
that are having an impact on her, including patriarchy and gender inequality- if you silo
the issues, than your responses are going to be siloed.” (Policy & Research Manager of a
women’s NGO in London)
To do this, 8.6% of British responders suggested using a human rights framework and
11.4% suggested using models for responding to forced genital mutilation (FGM). For example,
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a Director of a Women’s NGO in London first argued that using a human rights based approach
eliminates the focus on differences between cultures, and instead highlights that any type of
violence is a human rights violation. She then went on to say FGM intervention models have
been successful because they focus on using the community to produce change through
prevention, rather than the criminal justice system through punishment. Similarly, a
Researcher/Activist in London stated
“If you can get the group of villages that inter-marry to all come together and pledge that
they will not do it to their daughters, you can eradicate it [FGM] in a small region over
night, but it takes you a year and a half, two years, to get to that point with all of those
villages. So there’s something about working with networks and I think one of the
complicated issues here is we’re talking about diasporic networks, so how do you get the
family that’s in the U.S. and the UK and the family that is back wherever the rest of the
family is, to come together and be in a process together, and get to the same point.”
British responders also suggested taking a victim-centered approach to honor violence
(25.7% of the British sample) and giving victims options (31.4%). More specifically, British
responders recommended that all agencies receive training in responding to violence against
women (31.4%). This training is especially important because responders need to understand the
context of honor violence in order to respond appropriately (71.4% of the British sample).
British responders suggested that there should be ethnic, racial, and religious diversity
among responders (14.3%), good interpreters (22.9%), and standardized risk assessments (5.7%).
Some responders also noted that it is important to evaluate institutional responses and establish
best practices (20% of British sample). Two British responders, however, recommended using
caution when implementing risk assessments. According to a Detective Chief Inspector with the
WMP (E5), the danger is creating too many risk assessments for different issues because that
confuses police officers. The Director of a women’s NGO in London argued that risk
assessments are require the allocation of costly resources, and focus on “typical situations.”
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Thus, the results of risk assessments are often skewed and privilege certain types of crimes (e.g.,
assault) over other forms of abuse (e.g., verbal abuse).
Many responders also discussed the role of the community in institutional responses to
honor violence. For example, 20.3% suggested involving community leaders and 17.6%
suggested including citizens in responses to honor violence. A Social Worker in Diyarbakır
noted that all interventions should be tailored to the local level because “we cannot know what
works best for the local people, they should know it better.” Additionally, the community has to
change from within by putting out the message that honor violence is not acceptable.
Police Responses
Training
Most responders made recommendations for best practices in training police officers.
Generally, responders argued that police officers should receive more training concerning honor
violence (56.8%). Five responders argued that police officers should learn from foreign police
departments if possible (6.6%). For example, a Police Officer with the MPS stated he and several
other officers visited Maraş, Turkey in an effort to learn from the Turkish police.
Seventeen British responders (48.6%) and one Turkish responder argued that police
officers should be trained using case studies (24% of the total sample). It was also suggested that
survivors should be involved in training (10.8% of the total sample). A Detective Sergeant with
the WMP argued that hearing from survivors presents a different perspective to police officers,
explaining the complexity of the situation, the barriers that victims face, and reasons why a
victim may choose to return to their family and risk future harm. The Director of a women’s
NGO in London, on the other hand, recommended using caution when involving survivors in
training, saying
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“You don’t assume expertise become somebody is a survivor...That person knows about
their experiences, and it’s important that that’s given voice, but that person may never
have interrogated patriarchy, power, and control.”
Cultural awareness training was discussed by 20.3% of the sample. Six responders argued
that the police should not focus on cultural awareness training (8.1%). Five of these six
responders were British (14.3% of the British sample). For example, a Research Officer with a
women’s NGO in London argued
“The more I get into this, the less I’m interested in the why this family does this and why
this family does that. I want to know what the risk level is. We don’t treat other crimes in
this way, that’s the other thing. We don’t look at an arsonist and say, ‘what is he feeling?’
A psychiatrist might do that but the police aren’t supposed to be doing psychology.”
Nine responders argued that police officers should focus on cultural awareness training (12.2%),
six of whom were Turkish (15.4% of the Turkish sample). A Police Officer in Diyarbakır argued,
for example, that officers transferred from western to eastern Turkey experience culture shock.
Investigation
A few responders made recommendations for police investigations. British responders
(20%) discussed standard operating procedures concerning honor violence, with five responders
arguing for having standard operating procedure so that police do not have too much discretion
(14.3%) and two arguing against having standard operating procedures (5.7%). Responders also
suggested focusing on community policing (2.7%), building good relationships between the
police and BME communities (5.7%), and utilizing police officers who speak the languages of
specific communities (1.4%).
Legal Responses
Responders made several general recommendations concerning legal responses to honor
violence. For example, responders argued that there should be serious legal punishments for
honor violence (20.3%), and honor violence should be defined clearly and carefully (8.1%).
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For example, a Police Officer in Diyarbakır argued defining honor is very difficult because the
concept means different things to different people. In the UK, 11.4% of responders argued that
there should be stronger legislation concerning honor violence, and 11.4% argued that there
should not. Ten British responders (28.6%) also argued that any response to honor violence
should include Forced Marriage Protection Orders.
Separate Law for Crimes Motivated by Honor
A little more than half of responders (58.1%) were asked whether they think there should
be a separate law created for crimes motivated by honor (35.9% in Turkey; 82.9% in the UK).
Most responders who answered this question argued that crimes motivated by honor should not
be separate under the law (51.4%). A Researcher/Activist in (London) argued, “I’m not one of
these people that supports creating a crime for everything. I think that’s an excuse for not doing
anything.” According to the Director of a women’s NGO in London
“I mean it’s almost like you’re kind of dignifying it by making it it’s special offense, as if
you can’t deal with it under the penal code when you can, which makes me wonder about
the motivations. Not about the activist groups that we’re discussing, but about what is the
motivation within government? Because we’ve got a particularly nasty lot in power at the
moment, and where is their motivation coming from to make brown people’s crimes
separate, special. I don’t trust them.”
Three Turkish responders (4.1% of the total sample) argued that honor violence would
not be difficult to legislate against, while two British responders (2.7%) argued that it would.
There is no need for a separate crime, 43.2% of responders argued, because crimes motivated by
honor already exist. For example, the Director of a women’s NGO in London stated
“…the obsession with creation primary legislation on top of primary legislation- actually
I want people to use the laws that they have more effectively…What are we hoping to do
by having this special, wonderful, exotic, dimension of honor, somehow prove higher
levels of barbarism? Which is inevitably how things get languaged? There’s a way thatthat’s what’s so problematic about this- there’s a need to create hierarchies of
perpetrators, where some perpetrators who commit murder are somehow more well
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behaved than others. Or because you have centuries of patriarchal tradition, I’m not
quite sure which society DOESN’T have centuries of patriarchal tradition!”
For 39.2% of responders, having a separate crime is not necessary because violence against
women is universal. Six responders (8.1%) argued that laws should be general rather than
specific, and that the word “honor” is too subjective to be used in law (9.5%). For example, a
Lawyer in Istanbul argued
“We cannot put honor or any kind of word referring to honor or tradition etc. into the
penal code. It cannot be executed universally…Because otherwise, every case can be
concluded in a different way if they can use these terms. The judge, the practitioner in the
southeastern of Turkey, cannot solve the case as another judge who lives in Istanbul.
Because all values and all society practices is also different, is also changeable.”
A few responders also argued that creating a separate law for honor crimes would cause
Islamaphobia (8.1%) and make it seem like only minorities commit this type of crime (5.4%).
Some British responders argued that having a separate crime legitimizes honor violence (5.7% of
the British sample), excludes certain groups (8.6%), makes honor violence seem worse than
other types of similar crimes (8.6%), and drives the crime underground (5.7%). Legislating
against honor violence does not change behavior, 11.3% argued, and often reveals ulterior
motives (14.3%). Finally, four responders (11.3% of the British sample) argued that having a
separate crime for honor takes away options for victims and responders.
Some responders argued that there should be a separate law for crimes motivated by
honor (8.1%). For a Crisis Interventionist with the MPS, having a specific crime would allow for
responses to non-criminal offenses that the police are unable to address (e.g., psychological
abuse). Five responders stated that this is being considered in the UK, and that forced marriage
became a separate crime because there were no existing laws concerning forced marriage.
Twenty-two responders (29.7%) argued that instead of making a specific crime for honor
violence, honor could be an aggravating factor at sentencing.
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Eight responders in the UK (22.9% of the British sample) argued that honor should not be
an aggravating factor at sentencing. For example, a Research Officer with a women’s NGO in
London argued that many people making the argument for honor as an aggravating factor at
sentencing do so because of past rulings that allowed honor to be used as a mitigating factor. For
example,
“Heshu [Yones] was killed in 2002 by her father but he was given a reduced sentence on
the basis that his culture was different and that his daughter was provoking, which I
found pretty outrageous because for one thing you’re saying that the values of that man
reflect the values of his culture… So I almost said, if there is an argument, there is an
argument for being aggravated, but I only meant that there should never be an argument
for it being a mitigatory circumstance.”
Social Service & NGO Responses
A few responders made recommendations for social service and NGO responses to honor
violence, such as more social workers (14.9%), more shelters (6.8%), and different types of
shelters (6.8%, all Turkish responders). British responders suggested implementing MARAC’s
(10.8%), stronger mental health supports (2.7%), and a “one stop shop” for services (2.7%).
Almost half of the total sample stated that more programs (44.6%) and funding (33.8%) are
necessary to address honor violence. Responders in both Turkey and England made statements
that cases of honor violence are very labor intensive, making victims very difficult to support.
Finally, five British responders (6.7%) stated that is important for non-citizen victims to have
access to public funds.
Prevention
Almost two thirds of the sample (62.2%) argued that changes need to be made at the
societal level in order to prevent honor violence. Prevention may be achieved through use of the
media (24.3%), technology (4.1%), and more job opportunities for women (5.4%). Education
was noted as a tool for prevention by 62.2% of responders, most of whom were British (43.2%).
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Responders discussed using education as a means of prevention in two ways. First, women
should be educated about their rights (28.4%). Responders stated that “when they know their
rights, women can be more powerful.” Second, 46% of responders argued that prevention should
be done in schools. This was mostly a British response (37.8%).
Some responders also argued that it is important to recognize how honor violence affects
children (14.9%), as well as the importance of communication between parents and children, in
order to prevent honor violence (5.4%). For example, a Social Worker in Istanbul argued that
children who witness honor violence are traumatized and sometimes exploited while the Chief
Executive of a Charity in London argued dangers in the home are not discussed enough.
Responders argued (21.6%) that honor violence can be prevented if people understand the law,
sentences are increased (13.5%), and changes are made to the penal code (8.1%). Of the 18.9%
of responders who discussed the role of police in prevention, 5.4% argued that the police are
capable of prevention and 13.5% argued that they are not. Finally, some responders discussed
preventing honor violence by working in communities (14.9%), building resources and cultural
capital in communities (6.6%), and engaging religious leaders within communities (14.9%).
Suggested Models
If time allowed, the final question that responders were asked was whether they would
recommend using their country’s approach to addressing honor violence as a model for an
American response to honor violence. Seven responders recommended using Turkey as a model
(18% of the Turkish sample), and five stated that Turkey should not be used as a model (12.8%
of the Turkish sample). Police officers in Turkey gave different responses, for example, saying
that Turkey has worked hard to respond effectively to honor violence, and their methods should
be replicated. Others argued that Turkey and the U.S. are culturally too different.
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On the other hand, 20 responders recommended using the UK as a model (57.1% of the
British sample), and 2 did not (5.7% of the British sample). For these responders, the UK
response can guide an American response, but simply lifting a model will not produce the
structural changes necessary to eradicate honor violence. As the Joint Head of the FMU argued,
“We shouldn't have to be raising awareness at this stage…The Unit was established in
2005, eight years in, we are still educating frontline professionals about what to do in a
forced marriage case. It should become part of their daily practice… We still don't do
that here in the UK now, we seem like we are continually chasing our tail, which is all
well and good, but there should be a point at which a Forced Marriage Unit should cease
to exist.”
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study is threefold. The first goal was to simply compare how two
countries respond to honor violence. An important part of this comparison was determining how
each country socially constructs both honor and honor violence, and whether these social
constructions affect individual and country level responses. The second goal was to determine
whether othering is occurring in these responses. The third goal was to make recommendations
for an American response to honor violence that can avoid othering. In this discussion section, I
evaluate the results of this study in terms of these three goals.
7.1: Social Constructions of Honor, Honor Violence, and Term Honor Violence
Honor
I began by asking each responder how they would personally define honor, expecting that
each country would have different social constructions of both honor and honor violence. While
this expectation was generally true, responders did provide similar definitions in some ways.
Most responders were at first very hesitant to provide a definition of honor. They tended to argue
that honor is ubiquitous, yet very difficult to define. This is partly because definitions of honor
are not written or verbalized and differ by country, region, city, individual, and foreign diasporas.
These definitions were described as having been cultivated over thousands of years, and tacitly
understood. Everyone simply knows that they are expected to behave in a certain way to be
considered honorable. Once responders got past the initial hesitancy in providing a definition,
honor was commonly described as something that is cultural, based on values and beliefs, and is
a series of rules for behavior. Most responders stated that people experience a great deal of
psychological and social pressure to conform to an honor code. At this point, social constructions
of honor began to diverge based on the nationality of the responder.
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Responders tended to believe that there are two separate definitions of honor, one for
countries in the west and one for countries in the east. This indicates collective vs. individual
social constructions of honor. As discussed in Chapter 3.1, several studies have found that in
collective cultures the honor of the individual is tied to the honor of the greater kinship network,
making honor a shared resource of the family that can be lost or gained as well as traded on. In
individualistic cultures, however, honor is often defined in terms of the moral character of the
individual and is not linked to any greater social network. Honor was defined in the same way by
responders in this sample, with Turkish responders considering themselves eastern and British
responders considering themselves western. Responders in this sample generally described honor
as something that is guided by the expectation to behave in a certain way and adhere to certain
norms in both collective and individualistic cultures. Definitions of what constitutes honorable
behavior, however, were described as differing between cultures, communities, and families.
Definitions of honor were also described as fluid and changing over time, depending on the issue
and context.
Honor was described as collective by half of Turkish responders, while slightly less than
half of Turkish responders described honor as both collective and individualistic. Most of the
responders who described honor as collective were police officers, while most of those who
described honor as both collective and individualistic were employed in social service agencies
or NGO’s. Although responders often described individuals as having their own sense of
personal honor that can be thought of in terms of pride, everyone knows that if they violate
established cultural rules and customs then they will risk their place in society and possibly
experience violence. Although the threat of violence is real, the psychological pressure to
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conform is a much greater form of social control because of the potential to be shunned by
society.
Some responders, however, specified that this collective definition of honor only applied
to eastern Turkey. Several responders argued that eastern Turks were old-fashioned, uncivilized,
and uncultured. Other responders argued that eastern Turks have different ideas about morality,
and much stricter codes of honor. Interestingly, police officers who were born in southeastern
Turkey but were transferred to work in western Turkey agreed with these descriptions.
British responders tended to give a different definition of honor. Some responders
described honor as personal pride and reputation. For others, honor was often described as
something that other cultures have, but they do not experience. In fact, approximately half of
British responders automatically associated honor with honor violence, and never provided their
own definition of honor. These responders often immediately said “there is no honor in honor
violence”, and then defined honor in terms of honor violence. It is possible that they were simply
more interested in talking about honor violence because they knew that that was the focus of my
research in Turkey or because of their work with victims of honor violence. It seemed, however,
that they had completely distanced themselves from the concept of honor.
For British responders, honor was something abstract. They seemed to understand the
concept logically, but not personally. This is an interesting finding because I would argue that
honor is an extremely important part of western culture, and phrases associated with honor are
used on a daily basis. When British responders did provide their own definition of honor, they
tended to describe honor as both collective and individualistic. They specified, however, that
British and other western populations subscribe to an individualistic conception of honor while
eastern immigrant populations in the UK subscribe to a collective conception of honor. British
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responders tended to define honor as reputation, moral status, a value, or a perception that is not
tangible. When describing honor as socially constructed by eastern populations, they stated that
honor is seen as something that is owned by the community and family. The kind of honor that
would lead a family to commit violence is collective, which is different than what people from
an individualistic society understand. Thus, the collective nature of honor raises the level of risk
of violence.
Perhaps the greatest difference between the Turkish and British descriptions of honor was
the focus on either respect or sexuality. Although British responders were more likely to define
honor in terms of respect and disrespect, five Turkish police officers stated that honor
specifically means respecting males. In other words, British responders appeared to socially
construct honor and respect as something personal that is earned. Turkish police officers who
discussed respect, on the other hand, defined honor in terms of respect that is given to males.
Linked to this was the tendency for Turkish responders to argue that honor is typically
discussed in terms of the sexuality and virginity of women and girls. Turkish police officers
tended to argue that honor only applies to women and girls, while the rest of the Turkish sample
argued that honor applies to both genders and is incorrectly associated only with women and
girls. In the British population, only half of the population mentioned gender, who then argued
that honor is incorrectly associated only with women and girls. When discussing gender and
honor, responders in both samples tended to specify that females are considered the “vessels” of
honor and males are the “enforcers” of honor. In other words, the body of a woman or girl
represents honor and it is then the responsibility of the men in the family to ensure that honor is
upheld through the enforcement of rules. About half of responders said that this is related to the
belief that traditional gender roles should be adhered to, stating that honor is rooted in patriarchy.
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The Turkish sample was especially interesting because of the stark differences between
how police officers defined honor, and how the rest of the sample defined honor. Generally,
definitions of honor tended to focus on female sexual behavior. Several non-police responders
actually began their definition of honor by stating that “honor has nothing to do with what is
between a woman’s legs”, which acknowledges the common belief that honor refers almost
exclusively to female sexual behavior. Almost half of Turkish responders specifically mentioned
virginity in their answer, but the only responders to say that honor is related to virginity were
Turkish police officers. Similarly, twenty-five responders discussed honor in terms of adultery,
with thirteen responders stating that honor is incorrectly associated only with adultery. The
twelve responders who stated that honor is directly related to adultery were all Turkish police
officers. These officers argued that honor is defined differently for men and women saying, for
example, that men can commit adultery without losing honor.
Additionally, Turkish police officers tended to believe that honor is something that only
people living in eastern Turkey (particularly the Kurdish) believe in. This is interesting because
most non-police responders did not mention eastern Turkey or the Kurdish, or if they did, they
stated that it is incorrect to associate honor with specific populations in Turkey. These
differences can be explained in two ways. One is that police officers have distinctly different
viewpoints on honor and honor violence than social service/NGO practitioners. The second is
that Turkish police officers in this sample were predominantly male, and social service/NGO
practitioners were predominantly females who tended to identify as feminists and very active in
the women’s movement. Thus, these differences can either be attributed to profession or gender.
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Honor Violence
As noted by Welchman and Hossain (2005), as well as Peyton (2014), there continues to
be no universally accepted definition of honor violence. Rather, the term is often used to indicate
a specific form of domestic violence that is differentiated by motive and only occurs in specific
populations. This lack of a universal definition was a problem for responders in this study, which
was pervasive throughout their interviews. The effect that social constructions of honor and
honor violence have on institutional responses is discussed throughout this chapter and the next,
and recommendations for a definition of honor violence for response purposes are made in
Chapter 8.1.
Most studies define honor violence as an offense that is committed to restore honor to an
individual who is perceived to have shamed the family in some way (e.g., Meetoo & Mirza,
2007; Ouis, 2009, Roberts, Campbell, & Lloyd, 2014; Welchmann & Hossain, 2005). Similarly,
each responder in this study began by giving some variation of the answer “honor violence is
committed because the honor of the family has been violated”. Thus, causes and motives are the
factors that distinguished honor violence from other types of crimes for responders in both the
Turkish and British samples. Although responders were often unable to verbalize more specific
causes and motives when directly asked, specific causes and motives for committing honor
violence emerged in response to other questions as well as when responders provided examples
of cases that they have personally worked on. These findings are similar to that of Welchman
and Hossain (2005), who argued that defining honor violence is often complicated, focused on
motive, and tends to stress the exotic nature of the offense.
Responders tended to discuss descriptions of motives for honor violence along with
causes. Although inter-related, I differentiate between the two concepts. In this study, motives
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are defined as the purpose for perpetrating honor violence (e.g., to control the victim) while
causes are defined as the circumstances that trigger honor violence (e.g., the victim had sex
before marriage). I further distinguished indirect from direct causes of honor violence. Indirect
causes are defined as macro level triggers of honor violence that are present in all cases of honor
violence, but are not necessarily impacting specific instances of honor violence. Direct causes
are defined as events that triggered a specific instance of honor violence.
Indirect causes were described by responders as “related to” or “associated with” honor
violence. Similar to other studies (e.g., (AHA Foundation, 2012; Ouis, 2009; Tahiri Justice
Center, 2012; Welchman & Hossain, 2005), the majority of responders attributed honor violence
to culture, which was often defined in terms of race, ethnicity, and religion. Turkish responders
tended to argue that honor violence is a tradition in Turkey, with some specifying that honor
violence is related to tribal cultures and feudalism. Many British responders, on the other hand,
argued that honor violence is not related to culture and is a form of violence against women that
is present in all cultures.
Most Turkish responders discussed the relationship between culture and honor violence
in terms of race and ethnicity, with about one third of Turkish responders stating that honor
violence is incorrectly associated with the Kurdish population. Although a few responders
argued that honor violence is primarily committed by Kurds, about one third also argued that
individuals living in eastern Turkey have different beliefs than those living in western Turkey,
which leads to honor violence. I argue that the one third of Turkish responders who stated that
honor violence is primarily committed in eastern Turkey were also indirectly attributing honor
violence to Kurds because of the common association between eastern Turkey and the Kurdish
population.
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Most British responders discussed race and ethnicity, with a quarter of the sample
arguing that honor violence is primarily a South Asian crime in the UK and half of the sample
arguing that honor violence is incorrectly associated only with South Asians. British responders
also specified that honor violence occurs in a wide variety of cultures, including white western
populations. The difference, they argued, is that the term “crime of passion” is used rather than
“honor violence”.
Responders were more likely to argue that religion and honor violence are not related.
Rather, responders in both samples typically argued that religion is used as a justification or an
excuse to commit honor violence. One responder argued that this is similar to using religion to
justify terrorism. No religious text condones either crime, and claiming that they do is ignorance.
Several responders argued that many people may be misinterpreting religious texts, or choosing
the parts of religious texts that they wish to follow and ignoring the parts that contradict their
beliefs. Similarly, a handful of responders in both the Turkish and British samples offered that
maybe people genuinely do not understand their religion. It may be that they truly believe that
their religion condones honor violence, even though it clearly does not.
As predicted, the discussion of honor violence naturally drifted to Muslims. These
discussions went in several interesting directions. Turkish responders tended to speak as if honor
violence is only a problem in Muslim communities because western individualistic societies do
not have the same conception of “honor” that eastern collective societies do. They see honor
violence as a natural progression from Islamic beliefs and values. Two Turkish social workers
actually stated that killing women is more common in Muslim societies than societies following
other religions. Interestingly, the British responders who are also Muslim tended to argue that
Muslim populations commit most honor violence. Non-Muslim British responders tended to
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argue that honor violence is incorrectly associated only with Islam, and that people in other
religions engage in behaviors that are in fact honor violence, but are not labeled as such.
Responders also stated that honor violence is indirectly caused by strict definitions of
morality, and half of the total sample discussed education and socioeconomic status. Turkish
responders discussed education more often than British responders, with equal numbers arguing
that honor violence is and is not influenced by education level. Responders in both samples were
more likely to argue that honor violence is not associated with socioeconomic status.
Several responders also discussed national level causes of honor violence. For example, a
few Turkish responders stated that nationalism, armed conflict, and the Kurdish Question lead to
honor violence and affect the way that honor violence is perceived in Turkey. Similarly, a few
British responders argued that honor violence is used to influence immigration and national
security policies. Eight responders, both Turkish and British, also discussed the influence that
terrorism has on honor violence and the role that honor violence plays in forming terrorism
policy. In both samples, responders argued that certain populations are associated with both
terrorism and honor violence (e.g., Kurds and Muslims) and policies concerning honor violence
are often used to target these populations in ways that terrorism legislation cannot.
Direct causes were discussed in a variety of ways. The most common cause of honor
violence mentioned by both Turkish and British responders was disobedience. British responders
further specified that westernization often causes honor violence, meaning that victims deviated
from traditional cultural norms and assimilated into western culture after migrating. Like other
studies (e.g., Chesler, 2010; Welchman & Hossain, 2005), relationships were also noted as a
direct cause of honor violence, including marriage, divorce, or engaging in a relationship with
someone outside of the victims race/ethnicity/religion. Similarly, responders argued that events
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linked to sexual intercourse, as well as homosexuality, clothing, and platonic encounters between
males and females, often direct causes of honor violence. As described in other studies (e.g.,
Chesler, 2012; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007; Pitt-Rivers, 1968), the mere implication of an honor
violation (e.g., gossip) was also noted as a cause of honor violence. This discussion occurred
primarily in the Turkish sample.
Interestingly, Turkish police officers tended to believe that honor violence is committed
by men who have psychological disorders. For this reason, many Turkish police officers also
argued that honor violence does not actually occur anymore, but that people believe that it does
because of sensationalist media coverage of honor violence. In other words, the occurrence of
honor violence is exaggerated. Linked to this was the idea that property is a cause of honor
violence, although this was more of a Turkish response. Many responders stated that honor is
simply used as an excuse for violence committed during land and inheritance disputes. One
police officer in Istanbul said “follow the money” to see where the real cause of the violence lies.
More specifically, women are often considered property, and marriage is used to keep assets in
the family. If the woman somehow disrupts this process, the “solution” is often considered to be
“honor violence”.
Custom can be considered both a direct and indirect cause of honor violence. Most
Turkish responders and half of British responders argued that a violation of custom causes honor
violence (direct cause), while almost half of Turkish responders argued that honor violence is a
custom in Turkey (indirect cause). More specifically, they argued that honor violence occurs
because of patriarchal culture and customs. Women in Turkey were described as secondary to
men and viewed as commodities. Honor, they argued, is an “intense” part of both the Turkish
and Muslim identity, and is linked to religion, marriage, and sexuality. Responders also argued
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that educational institutions, the family, cultural values, and traditions are used to reinforce
patriarchy, which then reinforces honor violence.
Most responders argued that a primary motive for honor violence is to control the
behavior of others, similar to the findings of other studies (e.g., Chesler, 2012; Welchmann &
Hossain, 2005). For example, almost half of British responders discussed religion in terms of
controlling the behavior of women and children. Several responders linked the use of religion for
controlling family members to “saving face” in the community if a family member does
something that is considered shameful. Other motives for honor violence reported by responders
in this study included to restore honor to the family, to punish the person who violated honor,
and to hide or prevent an honor violation.
The term honor violence was typically used as an umbrella term by responders to
describe a variety of types of offenses. Most responders stated that honor violence exists on a
continuum, including both criminal and non-criminal offenses. Almost half of the total sample
compared honor violence to domestic violence, with a third arguing that honor violence is the
same as domestic violence. Several responders also argued that honor violence is the same as
crimes of passion, and a small minority compared honor violence to gang violence, youth
violence, and organized crime.
As in other studies (e.g., Baker, Gregware, & Cassidy, 1999; Pervizat, 2006; Peyton,
2014) honor violence was described as pre-meditated, committed by a family member or partner,
committed by multiple perpetrators, and occurring over a long period of time. Over two thirds of
the sample argued that there is no typical perpetrator of honor violence, while less than a quarter
of the sample argued that there is a typical perpetrator. Several responders argued that typologies
are not helpful and can actually impede police work, while a few responders argued that
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typologies are helpful and can aid responders. Although most responders argued that a typical
perpetrator does not exist, they did agree that perpetrators often share characteristics such as
being male, the youngest in the family, and very religious.
Similarly, responders argued that there is no typical victim of honor violence. Most
responders stated victims are most often female, young, married, and immigrants. Half of the
Turkish sample also described victims as being financially dependent on a partner or parent.
Victims of violence motivated by honor were often described as being at higher risk of violence
than victims of other types of crimes (e.g., robbery), but that this risk level is difficult to predict.
Victims of honor violence were also described as harder to reach, more vulnerable, and
uncomfortable seeking help. The characteristics that were identified as common among
perpetrators and victims are similar to that of other studies (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Chesler,
2010; 2012; Kulczycki & Windle, 2011; Nasrullah et al., 2009; Pervizat, 2006).
Finally, a quarter of the sample discussed the media, arguing that the media makes honor
violence more visible, engages in othering, and sensationalizes honor violence. Responders
tended to have conflicting opinions, with a few police officers arguing that the media overexaggerates honor violence and female NGO responders arguing that the media either uses the
graphic and salacious nature of honor violence to sell papers or ignores it altogether. British
responders argued that politicians use media coverage of honor violence to campaign against
policies of multiculturalism, and campaign for tougher policies concerning immigration and
terrorism by demonizing certain communities (e.g., Muslims).
Term Honor Violence
Several British responders argued that the debate concerning the use of the term honor
violence is unimportant because it is simply about semantics, and a few argued that the debate
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detracts from the issue, brings attention to the issue, and would cause confusion to change the
term. Turkish responders tended to dislike the term honor violence, while British responders
tended to not have a problem with or express ambivalence about the term. Many responders
noted that it does not matter what term is used, as long as the problem is being addressed.
Responders discussed positive and negative aspects of using the term honor violence. For
many responders, especially in the British sample, the term provides context for responses.
British responders also tended to argue that the term is helpful for responders, especially for
identifying high-risk cases. A few responders noted that the term has created leadership at the
local level and one survivor noted that the term serves as a means of uniting survivors and
victims. On the other hand, many responders argued that the term is inappropriate and
ambiguous. As a result, the term is not helpful to responders and often stigmatizes specific
communities. Almost one quarter of the total sample argued that the term also has a positive
connotation, which they believe helps to justify violence committed in the name of honor. The
phrase “there is no honor in violence” was popular among British responders, and served as a
means of elucidating this point. Many responders also noted that the term makes the violence
seem exotic and leads to othering, especially among Muslims and South Asians in the British
context.
One third of the total sample prefers the term honor violence, while one quarter would
like to use a different term. British responders tended to prefer the term “honor based violence”,
followed by “so-called honor based violence.” Few Turkish responders suggested a new term,
but those who did preferred the term “femicide”, the phrase “violence against women”, or the
specific crime or form of violence that was committed. Thus, the prediction that there would be
strong support for changing the term “honor violence” among social service and NGO
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responders was only partially supported. Police officers, social service, and NGO employees in
the UK tended to be ambivalent or have no problem with the term honor violence. Turkish
lawyers, social service, and NGO employees, however, disliked the term and preferred using a
different term. Turkish police officers equally expressed dislike or no problem with the term.
- Summary
The purpose of this portion of the study was to understand how institutional responders
socially construct honor and honor violence, because these constructions provide the framework
for individual, organizational, and institutional responses. Understanding, therefore, how
responders define and understand perceived cultural crimes like honor violence is the first step in
providing effective institutional responses.
Although many respondents used an “I can’t define it but I know it when I see it”
approach to their definitions, their answers revealed that they do know what honor and honor
violence are. However, they typically viewed these concepts as something that happens to other
cultures and not their own. This is problematic for several reasons. For example, Turkish police
officers who associate honor and honor violence with eastern Turkey, and who do not believe
that honor violence actually occurs anymore, may be less likely to take a victim who is seeking
help seriously. In fact many officers stated that they typically send the victim home to try to
“work it out” with their family.
British responders tend to have blinders on when it comes to potential victims of honor
violence, associating these types of crimes only with South Asians and Muslims. This may lead
to many victims being missed. Responders may also begin to see honor violence in every
situation concerning South Asians and Muslims, even when the crime has nothing to do with
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honor, which also does not help the victim. In both countries, responders focused on female
victims, which may lead to them overlook male victims and LGBTQ victims.
Those who respond to social problems are often too focused on identifying difference
rather than recognizing the similarities between cultures, and this poses a serious problem for
institutional responders. When responders argue that honor or honor violence only applies to
certain populations, they are distancing themselves from that type of violence as well as
stereotyping populations that they think engage in the practice.
I argue that this is linked to the controversy of the use of the term “honor violence.”
Many responders in both countries dislike the term become they believe it is, in itself, a form of
othering. For them, the term is stigmatizing because it is only applied to family violence
committed among specific communities. The conversations concerning the term honor violence
differed by both country and profession. British responders tended to distance themselves from
the term honor violence, in that they think it is a harmful practice that their culture does not
engage in. For the most part, British responders in all positions were either ambivalent about use
of the term or had not problem with the term.
Turkish responders, however, consider honor to be an important part of their culture and
honor violence a harmful practice that is prevalent in their society. Female responders, especially
in legal, social service, and non-governmental organizations, greatly disliked the term. Some
argued for a new term to be used, while others argued that honor violence should simply be
referred to as violence against women or the actual crime that was committed. For them, the term
honor violence justifies the harmful practice.
These differing experiences with honor violence may explain the acceptance of or
aversion to the use of the term. As one responder explained, responses to violence against
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women have evolved slowly over time. Progress was often made by singling out specific types of
violence against women that were previously legal, and criminalizing them (e.g., marital rape,
stalking). This criminalization drew attention to the issue, and began to change societal
perceptions about violent behavior. Turkey has recently begun a similar process with laws
concerning violence against women, including considering honor an aggravating rather than
mitigating factor at trial. The difference between reforming marital rape and honor violence,
however, is the focus is on both women and ethnicity.
For them, use of the term honor violence continues to normalize the harmful practice as
well as further marginalize vulnerable populations. This is compounded by the fact many
responders believe responses to violence against women reflect the views of a patriarchal
government and strengthen structural inequality. Responders who are against using the term
honor violence want to focus on the crime as one form of the greater continuum of violence
against women that is prevalent and unaddressed in their society. Thus, they argue for a rebranding of the term to create a united, rather than compartmentalized, front against genderbased violence.
British responders, on the other hand, tended to argue that it does not matter what term is
used as long as the problem is addressed. British female responders, however, do not have to
contend with the term being used as a justification of the violence being used against them.
Again, they do not identify honor violence as a form of violence against British women. Thus for
British responders, the term provides context, helps identify high risk cases, and unites survivors.
I understand both sides of this debate, and agree that the term honor violence has caused
othering. At the same time, the meaning has already changed for many responders. This is
evidenced in the disdain showed for use of the term honor violence, and the re-branding of the
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term in the UK as “honor based violence” or “so-called honor violence”. Responders no longer
believe that honor violence is a culturally acceptable practice. This definitional change shows
that it is possible for the perception of the term to continue to evolve, and can cease to be
perceived as a harmful practice committed by backward and barbaric individuals from South
Asia and the Middle East.
As Mills (1959, p.p. 19) argues in The Sociological Imagination, “the term matters less
than the idea.” Although he is referencing his use of the term “sociological imagination”, I think
this also goes to the heart of the argument surrounding use of the term honor violence. Mills goes
on to say
“…when we define a word we are merely inviting others to use it as we would like it to
be used; that the purpose of definition is to focus argument upon fact, and that the proper
result of good definition is to transform argument over terms into disagreements about
fact, and thus open arguments to further inquiry.” (p.p. 34)
Viewing the term honor violence in this way, the creation of the term has served its purpose.
Additionally, it is a well-established term that will continue to be used. The term may continue to
be misunderstood by some responders, and the majority of the public, but the narrative can be
changed. If institutional responders begin to have an understanding of the term, maybe the
correct meaning will trickle down to the general public, until eventually the term is used
correctly. Or better yet, there ceases to be a need for the term at all.
7.2: Comparison of Institutional Responses to Honor Violence in Turkey & England
Criminal Justice Responses
It should first be noted that although many responders acknowledged that honor violence
is perpetrated against both females and males, responders in both Turkey and the UK considered
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honor violence to primarily be a form of violence against women. It is important to keep this in
mind because when giving these answers, responders were thinking in terms of responding to
female victims. The basic structure for responding to honor violence in each country is
fundamentally different. Although a few Turkish police officers reported that there are special
departments and trained experts who handle cases of violence against women, most Turkish
responders stated that the police do not have special procedures or departments for violence
against women or honor violence in Turkey. In the UK, cases of honor violence are handled by
special units within each police department that address crimes committed against vulnerable
populations.
The Turkish police typically treat honor violence as a form of domestic violence, and
handle these cases in the same way as other investigations. British responders, on the other hand,
had many different interpretations of how honor violence should be classified. Some responders
argued that honor violence is a form of domestic violence, while others argued that it is a hate
crime. Many responders clarified that although honor violence may technically be a form of
domestic violence, there are important differences between the two types of violence.
Investigation & Protection
Turkish police officers gave less descriptive accounts of how cases of honor violence are
investigated than British police officers. This is to be expected, because there are no specific
protocols in place for honor violence investigations in Turkey. Honor as a motive is considered,
and some officers noted that they treat these cases as high risk. Instances of honor violence are
not tracked or monitored in any way. Some police officers argued that perpetrators of honor
violence will typically confess to their crimes, however, making these crimes easier to
investigate.
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In the UK, higher ranked officers in a specialist unit are immediately called to the scene
by first responders who suspect that the case may be honor violence. Risk assessments are
supposed to be administered by both first responders and special detectives, with honor violence
automatically considered high risk. Part of the standard operating procedure in these cases is
opening a case file; flagging the case as honor violence; asking for consent from the victim to
take their DNA, fingerprints, photographs, and passports; and creating a family tree. This
information is entered into a special database with highly restricted access, and investigated
differently than crimes that are not motivated by honor. Police officers in both samples are aware
of collusion between family members to commit honor violence, including the use of family
councils and the youngest male family member to commit the crime. British police officers,
however, added that making one arrest may only exacerbate the situation. Thus, positive action
policies do not apply to cases of honor violence.
Police officers in both Turkey and the UK tended to argue that protecting victims of
honor violence is an important part of their job. One key difference between the Turkish and UK
police officers descriptions of how they would provide protection was the element of choice.
Turkish police officers did not discuss the wishes of victims in cases of honor violence. Most
Turkish police officers stated that they could send victims to shelters, but several officers believe
that women take advantage of the shelter system (i.e., use them when they are not in danger).
Only a few officers mentioned the use of protection orders and home suspensions in cases of
honor violence, even though obtaining these orders is supposed to be a primary responsibility of
police officers. It was noted that the police will sometimes offer personal protection to victims,
but it is not possible for them to protect all victims. Some police officers argued that the police
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should also be comforting to the victims and provide moral support, but did not discuss whether
the victim is able to make decisions after they have sought help from the police.
Choice was a common theme throughout interviews with British police officers, however.
Police officers typically stated that they ask the victim how they would like to proceed, which
may include safeguarding, returning home, or receiving assistance in relocating. If the victim
decides to return home, the police officer will explain the risk of the situation and work with the
victim to construct a safety plan. If the victim decides to proceed with the investigation, referrals
will be made to outside agencies to assist the victim, and a protection plan will be established. It
is at this point that both the victim and the police often feel a great deal of frustration because the
victim may not want to engage in protective measures for a variety of reasons (e.g., they do not
want to leave siblings or children behind, or prosecute family members). Additionally,
responders noted that there are not many good options that can be offered to victims, which is
why many victims choose to remain in dangerous situations.
These differences may be indicative of the tendency for Turkish police officers to turn
victims away who do not have evidence that a crime has been committed or are seeking help
prior to a crime being committed, while British police officers are trained to look for
preventative measures to avoid a crime being committed. In fact, police officers somewhat
disagreed on whether preventing honor violence should also be a goal of the police. Some police
officers argued that prevention should be a goal, but found it difficult to articulate prevention
strategies. One police officer argued that the only way to prevent honor violence is for the police
to immediately discover when a shameful act has occurred. Other police officers and lawyers
argued that it is not possible for the police to prevent honor violence, and thus should not be a
goal. They stated that the role of the police is to intervene after a crime has been committed, and
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that harsh prison sentences are supposed to deter crime. One police officer stated that preventing
honor violence is difficult because perpetrators have the same mindset as terrorists, in that they
commit the crime out of a sense of duty. They have already accepted that they will be punished
severely for their crime, and are ready to give up their lives if necessary. Thus, many police
officers felt prevention was not a priority.
Referrals/Collaboration
Many British responders argued that a police response is only part of the solution, and a
holistic approach is needed to fully address honor violence. To do this, they argued that
collaboration should occur between police departments, border control, charities, and
organizations in the social service, education, health, and government sectors. One way to
continue fostering collaboration, British responders argued, is through MASH’s and MARAC’s.
The purpose of both collaborative conferences is to get responders from a variety of agencies
together to share information, conduct risk assessments, and assess the resources available to
victims (e.g., housing).
A similar system was not mentioned by Turkish responders and, I would argue, would
not currently work in Turkey due to a lack of trust in the police. Some police officers did note
that psychologists and social workers are not employed within Turkish police stations, thus
referrals are often made to other organizations in cases of honor violence. Only half of the police
sample mentioned the referral system, most of whom worked in Diyarbakır, so police officers in
Istanbul may not be aware of this referral system.
Legal response/Penal Code
In both Turkey and England, honor violence is investigated by the police and tried by the
courts according to the actual crime that was committed (e.g., murder, assault). The penal codes
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and application of those codes, however, differ greatly between countries and will thus be
discussed separately. Detailed explanations of how the legal system addresses violence against
women and honor violence were provided more often by Turkish lawyers, social service
responders, and researcher/activists than police officers. The penal code has been reformed
several times to protect women’s rights and address violence against women, culminating in the
adoption of the new penal code in 2005. For example, honor was formerly considered a
mitigating factor in murder trials using the unjust provocation clause in the Turkish Penal Code.
Since the enactment of the New Turkish Penal Code in 2005, honor killings are addressed
through the customary killing code. The word “honor” is not used in the code, but is understood
to be a form of customary killing that can serve as an aggravated factor at sentencing in murder
trials. In practice, however, the court still continues to use honor as a mitigating factor in some
murder cases of women. Responders also found it problematic to consider honor killings a form
of customary killings because of the stigmatizing association between töre and populations living
in eastern Turkey (especially the Kurdish), which leads to the belief that honor violence only
occurs in eastern Turkey and discriminatory sentencing. Parliamentary resistance to specifically
using the world “honor” in the penal code, several responders argued, reflects societal and
governmental views of gender inequality. One lawyer, however, argued that the word honor is
too vague to be included in the penal code and would simply be too difficult to make systematic
judicial decisions.
Overall, responders were pleased with the reform of the penal code and are seeing
positive changes in the handling of cases of violence against women. At the same time, offenders
continue to try to find ways to legitimize honor violence or find loopholes in the law (e.g., using
an insanity defense). Some responders stated that judges have discretion at sentencing, and tend
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to rule in favor of richer perpetrators and apply harsher sentences to those living in eastern
Turkey. Women continue to face barriers in obtaining help in cases of honor violence, such as a
lack of resources, lack of access to good legal help, and revictimization throughout the criminal
justice process.
In the UK, honor violence is not a specific crime in the penal code, but forced marriage is
both a criminal and civil offense. Cases of honor violence have been tracked by the CPS since
2010 in an effort to provide statistics on incidence and prevalence, but less than a thousand cases
have gone to trial. Honor is not an aggravating factor at sentencing, but the CPS and the judge
consider the role that honor played in a crime and can choose to give the maximum sentence
within the normal sentencing guidelines. Approximately fifty prosecutors have been specially
trained to handle cases of honor violence throughout the UK. There are several challenges,
however, to prosecuting cases. Evidence is difficult to obtain, witnesses often fail to cooperate,
and victims do not want to see family members prosecuted or testify in open court. Witness
protection and support has been a failure in the past because responders understood neither the
risk to the victim, nor the enormous burden a victim faces when leaving everything and everyone
they know behind.
Social Service/NGO Responses
Responders from social services and NGO’s in both countries described two types of
organizations, those that provides direct services to victims and those that provide training,
capacity development, and research. Most British NGO’s will conduct some type of risk
assessment, and will work with the victim to choose how to proceed. Turkish responders
typically did not discuss risk assessment. Responders in both countries argued that many victims
choose to seek help from NGO’s rather than the criminal justice system because they feel that
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they have more control over the situation (e.g., choosing not to press charges). Interestingly, one
British police officer noted that the police are often unable to respond to cases of honor violence
unless a criminal offense is committed, thus women’s NGO’s fill an important service gap.
Responders in the British social service and NGO sample believed that the cooperation and
collaboration fostered through MARAC is generally good for victims of honor violence, but
there are some problems such as a lack of confidentiality and victim empowerment.
Although fostering collaboration and partnerships between organizations that address
violence against women is also a goal in Turkey, not all organizations are willing to work
together for political reasons. Some organizations, for example, refuse to work with KAMER
and other organizations that have good relationships with the Turkish government because of
ideological differences concerning the Kurdish Question. Other organizations will not send
victims to ŞÖNİM’s because they are state run, and considered paternalistic and patriarchal
shelters whose policies violate victims’ rights. Turkish responders also noted that women often
lose control over the situation if they enter a government-sponsored shelter. Women can stay in
Turkish shelters for time periods varying from 15 days to indefinitely, but shelters are often too
restrictive of women’s freedom and do not engage in activities that foster independence (e.g., job
and life skill training). Shelters are also viewed by some responders as more prison-like than
rehabilitative, which they believe reflects patriarchal views within the government and society.
Responders in both countries generally believed that victims should have a choice in
what actions are taken in cases of honor violence. For example, safety is a priority but that does
not mean a victim must file a report with the police and press charges, or go to a shelter. Many
responders in this study made arguments similar to that of Yoshioko and Choi (2005), stating
that responders cannot expect all victims to want to leave their homes when experiencing family
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violence. In many violent situations, the victim believes that the costs of leaving far outweigh the
costs of staying. This is especially true in cases of honor violence, where victims are expected to
cut ties with everyone they know and move to a new location without any social support network.
Thus, victims are not presented with enough options when addressing interpersonal violence. As
Yoshioko and Choi argue, “if all we can offer a woman committed to staying with her family are
ways to leave, then at what point are we engaging in paternalism?” (p.p. 516). Similarly,
responders in this study argued that a holistic response to honor violence, incorporating a
continuum of services, should be made available to victims.
Challenges
Responders in both countries discussed a variety of challenges to honor violence. In
terms of police responses, investigations are difficult for police officers in both countries due to a
lack of evidence, as well as a lack of cooperation with the family and community of the victim.
Interestingly, while police officers in Turkey stated that they wished they were informed of the
potential for honor violence in order to engage in prevention efforts, British police officers had
the opposite experience. Victims often come to British police officers for help before a crime is
committed, but officers find it very frustrating that there is nothing that can legally be done at
that time. An additional source of frustration for British police officers is victims who report that
they are experiencing violence, but will not allow the police to investigate or remove them from
the home.
Challenges reported by police officers in each country then diverged. Turkish police
officers stated that there are not enough police officers to safeguard victims, and it is frustrating
that politicians and the media create unrealistic expectations for protection. It was also noted that
there are not enough shelters to offer protection, those available are inadequate, and police
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officers handling sensitive cases like honor violence experience high rates of burnout. British
police officers noted that ensuring victim confidentiality is a challenge, along with the
mislabeling of most cases of domestic violence among South Asian Muslim families as honor
violence. A detailed discussion of the mislabeling of cases is provided in the next section.
Criminal justice and social service/NGO responders noted a variety of barriers to victims
receiving help, such as a lack of shelter and mental health services, not speaking the language,
and the fear of having their children taken away by the state. Victims are not only under
immense pressure from their family, friends, and community not to report, they are also putting
themselves at a higher risk of violence once they seek help from the police or other service
providers. In Turkey, responders also noted that victims feeling pressured to reconcile with an
abuser or rapist and that female unemployment forces women continue to endure violence
because they are financially dependent on their partner. This makes transitioning away from
abusive situations very difficult for victims.
Victims are still distrustful of the criminal justice system, especially the police, believing
that they will be forced to proceed in a manner that is against their wishes. Some victims, for
example, feel that they are stigmatized due to counter-terrorism efforts in the UK. Others feel
that the police do not understand the high risk of violence that victims face, and would prefer to
receive help from specialist NGO’s. These concerns then lead to under-reporting. Many victims
also are often unaware that what they are experiencing is illegal, and simply slip through the
cracks in the system. A few police officers noted that they wish they had the resources to follow
up with victims after their case is closed.
Several challenges to providing effective NGO and social service responses to victims of
honor violence were also identified by responders in Turkey and the UK. First, a lack of
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resources presents a major problem for women’s organizations in both countries. Two
responders stated that the few resources allocated to women’s organizations by the Turkish
government tends to come with so many stipulations, that many women’s organizations choose
to seek independent funding. Funding is also difficult to both obtain and keep for British NGO’s,
especially since the government has moved towards funding very specific specialist
organizations. For many British NGO’s, this means that they cannot provide services to all
victims who seek help at their organization due to funder requirements.
According to one British responder, the social service and NGO response is very
“fractured” in that individual services (e.g., shelter, legal, counseling) are spread between many
different organizations throughout the country. Immigration status can also hinder victims,
especially those with no recourse status, because public funds are not made available to noncitizens. This issue has been discussed by Montoya & Agustin (2013), who argue that
immigration practices that exclude non-citizen from accessing public aid forces women to
remain dependent on their violent partners.
Responders stated that providers also experience barriers. In Turkey, responders noted
that they are frequently not accepted as intervening parties in court cases, constantly facing
bureaucratic barriers, and are failing to reach the most vulnerable victims. In the UK, several
responders noted that social service and NGO’s addressing honor violence often need additional
training, especially in regards to understanding risk levels and decision-making processes in
different contexts. Additionally, a few responders would like to see more training in healthcare
settings as a means of prevention and early intervention in cases of honor violence.
A few responders argued that risk assessments can be a very helpful tool, but need to be
revised to more accurately assess honor violence. They also need be administered by experienced
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individuals. Too frequently, risk assessments become an exercise in “ticking boxes” rather than
forming a full understanding of the victims’ experience. British responders noted that the lack of
a cohesive and consistent response throughout the UK is a major problem. Linked to this is the
assertion of two responders that more program and legislative evaluation is needed in order to
determine whether the needs of victims are being met.
- Summary
The purpose of this portion of the study was to compare two different approaches to
responding to honor violence, in an effort to inform best practices for an American response.
Before beginning this study, I expected that criminal justice and social service/non-governmental
organizations would have different and perhaps conflicting goals in responses to honor violence.
I would argue that this is generally not the case, however. Both institutions want to protect
victims, and see that perpetrators are prosecuted. Most responders argued that a holistic, multiagency response is necessary to effectively address honor violence. One organization cannot
completely support victims, nor should they be expected to. Responders in both institutions also
experienced similar challenges, despite having very different roles to play within the response to
honor violence.
There was one area of dissent between the two responses, which focused on choice. For
the most part, police officers want to investigate reported instances of honor violence, even if the
victim does not want to do so. British police officers acknowledged that it is not always in the
best interest of the victim to pursue an investigation against their wishes, in that it can put the
victim in more danger. The police, still however, expressed great frustration in having to
consider the victims choice. Social service/NGOs providers, on the other hand, were very much
in favor of giving the victims choices in how to proceed. This includes not reporting criminal
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acts to the police, if the victim so chooses. These goals are at odds with each other, and
understandably so. The third expectation, that evidence of othering in institutional responses
would be found in each country, will be discussed in the following section.
7.3: Othering Within Institutional Responses
Honor violence is typically viewed as cultural, or even traditional, by state and
international institutions, political parties, and the media (Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Montoya & Agustin,
2013). Several scholars, however, argue that honor violence cannot be explained in simply
cultural or traditional terms. To do so fails to consider structural and institutional power
differentials and inequality (e.g., Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Mohanty, 1988; Montoya & Agustin, 2013;
Narayan, 1997). Young (2011) argues that societies seek social categories that are absolute,
which leads to the othering of specific groups of people. These groups are defined as “normal or
deviant”, and essentialized according to nation, gender, race, and ethnicity. This othering was
apparent in the current study in each of these ways. I begin with a macro discussion of othering
at the governmental level, and move to micro discussions of othering at the organizational and
individual levels.
Governmental Othering
I argue that othering that begins top-down, from the government, sets the tone for
othering within institutional responses to honor violence as well as in society more generally.
The othering of certain groups continues to be a problem in both Turkey and the UK. This is
evidenced in specific governmental policies and legislation concerning specific ethnicities and
religions, as well as women.
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Turkish Penal Code
Similar to Turkish scholars (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Arin, 2001; Koğacıoğlu, 2004),
several responders argued that the Turkish Penal Code is discriminatory towards specific
ethnicities (especially Kurds) and women. I argue that both are forms of othering. Othering of
Kurds was described as occurring in a variety of ways. As discussed in chapter 4.1, the
Customary Killing Code is currently used to increase sentences in homicide cases where custom
was determined to be the motive. The word “honor” is never used in the text of this law, but
responders in this study stated that honor is tacitly understood to fall under this category.
Responders have two problems with the use of the Customary Killing Code for honor
killings. The first is that the word “custom” (“töre" in Turkish) is automatically linked to
populations living in eastern Turkey, more specifically the Kurdish population. In other words,
this law implies that there are specific types of crimes that are committed by a specific ethnic
group within Turkey, but not others. One of these crimes is honor violence.
According to several responders, this association between custom and Kurds is a
deliberate part of the nationalist agenda. Politicians, legislators, the media, and the general public
use rhetoric like “those barbaric people commit honor violence”, which ties honor violence to
other crimes of custom. This rhetoric makes it easier to say that similar practices committed by
Turks are not forms of honor violence. In other words, Kurds kill women for custom while Turks
kill women out of passion. This portrays Kurds as underdeveloped people with different, and
more violent, customs than Turks. Responders had two problems with the customary killing code.
For one responder this tendency is a form of orientalism, even within Turkey, and a
further division between the east and west despite the fact that victimization is the same
everywhere. Similarly, another responder further argued that this form of othering occurs within
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the feminist movement in Turkey, with certain factions arguing that Kurdish women need to be
rescued from the backward men who continue to commit honor violence. Turkish women,
however, need no such liberation because they do not experience honor violence. These
arguments are especially interesting, considering Mohanty’s (1988) discussion of western
feminist discourses. According to Mohanty, there is a tendency for western feminists to assume
that all “third world women” are powerless and oppressed victims that need to be liberated from
the dominant men in their lives. Responders in this sample argued that western Turks engage in
the same type of othering of Kurds living in eastern Turkey, thus extending beyond the typical
western women vs. third world women discourse.
The second problem, women’s groups argue, is that honor violence is not a form of
customary violence. Although they were unsuccessful, several responders in this study lobbied
(as part of specific women’s groups) for a separate crime for honor killings under the penal code.
As a compromise, Parliament stated that honor could be considered one form of customary
killing under the law, and the women’s groups were forced to take that compromise rather than
leave with nothing at all. They then petitioned for the word “honor” to be added to the customary
killing code, but were again unsuccessful. Two responders noted that Parliament stated that they
would not include the word “honor” in legislation because honor is a sacred part of Turkish
culture that cannot, and should not, be regulated. More specifically, almost every male
Parliament member insisted on the term “custom” rather than “honor”.
Responders argued that Turkish laws engage in the othering of women in a variety of
additional ways. This, several responders argued, is a reflection of the patriarchal foundation of
the Turkish Republic. As one responder explained, Ataturk may have begun liberating women as
he established the Turkish Republic, but a certain set of patriarchal rules pertaining to the
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behavior and freedom of women remained. She went on to explain that honor codes are one of
these vestiges of controlling women’s behavior and sexuality, which is done both through formal
(e.g., laws) and informal social control (e.g., honor violence committed by the general
population).
Several responders specifically mentioned the former Prime Minister’s role in othering
women, citing his speeches that argue that men and women are different by nature. He has
publically stated that women are weaker than men, and their primary role in life is to be mothers.
Similarly, other politicians have been known to say that pregnant women should not leave the
home because it is not aesthetically pleasing. These conservative ideas, they argue, increase
violence against women because although women object to these traditional gender roles, they
are still expected to adhere to them. Thus, violence against women is a reflection of this
patriarchal system. For them, simply using the term honor violence attaches a specific ethnic
and nationalistic significance, which is one reason why they refuse to use the term altogether.
Until 2005, the Turkish Penal Code allowed honor to be considered a mitigating
circumstance in homicide cases as a way to decrease the sentence. This is considered a
governmental protection for honor violence by many responders. Women’s rights organizations
in Turkey fought this law and made violence against women more visible, which then resulted in
legal changes. Unfortunately, although women’s rights and other grassroots organizations have
attempted to influence legislative and policy changes from the bottom up, the government
continues to set the agenda from the top down despite the strength of the opposition.
In the former criminal code, there was a special code for blood feuds between men,
which is used as an aggravating factor. The women’s movement argued that “female
assassinations are political” and should also be considered an aggravating factor. The former
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criminal code also differentiated between women and girls (e.g., raping a girl carried a heavier
sentence than raping a woman), married and unmarried women (e.g., raping a married woman
carried a heavier sentence than raping a single woman), and sex workers (e.g., raping a sex
worker carried a lesser sentence). Marital rape was only recently criminalized. The women’s
movement fought to change these double standards, arguing that if women were to be
differentiated under the law so should men. One responder argued that this is all related to the
debate on public morality, which is related to honor.
Responders argued that a range of other discriminatory practices and laws have also
targeted women. For example, in the not so distant past, a law stated that women may work as
long their employment does not affect the peace and welfare of the family. This code required
that women get permission from their husbands to have a job. The government has also tried to
regulate the types of clothing worn by women at universities and in public places, allows women
to be asked whether they are married or have children during job interviews, and forces women
to take the surnames of their husband.
Several Turkish responders also argued that the government is taking a superficial rather
than serious interest in violence against women. More specifically, the government is actually
striving for acceptance into the European Union, which Keyder (1997, p. 39) argues is part of a
top-down “project of Westernization” characterized by adherence to a variety of values to which
Turkish society is not fully committed. Several responders argued that violence against women is
one of these areas that Turkish government officials and citizens alike simply pay lip service to,
while still believing that violence against women is acceptable. Until societal and governmental
views of women change, they argued, violence against women will remain the same.
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Government in the UK
Seven British responders argued that the British government has used honor violence to
push different agendas. These responders tended to frame these as discussions of othering in
terms of forced marriage legislation, the criminalization of perceived cultural crimes, and
multiculturalism. For example, one responder believes that the media coverage of honor violence
highlights government interests by identifying honor violence, as well as forced marriage and
terrorism, as problems only within South Asian and Muslim communities. This, another
responder argued, leads to honor violence and forced marriage becoming “racialized”, in that
they are seen as forms of ethnic or cultural violence rather than one form of violence against
women and girls. This is in line with arguments made by Meetoo & Mirza (2007) that the media
and government agencies treat honor violence as an “ethnicised” (p.p. 108) form of domestic
violence, meaning only certain groups perpetrate this perceived cultural crime.
The push for specific legislation against forced marriage and honor violence, these
responders argued, is then problematic for three reasons. The first is that the decision to form
specific legislation was based on unreliable statistics. One responder worked at the MPS during
the time that the number of honor killings in the UK were estimated at twelve per year, and
stated that she questioned the methods used to make this estimate. She argued that too many
cases were assumed to be honor violence based on the race, ethnicity, and religion of the
perpetrator, rather than clear statements of motive made by the perpetrator.
The second is that current crimes within the penal code can be used to address both
forced marriage and honor violence, yet interest groups want specific legislation that targets
specific ethnic groups. Three responders argued that these are not “innocent discourses” that
show “caring and concern for women” who are experiencing honor violence, forced marriage,
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and FGM. Rather, this “demonizes” specific communities, “racializes” the issue, and fuels
xenophobia. In her opinion, it would be more helpful and empowering for women if responders
“find linkages across ethnicity and race” and treat the issue as one part of a continuum of
violence against women and girls.
Finally, four responders argued that government intervention for honor violence and
forced marriage appears to mask ulterior motives for immigration and terrorism policies. These
responders question who is lobbying for what, and the reasons given for this lobbying. One
responder argued that honor violence and forced marriage have been used as platforms for
British far right parties to campaign on. For example, the English Defense League frequently
points to the Muslim community and says “oh look, now they are forcing their girls into
marriage.”
The Director of a women’s NGO stated that honor violence and forced marriage have
“become industries unto themselves” in that they are used to accomplish other policy initiatives
concerning immigration and terrorism. A Researcher/Activist in London provided a specific
example of this, arguing that placing the Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) jointly within the Home
Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office indicates that forced marriage is an immigration
issue. More specifically, the placement of the FMU suggests that the government expects women
and girls who are South Asian immigrants to be taken out of the country to be forced into
marriage. This responder argued that this marks the issue as a problem among immigrants, as
well as “masks the problem of forced marriage within UK borders”.
Another Researcher/Activist argued that policies targeting Muslims are more prevalent in
the wake of the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks, and that policies aimed at honor violence and
forced marriage provide another angle for intervention. More specifically, she discussed the use
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of “Prevent” counter-terrorism policies (described in Chapter 4.2) in the school system. She
stated that Prevent calls for teachers and administrators within the school system, including at the
university level, to report suspicious activity to the police service. She went on to say
“It’s a bit like Nazi Germany really. A teacher could say they have certain concerns
about somebody’s brother or uncle through a child in the school and, you know, they can
be visited. So it’s really quite frightening.”
The problem, she argued, is that the government is actually more worried about men being
terrorists than engaging in violence against women. “What matters when by whom” is of
particular interest in a multicultural context, especially when using rhetoric stating that the values
of specific cultures are incompatible with the British way of life.
Montoya & Agustin (2013) argue that the political environment in the EU has been
affected by rhetoric surrounding the “War on Terror” and the subsequent xenophobic
construction of Muslims as “cultural others”. For example, vulnerable groups are further
marginalized by anti-violence policies that focus on the ways that cultural minority groups fail to
embrace values considered to be part of the European identity. According to Kantola (2010), EU
states often blame minority cultures for violence and then claim that this shows that specific
cultures are especially violent towards women. Specific cultures are then cast as inherently
violent, with gender-based violence becoming one exclusive manifestation of this violence that
does not seem to apply to the majority culture (Mantoya & Agustin, 2013).
Similar arguments are made by Kundnani (2012), who argues that although discussions
of multiculturalism have continuously shifted over the last sixty years, major themes of these
discussions centered on the effect that ethnic and cultural diversity has on British culture. The
shift towards the post 9/11 and 7/7 beliefs that tolerant multicultural policies resulted in home
grown Islamic extremism led to a new focus on defining nationalism in terms of traditional
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British values (Kundnani, 2012; Phillips, 2005). The call for the assimilation and integration of
immigrants was made, supported by the argument that limits needed to be established as to how
tolerant the UK would be of cultural difference without disrupting social cohesion (Kundnani,
2012).
- Summary
Othering appears to be occurring at the government level in both Turkey and the UK in
terms of honor violence. According to (Kundnani, 2012, p.p. 159), “liberalism, nationalism, and
civilization are intertwined, apparently seamlessly, into a unified discourse of identity”.
Responders in this study argued that honor violence becomes one tool that governments can use
to push nationalist agendas. In both countries, majority groups are described as committing
crimes of passion while minority groups (e.g., Kurds and South Asian Muslims) are described as
committing honor violence. In Turkey, othering occurs through the legal code. Turkish
responders argued that the government uses the Customary Killing Code to discriminate against
Kurds, and several other articles within the legal code to discriminate against women. This
othering is often connected to the desire to create a Turkish Republic that is cohesive and not
multi-cultural.
In the UK othering occurs through the criminalization of forced marriage, and the use of
honor violence interventions as a means of policing specific communities. Here, nationalism
leans towards the construction of immigrants as outsiders through the use of forced marriage,
immigration, and terrorism policies. Like Petersoo (2007), responders in this study argued that
othering plays a role in the construction of a national identity, often turning institutional
responses into a political issue. Similar to the arguments of other scholars, responders in this
study believed that laws are applied differently to Kurds in Turkey (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008;
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Koğacıoğlu, 2004), and policies are designed with ulterior motives in the UK (e.g., Meetoo &
Mirza, 2007). What is interesting is that social service responders in both countries recognized
this othering at the governmental level, and expressed frustration at having to address honor
violence within a framework that they considered discriminatory. Turkish and British police
officers, however, did not engage in the same discussions of nationalism. The following section
will focus on othering engaged in by responders in this study.
Othering Among Criminal Justice and Social Service/NGO Responders
Evidence of othering emerged throughout interviews with responders in Turkey and
England. There were three key findings in this portion of the study. Turkish responders engaged
in conservative othering, and British responders engaged in liberal othering. Third, police
officers in both countries engaged in othering more often than social service responders. This
third finding is examined in the course of the discussion of conservative and liberal othering.
Interestingly, a number of social service/NGO responders and Researcher/Activists in both
countries also discussed othering explicitly without prompting during the interviews.
Examples of Conservative Othering
Young (2007) characterizes conservative othering as the demonization of a minority
group by a majority group. The majority group will typically consider themselves to be
qualitatively different from the minority group, engaging in the projection of negative attributes
to others while assigning positive attributes to their own group. Conservative othering occurred
only among Turkish police officers in this sample. Several officers simply made statements like
‘honor violence is usually committed in eastern Turkey’. These officers sometimes provided
reasons why they believed this to be true. For example, some argued that the culture of eastern
Turkey is much different than western Turkey, in that they have different lifestyles and beliefs,
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follow strict moral codes, and are very religious. Additionally, some officers argued that honor
violence is a tradition in eastern Turkey, and that women are not valued as highly in eastern
Turkey as they are in western Turkey. This is because people in the west, two officers argued,
are more educated, less religious, and more socially conscious. Some responders also argued that
the PKK and KCK both have a large presence in eastern Turkey and engage in honor violence.
Others argued that honor violence occurs throughout Turkey, by both Turks and Kurds,
but that these ethnic groups commit honor violence for different reasons. For example, one
officer stated that Turks commit honor violence out of jealousy and Kurds commit honor
violence because of gossip. Turkish responders did not specifically use the term “stereotype” (as
British responders did), but they did describe a “typical” victim or perpetrator of honor violence
as immigrants, as well as individuals of lower education and socioeconomic status. It is
important to note that these descriptions of a “typical” perpetrator were predominantly, but not
solely, police officer responses.
In interviews with other officers, othering was more extreme. A few officers explicitly
stated that only people in eastern Turkey commit honor violence, and honor violence does not
occur in western Turkey. Some stated that only Kurds commit honor violence. Others argued that
only immigrants from eastern Turkey commit honor violence, and described perpetrators of
honor violence as uncivilized. One of these police officers, focused a great deal on ethnicity.
This particular officer stated that only Kurds commit honor violence, and Turks do not commit
honor violence. More specifically, he described Kurdish people as poor, uneducated, strange,
backward, and primitive. He continued to describe the Kurdish as people who live in a small
world, with their own culture and traditions. At one point he stated that he wished that the
Kurdish were given their own country, separate from Turkey.
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Interestingly, he acknowledged throughout the interview that his statements could be
considered “racist”. This prompted a discussion of racism, and how honor violence is a complex
issue not only in Turkey, but also for Muslims generally. He argued that “if you talk bad about
Turkey, you give more fuel to the Muslim haters.” This is an interesting statement because he
engages in othering throughout the interview, but also feels othered because honor violence is
one more reason to dislike Muslims. When I specifically asked if only the Kurdish commit honor
violence, he replied “I wouldn’t say that it’s just the Kurdish- that would be racist.”
Examples of Liberal Othering
Liberal othering, according to Young (2007), casts the minority group as one that lacks
the qualities or virtues of the majority of society. This is a subtler sort of othering, in that the
majority group admits to pitying and wanting to help those who are being othered. Othered
groups are described as committing certain types of crimes because they do not know any better,
thus their lives could be improved if they learned to be more like the majority group.
Rehabilitation and education are, therefore, the main goals of liberal othering.
Most British responders argued that honor violence is cultural. Although few responders
explicitly stated that honor violence only occurs among certain cultures, ethnicities, and religions,
most responders argued that the term “honor violence” is typically associated with black,
minority, and ethnic (BME) communities. More specifically, honor violence in the UK is most
often associated with South Asians (e.g., Indians, Pakistanis) and Muslims. Like Turkish police
officers, British officers tended to make statements that could be considered othering more often
than other responders.
Many responders agreed that victims of honor violence are stereotyped as young South
Asian Muslim females. Interestingly, a few officers specified that most people picture a victim of
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honor violence as wearing a hijab. Most officers argued that there is no typical victim of honor
violence, while at the same time arguing that honor violence does occur in the South Asian
Muslim community more often than among other ethnicities and religions in the UK. One police
officer, for example, stated that people believe that the “Qur’an condones honor violence”, but
that honor violence is rooted in patriarchal culture rather than religion. Another officer stated that
honor violence is tied to the Muslim faith, but definitely not Christianity.
Others discussed stereotypes in terms of immigration, education, and socioeconomic
status. For them, honor violence is something that occurs among eastern immigrants and not
native Britons. For example, one police officer stated
“It is beyond my perception how a parent could want to kill their daughter because they
want to marry somebody that they have not chosen, or was outside- it is beyond me. But
obviously, I have a Western background, a different cultural background.”
More specifically, several police officers and one social service responder argued that when
honor violence occurs, it is often due to older migrant community members panicking about
younger community members breaking with tradition and becoming too westernized. This, one
responder argued, will always occur in a country with a high migrant population.
Police officers often described victims as being placed in a difficult situation when
seeking assistance from law enforcement because they do not want to “go against their culture.”
Some police officers compared British culture to the culture of victims, saying that British
culture values women differently and cultures that practice honor violence are patriarchal
(implying that British culture is not). Others argued that preventing honor violence would be
very difficult because it would require changing the culture of people who commit honor
violence, and that culture has been around for “hundreds” or “thousands” of years. Police
officers also tended to argue that they should not be afraid of being called a racist when
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addressing honor violence, because perpetrators must understand that their cultural practices are
not acceptable in the UK.
Several responders specifically noted that honor violence occurs in white western
populations. These discussions, however, occurred in terms of outliers rather than cases that were
considered typical. Several responders specifically discussed honor violence within traveller
communities, which for them included both Roma and Irish travellers. One officer noted that
“gypsy girls” are frequently taken out of school, forced into marriage, and forced to become stay
at home mothers to many children at a young age. Two responders specifically discussed the
television show “My Big Fat Gypsy Wedding”, arguing that the show depicts forced marriages.
The public, however, is so accustomed to honor violence being associated with Muslim that they
do not recognize the show as depicting forced marriages.
Two British police officers gave examples of western literature that depicts cases of
honor violence. For example, one police officer argued that Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet is a
classic example of honor violence in that a couple from different communities and religious
backgrounds fell in love without the consent of their families, which then resulted in family
violence and suicide. Similarly, another police officer discussed honor violence in The Count of
Monte Cristo, saying that the book uses the phrase “blood is the only thing to wash your honor
clean”. He argued that this phrase is currently used in the same way with honor violence. Finally,
responders noted that forced marriage appears to exist in the Royal Family, especially the
marriage of Princess Diana to Prince Charles.
Schools
In Young’s discussion of liberal othering, he describes education as one example of how
institutional responders engage in othering. This is especially relevant to the current analysis due
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to the different ways that British and Turkish responders discussed education. Two thirds of
British responders provided detailed discussions of education as a method of preventing honor
violence. While half of Turkish responders also mentioned education, all but one of these
responders briefly mentioned education in passing without further explanation.
Several British responders argued that educational programs concerning honor violence
should target schools with large ethnic populations typically associated with honor violence.
These responders argued that education is very important for breaking the cycle of violence.
Since honor violence occurs only among certain ethnicities, they argued, resources should be
allocated to schools with those demographics so that students can be taught that honor violence
is not acceptable. Three responders argued that this may be difficult in mostly ethnic schools
because the families of most students may believe that honor violence is acceptable, and will not
want their children to be taught otherwise.
One responder gave an example of a Community Safety Day where a stall was set up at a
university to provide information on honor violence and forced marriage. This specific university
was chosen because this responders’ organization received many referrals for honor violence and
forced marriage. Another responder stated that there is currently a program on television called
“Educating Yorkshire” that is set in a predominantly South Asian school. A recent episode
touched on hijabs, gossip, and honor violence.
Many responders (including one Turkish responder) argued that if honor violence is
addressed in schools, it should be a standard part of the Personal Social Health Education
(PSHE) programs in all schools. In other words, honor violence education should not be targeted
to schools with specific ethnic and religious demographics. Some responders suggested that
schools should begin teaching gender equality in kindergarten, because beginning at ages eleven
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or twelve is too late, and that material could easily be made age appropriate. For example, it
would not be appropriate to discuss honor violence and women’s rights with five year olds, but it
would be appropriate to begin addressing gender norms, stereotypes, and interactions. It was also
argued that teachers and textbook writers should be trained to avoid gender stereotyping.
Some responders argued that healthy relationships can be taught throughout the school
years, and then cover different forms of violence when children reach an appropriate age. It was
suggested, for example, that teachers could begin talking about gender and respect around ages
nine or ten. Discussions on honor violence and forced marriage could then begin in middle
school. Responders cautioned that having one session on healthy relationships or violence
against women is not enough. This should be an ongoing process where young people are taught
about different forms of violence against women and girls, laws in the UK, consequences of
violence, and the resources available for victims. The goal is to educate children that violence of
any kind is not normal, and provide information for how they can ask for help. Teachers also
should be taught to recognize the signs of honor violence, and be aware of how to address the
situation (e.g., do not call the parents).
One responder argued that these types of discussions should not be in the form of lectures.
Educators need to be creative, for example using peer to peer learning and drama. He discussed a
project in Sweden that they have tried to replicate in the UK in which they train 25 teenagers
between the ages of 16 and 20 years old to discuss these issues in schools. He argued that it is
important to remember that “children listen to children, they don’t listen to adults.” There are
also, he explained, various forty minute plays about honor violence that have been developed
locally which are then followed by a discussion with students. It was suggested that this should
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be coupled with training for teachers, the integration of school policies with policies on violence
against women and girls, and the establishment of a single point of contact within schools.
Some responders noted that this has been discussed among school administrators, but
there is a reluctance to do so. For example, teachers want to prioritize discussions of honor
violence and forced marriage, but are afraid of discussing controversial issues such as sexuality,
race, ethnicity, and religion, as well as push back from parents. NGO’s are not given access to
work on these issues in schools because schools are afraid of offending various groups.
One responder who is currently working with high school students discussed her
observations concerning honor violence. For example, there were two cases in the same school
where an Afghani Muslim girl and a Sri Lankan Tamil girl were both engaged at the age of
fifteen to much older men. The teachers, however, were only concerned about the Afghani girl
because she “fit the profile” for forced marriage and honor violence. In another school that she
works in that has a mostly South Asian student body, they held sessions explaining that forced
marriage is illegal, but she thinks it would be difficult to have that discussion in a more multiethnic setting.
Two responders, however, argued that focusing on education is the “easy answer”.
According to one responder everyone says that the key to addressing violence against women
and girls is going into schools. While school interventions are very important, they must be done
thoughtfully. There have to be support services and networks of people who can help lessen the
danger, not create more danger. Similarly, another responder argued that education must
continue into the community. It is counterintuitive to teach children in school that violence is
wrong, and then send them to a home where violence is considered normal. For her, education
has to be done throughout society or there will never be lasting change.
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Othering or Reality?
The purpose of this section is to examine whether responders were engaging in othering
during these interviews, which may indicate that othering affects their responses to honor
violence. The question is whether believing that honor violence is cultural is in itself a form of
othering, or simply an acknowledgement of the experiences of responders. Two findings
complicate this discussion. First, I struggled with the question of whether responders are truly
engaging in othering if most of their work experience with honor violence is with specific
populations (e.g., Kurds, Muslims, South Asians).
In the UK, for instance, a Chief Inspector explained that honor violence is largely
associated with Muslims in a variety of communities concentrated in East London, East
Birmingham, and Bradford. Several responders stated that 75% of honor violence cases involve
Muslims, but this is reflective of the foreign diaspora currently residing in the UK and is thus
proportionate. Additionally, the number of services available to Muslims is much higher than
services available to other populations. Many cases of honor violence are present in Hindu, Sikh,
and Eastern European communities, but they do not have the level of trust in British responders
that has been developed with Muslim populations, nor do they seek help in the same ways. Thus,
Muslims may feel more empowered to seek help, which may explain why it may appear that
more Muslims commit honor violence.
Several British responders also explained that victims reporting honor violence to them in
their professional capacity were mostly Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Indian. These responders
associated these cases primarily with Islam. Similarly some responders argued that although
honor violence occurs throughout Turkey, more honor violence does appear to occur in the
southeast. Two responders argued that this may be because relationships between children and
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parents are strained in eastern Turkey, in a way that they are not in western Turkey. The family
structure in the east is authoritarian, thus children are not allowed to speak their mind or
communicate openly with their parents. Forced marriages are common, and often lead to honor
violence because the child does not want to get married. Others argued that perhaps there are
different methods of honor violence in different regions, but it does happen in both the U.S. and
the Middle East. By attributing honor violence to one region, it makes it less visible to the world.
The second finding that complicates this discussion is that several responders who
identified their ethnicities as one that is typically othered in their country (e.g., Kurdish, South
Asian) argued that honor violence is more prevalent among their ethnic group. For example,
three police officers who identified as Kurdish and from eastern Turkey also argued that honor
violence only occurs in eastern Turkey. Two of these officers were assigned to work in western
Turkey for many years, and argued that the two cultures are very different. This is especially true
in regards to honor, because people in eastern Turkey “live for honor”. Honor is more important
than both money and property in the east, one officer explained, which he believes makes this
population old-fashioned. Furthermore, he argues that the eastern Turks living in small villages
have remained uncivilized and uncultured. This is due to a lack of education, strict codes of
behavior (e.g., female friends cannot simply meet for coffee), and a lack of modern technology
like television and the internet. In his opinion, western Turks and eastern Turks in large cities
have become more modern and cultured, especially in accepting sex before marriage
Similar discussions occurred with seven of the nine British responders who identified
their ethnicity as being either South Asian or Turkish. Five responders identified as British/South
Asian (Pakistani and Indian) and two responders identified as British/Turkish. These responders
argued that the cultures typically associated with honor violence are very different from British
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culture, and these differences do sometimes lead to honor violence when cultural clashes occur.
In other words, these responders do believe that honor violence is cultural in many ways.
These responders specifically stated that they have a different perspective on honor
violence occurring in the UK because they have a personal understanding of both western and
eastern constructions of honor. For example, two British/Indian responders felt that they
occupied a difficult space where they believe in the individualistic construction of honor in
which their behavior reflects only on themselves, but also is part of a family that subscribes to a
collective construction of honor. One of these responders also trains police officers on honor
violence. She stated that it is often difficult to make police officers understand the differences
between individualistic and collective cultures, and how honor violence manifests differently
within these cultures.
They also stated that while eastern cultures are very different from British culture, not
everyone who is part of an “honor culture” believes in honor violence. For example, several
responders argued that they could not understand why people would choose to harm their
children. This is not the norm within South Asian and Turkish families, but rather the result of
either cultural or religious extremism. A British/Pakistani survivor of honor violence, and
member of the Survivor Advisory Panel of a women’s NGO, stated that it is important to
acknowledge that
“It’s not solely about Islam, but you can’t deny that this is happening a lot in Muslim
communities and it would definitely happen to us in the name of Islam...A lot of people
would probably want to hang me out to dry for saying that, but I do think there is a
problem in the Muslim community.”
Four responders (two Turkish and two Pakistani) attributed honor violence to the loss of
control over their children that immigrants experience upon moving to the UK. Many immigrants,
they argued, are hesitant to integrate because do not want to lose their cultural identity. As one
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British/Pakistani responder stated, families often feel that allowing their daughters to go to
college will result in westernization. Feeling that they have lost control then leads to honor
violence. One British/Turkish responder argued that it is important to recognize that although
there are some cultures that engage in honor violence more often than others, she believes that
honor violence specifically (and violence against women generally) are universal.
Responders Who Discussed Othering
Many responders discussed othering that occurs in regards to honor violence in Turkey
and the UK. These responders typically began by stating that most people believe that honor
violence only occurs in eastern Turkey among Kurdish populations, or South Asians in the UK.
This belief is incorrect, however, because honor violence is committed by many different
ethnicities throughout their country and the rest of the world. Turkish responders, for example,
argued that this occurs because of racism towards the Kurdish population that still exists in
Turkey. For example, one responder noted
“A woman is murdered- it’s not because those barbaric Kurds killed the woman and the
Izmir people do not. They both killed the woman. They are structural settings are
different, how they explain might be slightly different, but at the end of the day this is
violence against women”
As several responders explained, this racism is rooted in the Kurdish Question and nationalist
politics.
One responder argued that as women become more conscious of violence against women
and resist it, more violence is committed. The women’s movement is stronger in southeastern
Turkey, with more women reporting violence. She argued that this is partly due to the Kurdish
struggle in southeastern Turkey, where the women’s movement is especially fierce. Kurdish
women’s organizations are fighting violence against women, as well as fighting for a national
identity. Women are currently very involved in Kurdish politics, and continue to try to gain
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power by influencing policy. This has brought attention to both honor violence and the Kurdish
struggle throughout Turkey, which may have impacted the belief that more honor violence
occurs in eastern Turkey.
British responders, on the other hand, did not give as detailed responses as to why they
believe South Asians are associated most often with honor violence. It can be inferred from their
interviews, however that they attribute this association to the fact that South Asian Muslims seek
help for honor violence more often than other populations, making them more visible. More
generally, many British responders stated that these groups are commonly othered in the UK, and
this association to honor violence is simply one more way for this to occur.
Additionally responders in both studies argued that the media makes honor violence more
visible, as well as sensationalizes and exaggerates honor violence. First and foremost, the media
has a penchant for reporting honor killings because these are the types of stories that make good
headlines. This has made honor violence generally more visible to the public, and raised
awareness. Several high profile cases of honor killings have been reported in both Turkey and
England over the last two decades, which has fueled a media frenzy. One responder, for example,
noted that newscasters were at one point reporting honor violence like they do the “weather”,
saying things like “today’s honor killing is from Izmir.”
The problem for responders, however, is way that the media reports honor violence.
Several Turkish police officers argued that the media exaggerates the prevalence of honor
violence because “sex and violence sells.” One police officer noted that “saying a Muslim killed
their wife makes it even sexier, and sells more papers.” A Turkish legal activist described honor
violence coverage in the Turkish media as sensationalized tabloid coverage. Furthermore, she
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argued that this coverage is violently pornographic and revictimizing in their inclusion of lurid
photographs of the victims body.
Thus, responders in this study also argued that the media engages in othering in several
ways. The first is that they report honor violence stereotypically, linking what they perceive to be
a cultural crime to specific ethnicities and religions. In the UK, responders argued that the media
links honor violence to Muslims. Interestingly, two British first responders noted that the only
reason they knew anything about honor violence was through media coverage. One specifically
stated that she believes honor violence only occurs among South Asians because that is what she
learned from the media. Others argued that it is the trend to demonize certain communities in the
British media, and honor violence has become one method of doing so. Similarly, responders
argued that the media in Turkey tends to cover cases of honor violence that occur in the east
more so than in the west. Responders noted that the media portrays western Turkey as a place
where the people no longer believe in honor, further perpetuating the belief that honor violence
occurs only in eastern Turkey. The media thus perpetuates stereotypes, which then filters into
society.
Many female social service/NGO responders, however, argued that honor violence is
simply one form of violence against women, which is present in every culture around the world.
Specific cultures are not more violent than others, violence is simply socially constructed
differently by culture. More specifically, they argued that discussions surrounding honor
violence hinge on how societies decide whose values matter the most, as well as how to define
sexual and gender-based violence. Definitions and manifestations of honor violence are
constructed differently in each culture, but the elements that link honor violence to every nation
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are patriarchy and control. Honor violence is simply one “vehicle”, one responder argued, for the
expression of patriarchy as well as a justification for bad behavior.
One Turkish social worker argued that violence against women is an ideology resulting
from patriarchal culture. In other words, all violence against women occurs because of the belief
that men have the most power in society along with cultural expectations for how women should
behave. It then becomes very easy to both accept violence against women as the norm, and
attribute specific forms of violence to the populations within a society with the least power.
Describing honor violence as a heinous crime committed by the Kurdish or South Asians, and
crimes of passion to western Turks and white western populations, implies that one crime is
more offensive (or even more acceptable) than the other. Entire societies begin to adopt this
mentality, finding a variety of ways to rationalize violent behavior (e.g., the uncivilized Kurd
does not know any better, but the business man loved his wife so much he could not contain his
anger).
Similarly, one Researcher/Activist in London (E29) explained that civility is too often
associated with honor violence in that “the more civilized you get, the less honor crime there is”.
For her, the concepts of honor and honor violence are framed in an “us vs. them” dichotomy,
where ‘those’ uncivilized people commit honor crimes but ‘us’ civilized people would never
commit an honor crime. This is also an example of liberal othering in that if cultures who
commit honor violence could receive more education, they would become more civilized. Finally,
other responders argued that it is difficult to talk about honor violence outside of the colonial
context that has shaped current narratives. Responders made statements to the effect that current
narratives are “orientalist”, such as
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“Where we see things as happening over there in the bad east, where people are
behaving badly. And they’re more patriarchal than anyone else, but I live in the UK and I
just have to think about football and how honor works”.
Is honor violence a cultural crime?
Responders in both Turkey and England questioned why similar crimes within western
cultures are not considered honor violence. In Turkey, one responder asked me why western
societies do not consider crimes of passion to be a form of honor violence. This led to an
interesting discussion of how the two crimes are different. In this conversation, we discussed the
different roles of honor in each crime. The two crimes are both motivated by the violation of
honor, but while honor violence is typically constructed as the violation of a woman’s honor,
crimes of passion appear to be driven by the violation of a man’s honor. Crimes of passion are
considered heat of the moment crimes committed by an intimate partner, while honor violence is
usually considered a premeditated crime committed by a family member. Several responders
made similar comments in other interviews. For example, non-Kurdish Turks who commit honor
violence are often described as having committed a crime of passion. A typical crime of passion
would be a husband who kills his wife upon finding her in bed with another man. A typical
honor crime, however, might be premeditated homicide committed by family members against a
woman who shamed the family by engaging in sex before marriage.
Several responders argued that crimes of passion were previously included in the penal
codes of most Mediterranean countries. One responder used crime of passion laws in France to
clarify her point. She argued that until recently, these law stated that a man could murder a
woman and justify his crime by saying that she had violated his honor, yet honor violence in
France is never mentioned. Similarly, another responder discussed a murder case that occurred in
the UK in 2003. In this case, a white middle class city banker stabbed his wife fifty-seven times
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because she committed adultery. His children sided with the father, believing that the murder
was justified because their father had worked hard to provide for his family while their mother
had a series of extra-marital affairs. The man was given a very low sentence because it was
considered a crime of passion, and the judge admitted that he empathized with the perpetrator.
For these responders, crimes of passion and honor violence are more similar than
different. They argue that crimes of passion are often romanticized and considered crimes based
on love (e.g., he loved her so much, that seeing her with another man made him hurt her). These
crimes are typically associated with western populations and considered understandable, because
the man was provoked. Responders argued that this applied even within Turkey, with western
Turks categorized as committing crimes of passion while eastern Turks commit honor violence.
Honor violence, on the other hand, is constructed as a crime committed by barbaric eastern
families who simply do not know any better.
One responder used gun crime in the United States as another example of the disconnect
between what is considered a cultural crime and what is not. She argued that although gun crime
is rampant in the United States and very low in other countries, gun crime is not considered a
culturally American issue. Similarly, another responder used gangs as an example. For her,
honor and respect are conceptualized the same way within gang culture, especially in terms of
how gang members negotiate space. She gave the example of a young male gang member
justifying his violent attacks on a significant other by arguing that the young woman disrespected
him (e.g., by dating another gang member). She also argued that some of the policing and
surveillance attitudes of gang members are very similar to the way that traditional families with
honor codes behave. Gun crime and gang violence, however, are not considered cultural violence.
As one responder argued “what’s good for the goose should be good for the gander.” Labeling
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crimes committed by certain communities as cultural prevents action from being taken because
the response becomes to do nothing, and instead let the community deal with the problem
themselves.
Honor violence, another responder argued, is a reflection of the belief that women are
harmed because something about their behavior is perceived to reflect on the abuser. The abuser
feels the need to control this behavior, which can be manifested in a variety of different ways
that may differ by culture. In the US and the UK for example, she argues, stalking and
harassment could be forms of honor violence. These actions may be prompted by the need for
control, a challenge to masculinity, or the feeling that the abusers status has been diminished in
the community. For her, codes of respectability and codes of honor are similar, but codes of
honor are more extreme. Cultures “do gender” differently, thus understanding these differences
without engaging in othering is of utmost importance.
One responder took the argument further, stating that honor violence is considered
stereotypically Muslim for the same reason that there are stereotypes about all types of crime.
Crime is always associated with the “lower orders” of society, and who comprises those lower
orders is constantly shifting and changing. Post 9/11 and 7/7, honor violence has been associated
with Muslims rather than linked to patriarchy. She argued that associating a crime with a group
like Muslims provides a level of protection for perpetrators who are from the higher orders of
society in that “there’s always a willingness to disbelieve that they could have perpetrated
violence than somebody who has lower social status.” At the moment, there is a lot of
problematizing of Muslims in the UK, so it appears to be specific and particular, but she does not
believe honor violence is actually any different than the way all crime is problematized in that
“you don’t want to think that middle class professional men put their wives in hospital or
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sexually abuse their children, but they do.” Saying that honor violence is a religious, ethnic, or
cultural crime is over-simplifying the matter.
Are Stereotypes Harmful?
Many British responders discussed whether stereotypes are harmful or helpful. Several
responders argued that although using the term honor violence often leads to stereotyping, the
term does provide context, and triggers a specific response. For the most part, however,
responders argued that stereotypes are problematic. The main problem with these stereotypes is
the impact they have on the police response. According to one responder, the label honor
violence is not problematic, but “the way it’s bandied around is problematic” for several reasons.
The first is that some responders are hesitant to act when presented with cases of honor violence
because they want to be culturally sensitive, and avoid being accused of being racist or culturally
intolerant.
The second problem is that professionals become “paralyzed with fear about what to do”
when responding to cases of honor violence. This is partly due to the “culture of fear” in the
police service following the Banaz Mahmod case, which has lead to officers adding the honor
violence label because they are very afraid of failing to respond appropriately. Innocent incidents,
however, are too often labeled as honor violence. Several responders, for example, argued that
all families have arguments and parents often make hyperbolic statements like “if you are
pregnant I will bloody well kill you!” It is important to recognize these situations as normal
family arguments, rather than honor violence.
Responders start to have very fixed ideas of who does what to whom, and cannot get past
these preconceptions. Thus, five responders argued that it is important not to see every case with
South Asian Muslims as honor violence because then the “organization will become blind” to
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the victims who are truly at risk of honor violence. Responders need to be trained to recognize
the warning signs of honor violence, but there is a constant tension between formulating
guidelines for responders, avoiding stereotypes, and addressing the racial tension inherent to the
topic. Many responders questioned whether it is necessary to label the offense honor violence.
The argument here is that honor violence should simply be treated as one part of the continuum
of violence against women rather than focusing on different cultural manifestations.
On the one hand, removing the focus on motive may alleviate the racial, ethnic, and
religious focus on this group of offenses. I argue that on the other hand, however, is important to
understand the context of honor and the impact that honor has on the situation. Recognizing
honor as a motive triggers a much different response to what is considered a “typical” case of
domestic violence. For example, while immediately arresting an abuser in a case that does not
involve honor may be the correct action to take, the same action may trigger an escalated risk of
violence for a victim where honor is the motive. The problem is identifying differences and
responding appropriately without engaging in othering.
- Summary
This portion of the study contributes to the literature by examining othering among
institutional responders. Although the vignettes were inconclusive, a great deal of information
can be gleaned from the interviews themselves. To my knowledge, no other studies have
interviewed responders about their opinions of and experiences with honor violence. Most
studies address honor violence from a sociological, theoretical, or women’s NGO perspective.
When beginning this research, I expected there to be more conservative othering
occurring, which would be evidenced through narratives such as “those barbaric people” and
“those poor women who need to be saved.” That was generally not the case, however. When
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othering did occur, it was typically conservative othering among police officers in Turkey and
liberal othering among police officers in the UK. I only encountered one case of extreme
conservative othering when interviewing a Turkish police officer. Similar to Gianettoni et al.
(2010), male Turkish police officers also engaged in sexist (and what I consider to be
conservative) othering. Social service/NGO responders in both countries (and Turkish female
police officers) did not, for the most part, engage in othering. In fact, they directly discussed the
tendency for government institutions, policies, responders, the media, and society in general to
engage in othering.
Gianettoni and Roux (2010) link this to sexist othering that also occurs in political
discourses. In Turkey, this can be seen in the penal code and beliefs of prominent politicians like
President Erdoğan. In the UK, this manifests as the belief that immigrants cannot successfully
integrate into British culture because cultures in which honor violence is prevalent are
essentialized as sexist. They further argue that framing immigrants, and foreigners more
generally, as essentially sexist diverts attention from gender inequality and violence against
women within western cultures. This provides policymakers with a justification for limiting the
rights of immigrants. Again, this is splitting hairs, and arguing that “their” form of sexism is
unacceptable while “our” forms of sexism are simply normal.
On the one hand, it can be argued that othering is inevitable. As de Beauvoir (1949)
argued, there always will be an ‘other’ cast in opposition to the self. That othering is considered
a part of human nature, however, is what makes it imperative to evaluate it in terms of power and
oppression (de Beauvoir, 1949; Schwalbe et al., 2000). Othering becomes oppressive when a
social distancing occurs between ‘us and them’ that comes from a position of power, thus
becoming a means of justifying inequality or discriminatory treatment (De Beauvoir, 1949;
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Schwalbe et al., 2000). There is a fine line between recognizing difference and engaging in
othering. The goal is to refrain from essentializing cultures and change the narrative surrounding
honor violence.
I argue that institutional responses to honor violence fit Montoya & Agustin’s (2013)
definition of exclusionary policies. Currently, responses to honor violence overemphasize the
differences between the way that cultural minorities (e.g., Kurds and South Asians) and western
populations experience violence against women. This has resulted in an “us vs. them” mentality
by using words like “custom” or “tradition” (Montoya & Agustin, 2013), which stresses that
honor violence is a distinctly cultural crime. As Burman et al. (2004) argue, cultural crimes are
“pathologized” and considered more severe than western forms of violence against women. It is
possible, however, to acknowledge difference while addressing violence against women as a
universal problem that unacceptable in any form (Volpp, 2001).
Several scholars argue that the next step is addressing the diverse needs of women
experiencing violence, within a universal frame of violence against women, without engaging in
othering and discriminatory practices (Crenshaw, 1997; Montoya & Agustin, 2013; Solokoff &
Dupont, 2005). An effective response to violence against women would have to acknowledge the
conditions of violence (e.g., xenophobia, classism, racism) (Montoya & Agustin, 2013; Smith,
2005), while also being aware that the marginalization of certain groups is often intensified by
focusing on their specific needs (Montoya & Agustin, 2013). This is discussed in more detail in
the following section.
7.4: Best Practices & Responder Recommendations
Responders discussed a variety of best practices that are already established in their
country, as well as best practices that they would recommend for a better response to honor
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violence. Most responders argued that it is important to begin with clear definitions, especially
with perceived cultural crimes like honor violence. Clear definitions will then help responders
understand the context of the violence, and inform institutional responses. These responses
should be multi-agency, and include extensive training, using case studies, experienced frontline
responders, and survivors whenever possible; strong mental health support; standardized risk
assessments; and interpreters for victims. Responders then discussed prevention strategies, and
the legal responses that they believe would best address honor violence. In depth discussions of
these best practices continue below.
Multi-Agency Approach
Although mostly a British response, almost half of the sample argued that any response to
honor violence should be holistic, coordinated, and multi-agency. For example, the UK has
implemented Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs), which is a team of
responders convened for high-risk cases. The purpose is to have key stakeholders meet to
determine the best course of action for each specific victim, keeping the victims’ choices in mind.
As one police officer stated, there are many steps in responding to honor violence and police
involvement is only one possible first step. Victims need additional support as the case is
investigated and continues through the criminal justice process, but this process should only be
embarked upon with the victims consent. In other words, positive action policies are not in effect
in cases of honor violence because they may put the victim at greater risk of violence. Several
responders suggested that the U.S. implement a similar response.
Almost two thirds of British responders cautioned against a “siloed” approach. This was
mostly a social service/NGO response, although a few police officers also agreed. For these
responders, siloing meant classifying and responding to honor violence differently than other
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crimes. They argued that while it is important for people to understand the impact that violence
has on different communities, groups, and contexts, labeling offenses like honor violence
separately puts them in a silo. For them, this is problematic for several reasons. First, honor
violence becomes a box that responders check on a form and prevents responders from asking
the questions necessary to helping the victim. Second, they argued that creating very specific
responses to very specific offenses takes the focus off of the victim. I interpreted this as meaning
that siloing fails to consider the range of offenses the victim is experiencing, creating a kind of
tunnel vision. Siloing prevents responders from truly “understanding how violence works”, as
one responder noted, and leads responders towards specifically targeted responses that might not
be right for all victims. Third, siloing implies that honor violence is more offensive than other
types of violence. I argue that this also leads to othering and politicizes the issue.
Instead, they recommended treating honor violence as part of a continuum of violence
against women. In this way, responders can be trained to recognize and address honor violence
without having a siloed response. A few British responders suggested using a human rights,
rather than criminal justice, framework to respond to honor violence. This takes the focus off of
cultural differences in violence and crime, and puts the focus on the violation of basic human
rights.
Organizational Procedures
Specific best practices for organizations were generally not discussed. Responders tended
to provide descriptions of how they responded to honor violence, but not in the context of
whether they believe these procedures should be considered best practices. There are, however,
some suggestions to note. Responders in this study, along with British women’s NGO’s (e.g.,
Southall Black Sisters, 2014), argued that more resources must be allocated to protecting and
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supporting victims and survivors. More specifically, responders argued that more social workers
and stronger mental health supports, as well as more shelters are needed. These shelters must be
safe, and their locations confidential. Social service responders in both Turkey and England also
tended to argue that follow up is an extremely important part of any institutional response to
violence, yet one that is typically not done because of a lack of funding. Southall Black Sisters
(2014) further argued that frontline BME women’s organizations must receive sustainable
funding from the state to provide information, advocacy, counseling, and safe houses for victims
and survivors.
The problem, several responders noted, is that non-citizens do not have access to public
funds. Since many victims of honor violence in the UK are not permanent citizens, this is a
major concern. Southall Black Sisters (2014), thus, recommend that housing law and allocation
of welfare benefits be reformed to include victims and survivors of forced marriage as a
vulnerable population. It was also suggested that immigration, asylum, and no recourse to public
funds policies be reformed to protect forced marriage victims, ensuring that no one is trapped in
a forced marriage or abusive relationship, deported, or face destitution.
Some British responders in this study would prefer greater ethnic, racial, and religious
diversity among responders, and responders in both countries noted the need for good
interpreters. In terms of investigations, almost one quarter of British responders suggested that
having a standard operating for a police response to honor violence would limit discretion, and
help ensure that the correct actions are taken. For example, honor violence is typically a group
crime with multiple perpetrators. This, along with other factors, raises the risk and vulnerability
of the victim and makes it necessary for police to respond differently than they would to a case
of domestic violence.
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Additionally, several British responders discussed risk assessments. It was recommended
that a risk assessment be immediately conducted in suspected cases of honor violence. Some
British responders preferred that risk assessments be standardized because it would provide
guidance to responders who may not know exactly how to evaluate the situation. The problem,
however, is that the DASH risk assessment currently in use in the UK has not been updated to
reflect the current state of knowledge concerning honor violence.
Other British responders recommended using caution when using risk assessments. Too
many types of risk assessments, responders argued, can confuse police officers. Risk assessments
also focus too much on typical victims and perpetrators, and fail to capture the experiences of
victims who may have experiences that fall outside of what the designer of the risk assessment
considered to be “typical”. This is especially a problem in a place like the UK, where honor
violence is considered a crime that is experienced only by minority populations in that risk
assessments are an outsiders’ view of what is occurring in these situations. Additionally, one
responder noted that risk assessments “privilege” certain types of violence (e.g., physical) over
other types of violence (e.g., psychological) when assigning severity of risk. Thus, the results of
these risk assessments are inherently skewed.
Finally, it was argued that honor violence becomes a box that gets checked on a form,
and prevents responders from asking the follow up questions necessary to actually help the
victim. In other words, risk assessments are not a substitute for training and experience.
Quantitative methods of assessment have become the gold standard, leaving little room for the
true skill of front line workers. As Young (2011, p.p. viii) stated “the telescope becomes of
greater importance than the sky.”
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Responders also noted that training is an integral best practice in responding to honor
violence. In this study, one third of British responders suggested that responders in all agencies
receive training concerning honor violence. Southall Black Sisters (2014) also recommend that
public agencies receive mandatory training programs, and that BME women’s organizations
participate in these training programs. Many responders argued that in a perfect world, specialist
advocates would be trained in each sector, so that there is at least one police officer, judge,
prosecutor, or social worker who understands honor violence in each institution and organization.
Most British responders in this study argued that understanding the context of honor violence is
necessary for implementing appropriate responses, thus training would be necessary. Almost half
of the British sample and one Turkish responder argued that case studies should be used to train
police officers. British responders noted that one method of delivering case study trainings is
through “video box”, which is a ten minute recorded session of an expert describing a particular
subject area, case, or type of legislation.
Interviews with victims in the UK are sometimes presented in this format, which some
responders found to be a very powerful method of training. A few responders noted that
involving survivors in training provides the victims point of view, including the barriers that they
faced in seeking help, how they made decisions concerning their case, and how these decisions
affected their family and their personal safety. Other responders stated that involving survivors in
training should be done cautiously because being a survivor does not make someone an expert on
honor violence. That person simply knows about their personal experience, which is important,
but must be presented in terms of the greater context of patriarchy, power, and control.
Almost one quarter of the total sample specifically discussed cultural awareness training
for police officers. British responders in both criminal justice and social service/NGO’s tended to
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argue that the police should not focus on cultural awareness training. In their opinion, the police
do not need to know why an offense was committed. They simply need to understand the level of
risk for violence, and how they can best protect the victim. As one responder stated, police
officers are not supposed to be psychologists. Furthermore, the motives of other types of
perpetrators are not questioned so they question why motive should matter in cases of honor
violence.
Turkish police offices, on the other hand, argued that cultural awareness training is
important for responding to honor violence. It is difficult, they explained, to understand how to
respond to a type of crime that is not present in a police officers’ native culture. Interestingly,
some police officers from western Turkey discussed their confusion when assigned to work in
eastern Turkey. For them, cultures varied so greatly between the east and the west, and they
would have appreciated training on how to deal with these cultural differences on a day-to-day
basis. Similarly, police officers in both Turkey and England discussed the potential for
international training collaborations. Some responders noted, however, that it is important to
keep in mind that investing in training and then rotating police officers to new departments is a
waste of resources.
Prevention
Responders had many ideas for the prevention of honor violence. Almost two thirds of
the total sample argued that change must occur at the societal level in order for any form of
violence against women to be prevented. As discussed in Chapter 7.2, many responders argued
that one way to do this is through education. For example, a Program Manager at the Mayor’s
Office in London stated
“I think schools should be teaching children, and young people about healthy
relationships… different forms of violence against women and girls, what the law is in
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the UK, what the consequences are, what the impact is, trying to do some of the, kind of,
challenging attitudes, letting people know, you know, what support is out there for
victims.”
The Southall Black Sisters (2014) recommended that the Personal, Health, and Social Education
(PHSE) program national curriculum include modules on forced marriage and other forms of
violence against BME women and girls. More generally, they recommend that BME women’s
organizations that are engaging in prevention work within communities receive more funding
and support. Responders in this study also recommended that women must be educated about
their rights, especially among immigrant populations. If women are educated about their rights,
they will become empowered and better equipped to seek help when experiencing honor
violence.
Involving community leaders and citizens in responding to honor violence was suggested
by many responders, because these individuals know what will work best for their community.
Several responders, especially Turkish police officers, suggested using religious leaders to help
prevent honor violence. This is important, they argued, because many people do not have a clear
understanding of their religion. Many people believe that their religion condones, or even
expects, honor violence. They believe that people are more likely to listen to religious leaders
about this sensitive subject than they are police officers. Building relationships between the
police, other agencies, and the community, as well as cultural capital within the community, can
also serve as prevention measures. Additionally, a Chief Superintendent with the WMP argued
that greater community involvement lessens the burden on the police, in that
“Every officer I've got preventing means they're not investigating crime or responding to
victims. So, if you're stripping the police back, more, more, more… we've got to deal with
problems it presents us. And it's really easy to sort of throw a comment that prevention is
better than cure, yea, but, if you're saying, ‘Shall I go to the school and educate all of
these people? Or, in the front office there's a victim of honor-based violence that is
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waiting to see me?’ Any member would probably go to see the victim. It's a choice, I've
got to deal with the victim.”
Preventing honor violence through education and community engagement is also noted
by many other scholars and practitioners (e.g., Kvinnforum, 2005; Roberts, 2014; Southall Black
Sisters, 2014). Kvinnform (2005), for example, suggest working in schools to not only give
students the tools necessary to seek help, but also to provide discussion forums, engage in role
play and group work concerning gender roles, and information on the harmful nature of gossip.
They also endorse training responders (e.g., police officers, social workers, teachers) to identify
potential situations of honor violence and be aware of risk; creating youth centers; engaging
more men in prevention efforts; and committing to more long-term initiatives.
Although it is often argued that a change in attitudes is needed to prevent honor violence
(e.g., Kvinnforum, 2005; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007), Roberts (2014) argues that the focus is too
often on patriarchy or culture as the root causes of honor violence. He suggests using the Theory
of Planned Behavior (TPB) as a framework for prevention and intervention. TPB was proposed
to account for the mechanism through which attitudes and beliefs lead to intentions to act, as
well as provide an explanation for why individuals do not always engage in behaviors that would
be expected based on their attitudes and beliefs.
In terms of honor violence, Roberts (2014) argues that environment can serve as a means
of prevention. For example, when individuals who believe that honor violence is acceptable are
living in an environment where others do not share their beliefs, then the social pressure to
commit honor violence can be alleviated. Roberts suggests that community education programs
can achieve this goal by raising awareness, changing beliefs concerning honor, highlighting the
harmful effects that honor violence has on victims and communities, and providing alternative
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ways of responding to perceived honor violations. Educational programs should then be led by
community members or individuals who are considered insiders.
Effective risk assessment can also be used to remove the victim from the situation, as
well as engage law enforcement to monitor the situation thereby reducing the opportunity to
commit honor violence. Roberts (2014) suggests that target hardening may prove effective. This
may include training professionals in the identification of honor violence (e.g., teachers, law
enforcement, social service employees), enacting strict legal sanctions against committing honor
violence, and ensuring attentive law enforcement will also make individuals less likely to
commit honor violence. Very little research has been conducted to examine effective methods of
preventing honor violence, but TBP may provide a useful framework for beginning the process.
Others suggestions for future prevention research are discussed in Chapter 8.3.
Legislative Responses
Although there is currently a global debate on whether honor violence should be a
separate crime under the penal code, neither Turkey nor England has taken that step. It has been
up for discussion in England, however, where forced marriage has recently become a criminal
offense. More than a quarter of British responders suggested that other countries institute Forced
Marriage Protection Orders (FMPO). Responders in this study also generally agreed that there
should be serious legal responses to honor violence. There was disagreement, however, as to
whether or not this should be accomplished through stronger legislation specifically targeting
honor violence.
Scholars addressing this issue typically argue that creating a separate crime for honor
violence would result in non-response based on multiculturalism (e.g., Meetoo & Mirza, 2007),
as well as cause discriminatory and xenophobic responses (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 2011; Korteweg &
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Yurdakul, 2009; Siddiqui, 2005). Young (2007) argues that the othering of certain groups leads
to social exclusion that manifests in false binaries (e.g., victims vs. criminals, natives vs.
immigrants, society at large vs. the underclass). In terms of criminal justice policy applications,
socially excluding certain groups implies that one group engages in crime where others do not.
This creates the illusion that certain types of crime are abnormal and prevalent only among
certain groups, who then become “scapegoats” (p.p. 42) for specific social problems. “Their
portrayal is presented in an extraordinarily stereotypical fashion which bears little relationship to
reality” (p.p. 42). I argue that this is especially true in perceived cultural crimes like honor
violence, when in fact violence against women is one of the most prevalent types of crime across
all cultures, races, ethnicities, and nationalities. For this reason, in the next section I argue that
honor violence should not be treated with separate legislation in the United States. Rather, honor
violence should be recognized as part of the continuum of violence against women.
Although I expected that there would be strong support for making honor violence a
separate crime under the penal code within the criminal justice and social service organizations,
this was not the case. Most responders in this study argued against creating a separate law for
honor violence, discussing separate legislation in much the same way. For them, creating a
separate crime gives the appearance that crimes motivated by honor more serious, exotic, and
barbaric than other crimes. This also creates hierarchies of perpetrators who are “more well
behaved than others”. British responders argued that creating a separate crime for honor
violence would result in othering, because honor violence is considered by most people to be
“brown people’s crimes” and cause Islamaphobia. These responders went so far as to say that
they do not trust the motivation for creating a separate crime, in that there is the chance that the
othering is deliberate.
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Responders also added to the discussion in many ways. Several Turkish responders
argued that creating a separate crime for honor violence would provide justification for the crime
by reproducing the patriarchal values that cause violence against women. For many responders,
separate legislation simply is not practical. Most responders argued that the crimes currently
listed under the penal code are sufficient for arresting and prosecuting offenders. If laws were
used correctly, there would be no need for special legislation.
Additionally, some responders argued that the word “honor” is too subjective to be used
in legal frameworks. Honor is defined in many different ways depending on the individual,
community, and country, thus trying to execute laws against honor violence in a universal
manner would be very difficult. The same case could be decided in too many different ways
depending on the perpetrators, prosecutors, judges, and juries definitions of honor and honor
violence.
Other responders argued that legislating against everything is an excuse for doing nothing
of substance. Legislating does not change behavior or prevent honor violence, therefore
additional work needs to be done to prevent these offenses. Creating a separate crime for honor
violence further fragments the response to violence against women, which many responders
argued exists on a continuum. Compartmentalization does not help fight violence against women
in the long run. The focus, rather, should be on understanding the role that patriarchy plays in all
manifestations of violence against women throughout the world. Globalization has brought
different types of violence against women to the world’s attention, but attempting to categorize
them as cultural weakens institutional and societal responses. A few British responders further
argued that such a specific crime would reduce the options available to victims and responders in
cases of honor violence. As one responder stated “justice is done for people, not to people.”

	
  

293	
  

Very few responders argued that there should be a separate crime for honor violence.
Several British responders noted that this has actually been considered in the UK, but was never
instituted (also noted in Idriss & Abbas, 2001). Those who were in favor of a separate crime for
honor violence stated that it would be easier to charge perpetrators with offenses that are not
currently against the law (e.g., constant surveillance, psychological abuse) but eventually
culminate in serious violence. These responders also noted that having a separate crime for honor
would provide deterrence.
There was a divide, however, on thoughts about making honor an aggravating factor at
sentencing. More than a quarter of responders in the total sample argued that honor could be an
aggravating factor at sentencing, rather than a separate crime. In the UK, honor is not currently
considered an aggravating factor and British responders in both criminal justice and social
service professions tended to argue that there is no clear rationale for considering honor an
aggravating factor. Under the customary killing code in Turkey, however, honor can be
considered an aggravating factor at sentencing and most Turkish social service professionals
agreed with this approach. For them, this was a way to prevent honor from being used as a
mitigating factor.
What is interesting about both countries is the trend towards honor as an aggravating
factor has only occurred over the last five to ten years. Previously, honor was often used as a
mitigating factor at sentencing in both countries because honor violence was considered a
cultural custom for which perpetrators should not be held accountable. More specifically, honor
violations were considered “unjust provocations”, especially in Turkey where honor was literally
defined as an unjust provocation until the New Turkish Penal Code came into effect in 2005.
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Finally, many responders (as well as Southall Black Sisters, 2014) argued that any
response to honor violence should include practices that are compatible with human rights
conventions and declarations, especially the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Briefly, member states of CEDAW agree to commit
to ending discrimination of women through a series of measures mandated by the United Nations.
This includes opposing forms of gender discrimination that are considered cultural or traditional
(UN Women, 2014).
More specifically, one Turkish responder argued that there has been a tendency in
European countries for immigrants to get reduced sentences based on multiculturalism. The
argument is that immigrants have different religions and cultures than the dominant society,
which forces them to commit crimes. She opposes this logic and has argued in international
forums that perceived cultural codes should never be used to mitigate or legitimate violence
against women. She specifically cites the UK for this practice, and further argues that all UN
agreements should be applied to all crimes against women all over the world without exception.
In sum, less than one quarter of the Turkish sample recommended using the Turkish
model, and a similar amount argued that Turkey should not be used as a model. Those who
argued that Turkey should not be used as a model stated that the U.S. and Turkey are too
different culturally. More than half of the British sample recommended using their model, while
only two responders did not. One responder cautioned against simply lifting a model, however,
because the local context will always be different. An American response would have to reflect
those differences. For them, the UK model is not perfect but is a good starting point.
The long-term goal is to change the societal perception of honor violence, and all
violence against women. The discussion led by feminist scholars pushing for gender-based
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violence to be framed universally, rather than culturally, is not new. The problem has been
gaining acknowledgement of the need for effective policies targeting the different ways that
violence is experienced by women and girls, without having these discussions of difference used
to essentialize minority groups (Montoya & Agustin, 2013). This, however, is exactly what has
occurred in the EU over the past several decades (Kantola, 2010; Montoya, 2009; Montoya &
Agustin, 2013). Montoya & Agustin (2013) argue that while the EU has dedicated efforts to
address violence against women, these efforts have unfortunately focused on violence that is
perceived to be cultural. This allows Western European countries to retain the moral high ground
while placing the focus on “others” who are violent in a cultural way that is somehow more
reprehensible than other forms of violence against women.
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CHAPTER 8: RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1: Recommendations for an American Response to Honor Violence
Taking all of these arguments and suggestions into consideration, I make several
recommendations for responding to honor violence in the U.S. Best practices cannot simply be
imported from Turkey and the UK to be used in the US. The cultures and legal systems within
each country are very different and, as Young (2011) argues, it is not appropriate to assume that
the conclusions drawn from research in one country precisely translates to the situation in
another country. These models can, however, serve as guidance. The U.S. can learn from past
mistakes and the methods that have been previously tried. Generally, I would not recommend
establishing a specific response to honor violence. According to Montoya & Agustin (2013) and
Smith (2005), more inclusionary policies are needed to combat violence against women. This
approach would address the different ways that women experience violence equally, without
stigmatizing specific groups of people (Christensen & Siim, 2010; Montoya & Agustin, 2013;
Roggeband & Verloo, 2007).
Definitions
Any institutional response should begin with clear definitions. I suggest beginning with a
definition of honor. It was clear from this study that responders were unsure of how to define
honor, even though the concept is considered a normal part of society. Peyton’s (2014, p.p. 4)
definition of honor may be most helpful for responders, which states that “’honor’ should then be
seen in terms of a measure of reputation that is both generated and policed through social
interactions.” Individualistic and collective constructions of honor can be explained simply and
clearly, along with an explanation of why it is important to understand. Responders coming from
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cultures that are considered individualistic may have a difficult time comprehending honor
violence.
Many British responders expressed this sentiment, which can lead to othering in that they
associate honor violence with irrational, backward, and exotic behavior. Demystify honor
violence by explaining that in families with collective constructions of honor, the behavior of
one family member reflects on each individual member of the family. Ask responders to place
themselves in the shoes of a person who believes in collective honor- how does your perception
change if your honor depends on the behavior of your sister? This can be used to explain why the
risk level in cases of honor violence is so high, as well as teach responders to understand
difference.
Responders should then be provided with a clear definition of honor violence. This
immediately becomes murky, in that honor violence is defined interchangeably as domestic or
family violence. The problem, however, is that honor violence does not completely fit into either
category. Interpersonal violence is the over-arching category for any violence committed by one
individual against another. Domestic and family violence, as well as violence in other settings
and between acquaintances or strangers, naturally fall within this over-arching category (Lawson,
2013). Domestic violence is often defined as abuse between current and former intimate partners,
which has led to use of the more specified term “intimate partner violence” (Buzawa et al., 2012;
Lawson, 2013; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). Family violence includes abuse between
intimate partners, parents, and other non-nuclear family members (Lawson, 2013).
Thus, honor violence is neither domestic nor family violence, but rather a form of
interpersonal violence that can be perpetrated by intimate partners, family members, or
community members. This is not to say that honor violence should be its own stand-alone
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category of crime, but rather conceptualized simply as a form of interpersonal violence. It is also
important to recognize that while honor violence is most often perpetrated against women and
girls, it is also a form of violence that affects men and boys. When men and boys are victims of
honor violence, it usually for two reasons. The first is that the male was involved in the female’s
honor violation in some way (e.g., engaged in sex before marriage, or committed adultery). In
this way, the male is the secondary victim of honor violence. The second situation occurs when a
male victim admits to being (or is suspected to be) homosexual. These forms of honor violence
against men are far less common, however, thus from an advocacy standpoint it is
understandable to argue that honor violence is a form of violence against women because women
and girls are usually the targets.
For responders, however, it is imperative to understand the full range of honor violence.
Thus, I suggest starting with the definition provided by the Association of Chief Police Officers’
(ACPO, 2008, p. 30), which defines honor violence as a gender-neutral “crime or incident which
has or may have been committed to protect or defend the honour of the family and/or
community.” While I agree with Peyton (2014) that this definition is recursive in that it defines
honor violence as an offense being motivated by honor, I also believe that responders need a
clear, simple, and succinct starting point. Trainers cannot lean entirely on this definition without
explaining the elements that differentiate honor violence from other crimes.
Before describing the specific definitional elements of honor violence, it is important to
address my views on creating a sub-category for this group of offenses. I argue that violence
against women should be viewed as a continuum of criminal and non-criminal offenses. It is
more helpful to conceptualize violence against women in terms of human rights rather than
culture. At the same time, responders do need to understand context. I do not think that
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understanding the context of honor violence must always result in othering, stigmatizing, or
discriminatory practices.
According to Montoya and Agustin (2013) it is possible to consider context while
avoiding ethnocentrism. I argue that violence against women should be defined as universal and
pervasive, while also understanding that this violence is experienced differently depending on
the context. The short-term goal is to teach responders to understand context and difference,
while avoiding othering. All violence against women is manifested culturally. There are cultural
differences around the world, and these are to be celebrated. This, however, is where responders
begin to walk a fine line with perceived cultural crimes. Responders’ othering is brought on by
their definitions of honor violence, but those definitions can be changed through better training.
Thus, it would be impractical to tell officers not to consider culture and ethnicity when
investigating honor violence because honor violence does not manifest in the same ways among
all populations. There are several key elements for responders to consider. First and foremost,
honor violence is a range of criminal and non-criminal offenses (see Roberts et al., 2014 for an in
depth of discussion of the possible manifestations of honor violence). This range of violent
behavior can escalate quickly, making risk assessment a key part of any response. Honor
violence does tend to occur among cultures that have collective constructions of honor, but is not
limited to Muslim, South Asian, and Middle Eastern populations (e.g., Meetoo & Mirza, 2007;
Roberts et al., 2014). Responders should also be aware that honor violence includes multiple
instances of violence that occurs over a long period of time, is premeditated, and committed by
multiple perpetrators with a variety of motives (e.g., Peyton, 2014; Welchman & Hossain, 2005).
Finally, there are also a variety of indirect and direct causes of honor violence that responders
should be aware of in order to identify the signs of honor violence.
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Criminal Justice Response
- Legal Response
As Montoya and Agustin (2013) argue, it is harmful to emphasize the cultural aspects of
violence against women because this ignores structural gender inequality as a root cause,
marginalizes groups that are already vulnerable, and thus undermines and normalizes all forms of
gender-based violence. For example, there is more outrage concerning honor killings than for
homicides committed in other domestic and family violence situations, which implies othering.
This leads to the call for creating specific laws for honor killings, while all other homicides
resulting from domestic and family violence are addressed under homicide laws that are “gender
neutral” (Montoya & Agustin, 2013).
Similarly, I argue that the best approach is to consider honor violence legislation and
policy within the context of other domestic and family violence policies. In other words, honor
violence is a variation of domestic and family violence, not a distinct form of crime. There are
several reasons for this recommendation. I first question the motivation for making honor
violence a separate crime under the penal code. These arguments seem to hinge on the idea that
honor violence is somehow worse than other forms of domestic and family violence, and should
therefore be punished more harshly. The discussions about codifying honor violence are more
about retribution and punitiveness than deterrence. Hierarchies of perpetrators are created in
perceived cultural crimes, where some perpetrators are considered more civilized than others.
This does not happen in crimes that are not considered cultural, however. For example, serial
killers are considered heinous criminals, yet they do not have a specific criminal code dedicated
to them. They are simply charged with each individual homicide, and have the option of
receiving the death penalty.
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Those who argue for codifying honor violence separately may have the best intentions in
mind, but their logic is often outweighed by the moral outrage. In other words, there is the
danger of excessive sensibility at the expense of sense. Such a separation under the legal code
also insinuates that entire cultures believe that killing for honor is acceptable, and this viewpoint
needs to be corrected. Thus, I argue that making honor violence a separate crime would be
another form of othering.
Second, creating separate legislation does not assist the response in any way. Many
responders who argued that honor violence should be a separate crime did so because honor has
been used as a mitigating factor at trial in the past. As long as current laws clearly state that
honor may not be used as a mitigating factor at sentencing, there is no need for a separate crime
of honor violence. Third, separating honor violence from other forms of domestic and family
violence would be very difficult in practice. Honor and honor violence are both very subjective
concepts, which could lead to differential application of laws. If current laws are used effectively,
there is no need for additional legislation. The crux of the issue is creating an understanding of
honor violence that leads to better investigations, protects victims, and prosecutes perpetrators.
Adding specific legislation does not change the deeper causes of crime, or address the societal
perceptions of honor violence specifically, and violence against women generally. It is an empty
gesture.
In terms of sentencing, I also argue that honor violence should not be an aggravating
factor. Instead, I advise following the guidelines of the Crown Prosecution Service. In the UK,
honor violence falls under the umbrella of domestic violence, but is flagged as honor violence.
This tells the prosecutor what guidelines to follow when prosecuting the case. The perpetrator is
charged with the crime they committed (e.g., murder). Honor is not considered an aggravating
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feature, but judges may consider honor as a motive during sentencing. Judges then use their
discretion whether to give the maximum the sentence within the normal sentencing guidelines.
- Police Response
Turkish and British police officers in this study described their response to cases of honor
violence differently. While Turkish police officers investigate honor violence as they would a
case of domestic violence, British police officers use a series of special procedures in cases of
honor violence. Because of the extremely high levels of risk involved in honor violence, I
recommend following many of the procedures recommended by British police officers. These
suggested procedures should supplement existing police responses.
A recently published book by Roberts, Campbell, and Lloyd (2014) presents an
extremely detailed method for police and prosecutorial responses to honor violence, which can
be used as a guiding resource. Here, I will highlight some specific suggestions that responders in
this study made that I think would translate well to an American response to honor violence.
Roberts et al. (2014) frame their discussion in terms of primary and secondary investigations. I
find that this is a helpful way of thinking about responses to honor violence. They define primary
investigations as the immediate response to honor violence performed by first responders, while
secondary investigations are defined as the long-term investigation performed by specially
trained police officers.
In terms of both primary and secondary investigations, I first argue that it is not necessary
to have a special department for honor violence. It should be enough to train officers on the issue,
and make experts available for consultation. Standard operating procedures should be established
and followed closely. These procedures should include a tracking system for monitoring cases of
honor violence, as well as detailed safeguarding strategies and investigation. For example, all
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responders should know that victims should be interviewed privately and should not be sent
home without a protection plan in place. Positive action and mandatory arrest policies should not
apply in cases of honor violence. Victims’ should be given a choice in how to proceed, and
responders should respect these choices to the best of their ability within the confines of the law.
Police officers should be aware of referrals they can make to social service agencies or NGO’s
for further assistance. This information can be disseminated in a variety of formats (e.g., booklets
or websites).
In terms of primary investigations, first responders should be trained to contact a
specialist within their department immediately. A case file should be opened, even if no criminal
activity is being reported, and flagged in case of future violence. If possible, first responders can
conduct an initial risk assessment for direction on how to proceed. In secondary investigations,
specialist police officers can conduct further risk assessments both initially and throughout the
duration of the investigation. As Roberts et al. (2014) note, risk levels change over time and must
constantly be updated. For this to be effective, police officers must understand the patterns of
risk escalation in cases of honor violence. Part of the risk assessment process can be asking the
victim to provide a family tree, in which they identify who may be an ally or a potential
perpetrator.
Secondary investigations should also include the creation of a safety plan. This can go in
two different directions. For victims who want to leave home, police officers should be ready to
refer victims to a local shelter or take the necessary steps to arrange relocating the victim to
another city if there is a high risk of violence. If the victim wants to return home, police officers
can develop scheduled check in phone calls, which include code words; flag the victims address
and phone number as potential honor violence to initiate an immediate response; provide the
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victim with a cell phone for emergencies; and establish if there is anyone else who needs
safeguarding (e.g., siblings, children). I also suggest establishing Forced Marriage Protection
Orders because this provides civil remedies and protections to victim, but I do not think that the
criminalization of forced marriage is necessary.
Social Service/NGO
Social service agencies and non-governmental organizations already provide a wide
range of service such as legal support, shelter, healthcare, psychological support, job training,
education, and childcare. In terms of honor violence, the intake process is very important.
Responders should try to understand the violence the victim is experiencing and how they want
to proceed. In some cases, women simply want to discuss their options. This may or may not
include reporting violence to the police. Some victims prefer seeking help only from NGO’s
because they want to have more control over what steps are taken (e.g., choosing not to press
charges). Once various plans of action are discussed, responders can provide advice and referrals
to other organizations if necessary.
I argue that social service agencies and NGO’s should conduct risk assessments to
determine what types of steps should be taken to protect the victim. Support services could also
include helping the victim through the criminal justice process, such as filing a claim with the
police, meeting with prosecutors, attending court with the victim, and providing interpreters if
the victim does not speak the language. Survivor Advisory Panels could be assembled to
integrate the voice of the victim into responses.
Multi-Agency Response
I recommend creating a holistic, multi-agency response. British MARACs provide a good
model for beginning collaboration between agencies. Roberts et al. (2014) suggest that for risk
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assessments to be effective all agencies must share information, which can be accomplished
through information sharing agreements. I want reiterate that victims should be given options
whenever possible, and those options have to be realistic and helpful. Victims cannot be
expected to give up everything without being offered any type of support services or follow up.
All organizations responding to honor violence should receive training in violence
against women. Many responders in this study noted that training was severely lacking for them,
which is why they often feel unprepared to deal with cases of honor violence. This was
especially true of police first responders. It is imperative that first responders be trained to
recognize honor violence, because they are the initial point of contact for victims. Based off of
responders’ preferences, I would suggest beginning training with computer-based modules for
background preparatory information. This should then be followed by in-person training, which
is interactive and includes case studies. Trainers should have expert knowledge of honor violence.
This may include experienced police officers, representatives from women’s NGO’s, activists,
and survivors when appropriate. Refresher courses should be offered.
Trainings should go beyond procedure, and include instruction on how to locate
additional information and resources. Responders can be informed of the challenges they may
experience in these types of cases (e.g., multiple perpetrators, family collusion, uncooperative
victims and witnesses, lack of evidence), and how to address these challenges. Responders
should be aware of the barriers that victims face in seeking help, as well as why victims may be
reluctant to seek help.
I do not, however, recommend cultural awareness training for responses to honor
violence. This would be difficult because honor violence occurs in many different cultures, and
may also result in othering. I argue that it is more important to train responders to recognize the
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signs of honor violence and act accordingly. This would include training officers to understand
that not all cases of domestic or family violence from South Asian or Middle Eastern populations
are honor violence. There is a fine line between othering and acknowledging difference.
Training should also address not only the importance of confidentiality, and but also
methods of confidentiality. It would be especially helpful to train a few specialists in police,
legal, social service, government, and non-governmental organizations, who can be called in to
advise on cases. Perhaps an experts network could be established. When possible, American
responders could learn from foreign organizations that have established responses to honor
violence.
A long-term goal of a multi-agency response should include educational programs in
schools grades K through 12. As noted in the previous section, age appropriate information can
be provided to students concerning gender equality, healthy relationships, and family violence. I
would not target schools in specific ethnic enclaves that are typically associated with honor
violence. Violence against women is a universal problem and if real change is to be enacted,
social constructions of gender and violence have to change at the societal level. Although I argue
that honor violence should be considered a form of interpersonal violence rather than family
violence, explaining honor violence as one possible manifestation of family violence may
provide a means of integrating prevention programs into all schools rather than schools with
specific ethnic populations. In this way, the issue is framed as one that affects families of many
different backgrounds without engaging in othering.
Finally, I recommend that organizations providing responses to honor violence be
evaluated to ensure that they are implementing effective programs and responses. With the
growing trend towards evaluating best practices within American criminal justice institutions, it
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may be possible for organizations to reach out to researchers who would be interested in
evaluating their programs and assist with improving responses. Like Roberts et al. (2014), I
argue that appropriate institutional responses to honor violence are important not only for
helping the victim and prosecuting the perpetrator, but also for instilling confidence in the
communities that are often stigmatized to seek help.
8.2: Limitations
This study is not without limitations. First and foremost, case studies are difficult to
generalize (Flick, 2009; Patton 2002; Yin, 2009). All findings are based on a relatively small
sample of key stakeholders living in two countries with specific laws and policies pertaining to
honor violence. Thus, the results of this study may not be generalizeable. Second, differences in
language sometimes posed a problem. Although English is widely spoken in Turkey, it is not a
primary language. In many cases, research assistants had to complete interviews with key
stakeholders. In many of these interviews, my research assistant would translate the respondent’s
answer to the question, and I would instruct them on which question to ask next. Simultaneous
translation was not always possible due to respondent time restraints, however, thus I sometimes
had to trust my research assistants to complete the interviews without my guidance.
Turkish respondents often had very limited time to talk, which presented a third
limitation. This caused the interviews to often be rushed, and did not allow for all of the
questions to be asked. Additionally, not all answers were probed as they were in the British
interviews. Fourth, interviews may be negatively affected by personal or respondent bias, the
emotional state of the interviewer or respondent, respondent recall error, and any ulterior motives
that the respondent may have. It is also important to note that this research is based on what I
learned from others, and may not be an accurate depiction of the institutional response. The
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takeaway, however, is that responders are confused about both the response and their role in the
response. A sixth limitation concerned the design of the vignettes. The vignettes were designed
to be open-ended in an attempt to obtain a natural response concerning procedure and whether
othering was occurring. They were too open-ended, however, and did not provide the
opportunity to examine othering as hoped. Future research should use close-ended questions to
guide responders through the hypothetical situation.
Seventh, I did not have access to police, court, or social service case files as I had hoped.
Lack of access prevented the examination of patterns of institutional responses and key actors in
these responses, outcomes of similar cases, and characteristics of the victims and perpetrators, all
of which could better inform institutional responses. Additionally, triangulation was limited
since these records could not be compared to the interviews and answers to vignettes (Patton,
2002; Yin, 2009). Finally, I did not interview the victims or perpetrators of honor violence. This
study will therefore lack the perspective of the population that institutional responses to honor
violence are targeted to.
8.3: Future Research
Several areas for future research became apparent throughout this study. Responders in
this study were chosen for interview based on their professional experience in cases of honor
violence. I also had the opportunity, however, to interview several first responders. During these
interviews, it became evident that these responders had no experience with or training on honor
violence. In fact, a few said the only information they had pertaining to honor violence was
learned from the media. This contradicts the beliefs of higher-level responders interviewed for
this study, who were under the impression that all first responders received training on honor
violence. Future research should further investigate first responders experiences with honor
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violence (or lack thereof). This is an especially important area of research, since first responders
are the first point of contact for victims.
Two very interesting ideas for prevention were noted in this study that should be explored
for honor violence prevention research. Some responders argued that models currently used to
address forced genital mutilation (FGM) could be adapted for honor violence responses.
Responders described these interventions as focusing on changing societal perceptions and
acceptance of FGM, so that the practice will eventually cease to exist. In other words, the focus
is on prevention at the community level rather than prosecution. Additionally, many responders
argued that the media should be used more positively and responsibly in their coverage of honor
violence. For example, one responder stated “that’s the key in terms of the media- media as
primary prevention.” Several responders mentioned working honor violence into the storylines of
popular television shows to raise awareness. Others noted the changing discussions of violence
against women more generally in television and movies. Future research should explore how
prevention using the media can be accomplished.
Evaluation research is definitely lacking in regards to programs, polices, and institutional
procedures concerning honor violence. Part of this research should include speaking to victims
who have sought help at criminal justice, social service, and non-governmental organizations to
examine their experiences as well as suggestions for future responses. Finally, future research
should examine honor violence among male and LGBTQ victims.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION
This dissertation examines institutional responses to honor violence. In order to provide
effective methods of intervention and prevention, it is important to understand honor violence in
different contexts and extract the commonalities and differences between societies, cultures,
religions, and ethnicities. As Mohanty (2002) states, “the challenge is to see how differences
allow us to explain the connections and border crossings better and more accurately, how
specifying difference allows us to theorize universal concerns more fully” (p. 505).
A problem with all major disciplines is that each tends to ignore the other. Theories are
created, forgotten, and then reinvented. The same problem occurs with institutional responses to
social problems cross-nationally, especially in different legal jurisdictions. This study sheds light
on institutional responses to honor violence in two different countries in order to more fully
understand how and why specific countries respond to honor violence. This study adds to the
existing literature in several ways. First, this study examines institutional responses to
populations who are often marginalized, stigmatized, and hard to reach. This study also examines
the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional responses of Turkey and England in order to
best inform an American response to honor violence. This multi-disciplinary and cross-national
approach can also be applied to a wide range of social problems beyond honor violence. Third,
this study examines whether responders in each country are engaging in othering in their
responses to honor violence. I concluded that Turkish responders tend to engage in conservative
othering, British responders tend to engage in liberal othering, and police officers are more likely
to engage in othering than social service/NGO responders.
The fourth benefit of this study is the conclusion that labeling honor violence as a crime
that is separate from other forms of domestic and family violence is not in the best interest of the
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victims and perpetrators of honor violence. Additionally, a discussion of how this separation
promotes discriminatory institutional responses that are more beneficial to national agendas is
provided. Like Young (2011), I argue that there is a tendency in criminal justice policy to
segregate groups that are viewed as morally lacking and inferior to the majority population. This
becomes more of a problem as societies rapidly diversify, and is especially relevant to perceived
cultural crimes like honor violence. Here, we become obsessed with identifying and focusing on
difference rather than recognizing the similarities between cultures.
I argue that in terms of honor violence, however, patriarchy and control are the ties that
bind each culture together at the global level. This leads to a better understanding of why honor
violence should be discussed in terms of universal human rights rather than a culturally specific
form of violence against women. This research, therefore, contributes to a framework for
policymakers, law enforcement, social service organizations, and NGO’s to address honor
violence at the domestic and international level, as well as for the study of honor violence in
other nations. Finally, understanding institutional responses to multi-cultural populations can be
used to inform best practices for responses to violence against women in the United States.	
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APPENDIX A: Interview Schedule
Introduction Script
Hello, thanks for meeting with me today. I am currently conducting my doctoral dissertation
research on institutional responses to honor violence, and I’d like to talk with you about your
opinions and professional experiences concerning honor violence. You were chosen to
participate in this study [or ‘were referred to me by Professor… for participation in this study’]
because of your experience with responding to honor violence.
The best way to learn about your thoughts and experiences is for you to tell me about them, in as
much detail as possible. So I will ask you some questions, but I would like for you to do most of
the talking today. If any of the questions make you feel uncomfortable, please let me know and
we can move on to another question. You do not have to answer any question that you don’t
want to, and you can stop the discussion at any time. You will not be identified by name in this
study. Do you mind if I audio-record this interview? Do you have any questions before we
begin?
Demographic Information
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Full Name
Sex
Date of Birth
How do you describe yourself in terms of racial or ethnic identity?
Are you originally from this city?
• Probe: Where did you grow up?

Interview questions will include but not be limited to:
1. What are your current role(s) and duties in this organization?
2. Does your organization have a working definition of honor violence? How would you define
it?
3. Do you think honor violence is related to religion in any way?
4. What do you think of the term “honor violence”? Would you change the term “honor
violence” to something else if you had the chance?
5. How would you describe honor violence in your city?
• Probe: Is it a more serious problem here than in other cities?
• Probe: In what ways?
6. As far as you know, has honor violence increased, decreased, or stayed the same in your city
over the past few years?
• Probe: Why do you think that is?
7. As a professional, can you describe your experience in responding to honor violence?
8. Are there any laws concerning honor violence in [Turkey, England]? How does the legal
system handle cases of honor violence?
9. Can you summarize your organization’s strategy for addressing cases of honor violence?
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10. What do you think of the ways that your organization addresses honor violence?
• Probe: Does it focus in the right areas, on the right factors?
• Probe: What is your opinion on the way victims are handled by your (and other)
organizations?
• Probe: What is your opinion on the way perpetrators are handled by your (and other)
organizations?
11. Who are typically the victims of honor violence that your organization helps?
• Probe: Is there a typical description of a victim of honor violence that you could give?
• Probe: Are the problems of victims of honor violence different from the other
individuals that your organization provides services to?
12. What services does your organization offer to victims of honor violence?
• Probe: Are these services sufficient to meet the needs of this population?
13. Does your organization have any measures to try to prevent honor violence?
14. In general, can you tell me anything about the people who commit honor violence?
15. Does your organization work with other organizations on cases of honor violence?
• Probe: Which organizations?
16. In a larger sense, how effective is the current response to honor violence in your country?
• Probe: Do you think criminal justice organizations are effective?
o Social service organizations?
o Educational organizations?
17. Do victims of honor violence face any particular barriers in seeking help?
18. What do you think is the most successful of the responses to honor violence in your country?
19. What changes would you make right now that would make your efforts more successful?
• Probe: Can you do this? If not, why?
20. Is there any other information concerning honor violence that you think is important for me
to know?
Thank you so much for your time! A transcript of this interview can be made available to you if
you wish, as well as any paper that results from this interview. Please contact me if you have any
additional questions. [Each respondent is given a business card]
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APPENDIX B: Vignettes
Vignettes for England
Directions
Please read the following scenario and then answer the question following to the scenario.
South Asian Family Social Service Organization Version
A social service organization in England must manage the following case regarding a South
Asian family:
Geetanjali N. comes from a Hindi family living in England. Without her parents’ knowledge,
Geetanjali had a fling with Vinayak, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with
him, she finds herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the
young man in question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old,
and cannot imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Geetanjali fears that there
will be an intense response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry
Vinayak. How would you handle this case if Geetanjali came to your organization for help?
English Family Social Service Organization Version
A social service organization in England must manage the following case regarding a family
from London:
Emily N. comes from a Protestant family living in England. Without her parents’ knowledge,
Emily had a fling with David, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with him, she
finds herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the young man
in question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old, and cannot
imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Emily fears that there will be an intense
response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry David. How would you
handle this case if Emily came to your organization for help?
Directions
Please read the following scenario and then answer the question following to the scenario.
South Asian Family Police Department Version
A police department in England must respond to the following complaint regarding a South
Asian family:
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Geetanjali N. comes from a Hindi family living in England. Without her parents’ knowledge,
Geetanjali had a fling with Vinayak, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with
him, she finds herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the
young man in question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old,
and cannot imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Geetanjali fears that there
will be an intense response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry
Vinayak. How would you handle this case if Geetanjali came to your police department for help?
English Family Police Department Version
A police department in England must manage the following case regarding a family from
London:
Emily N. comes from a Protestant family living in England. Without her parents’ knowledge,
Emily had a fling with David, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with him, she
finds herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the young man
in question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old, and cannot
imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Emily fears that there will be an intense
response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry David. How would you
handle this case if Emily came to your police department for help?
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Vignettes for Turkey
Directions
Please read the following scenario and then answer the question following to the scenario.
Kurdish Family Social Service Organization Version
A social service organization in Turkey must manage the following case regarding a Kurdish
family:
Zilan N. comes from a Kurdish family living in Turkey. Without her parents’ knowledge, Zilan
had a fling with Halil, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with him, she finds
herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the young man in
question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old, and cannot
imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Zilan fears that there will be an intense
response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry Halil. How would you
handle this case if Zilan came to your organization for help?
Turkish Family Social Service Organization Version
A social service organization in Turkey must manage the following case regarding a family from
Istanbul (or Diyarbakir):
Ayla N. comes from a Turkish family living in Istanbul. Without her parents’ knowledge, Ayla
had a fling with Ahmet, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with him, she finds
herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the young man in
question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old, and cannot
imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Ayla fears that there will be an intense
response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry Ahmet. How would
you handle this case if Ayla came to your organization for help?
Directions
Please read the following scenario and then answer the question following to the scenario.
Kurdish Family Police Department Version
A police department in Turkey must respond to the following complaint regarding a Kurdish
family:
Zilan N. comes from a Kurdish family living in Turkey. Without her parents’ knowledge, Zilan
had a fling with Halil, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with him, she finds
herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the young man in
question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old, and cannot
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imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Zilan fears that there will be an intense
response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry Halil. How would you
handle this case if Zilan came to your police department for help?
Turkish Family Police Department Version
A police department in Turkey must manage the following case regarding a family from Istanbul
(or Diyarbakir):
Ayla N. comes from a Turkish family living in Istanbul/Diyarbakir. Without her parents’
knowledge, Ayla had a fling with Ahmet, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst
with him, she finds herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry
the young man in question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years
old, and cannot imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Ayla fears that there will
be an intense response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry Ahmet.
How would you handle this case if Ayla came to your police department for help?
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